It seems the French do not like the idea of giving to the Turks the option of an independent State with smaller limits, or of a State under Suzeraineté with extended limits, contrary to the treaty, and sending at the same time secret instructions to the Ambassadors to insist upon the entire independence of the new Greek State. The French seem likewise to have been offended at the protocol having been settled between Russia and us, before they were called in to give their opinion. No wonder. Certainly our diplomacy has not succeeded. We have failed in all our objects.
November 13.
Cabinet. I was first called upon to say my say upon the general Indian question. I observed that the present prospective deficiency was one million a year. That until we could ascertain whether that deficiency could be diminished or done away with we were really not ourselves prepared to come to a decision upon the future government of India; nor would Parliament endure that the China trade should be closed upon the country for twenty years more without first inquiring whether it was necessary. The first question was, 'Can we make such a reduction of expenditure, or effect such an increase in income as to enable the Government of India to go on without any assistance direct or indirect from England?' If it can, then we have the China trade in our hands. If it cannot, we have to decide whether the necessary assistance shall be found by means of a continuance of the monopoly or in some other manner.
I stated the increase of two millions in six years in the civil charges of Bengal; that the Court had issued the strongest instructions, and the local Government seemed to have a real intention to curtail expenditure. That I had done something, and should do all I could, investigating every item. Peel suggested a commission. I said that had occurred to me last year. The Duke, however, objected to a commission as really superseding the Governor- General and being the Government. Another objection certainly is the delay. Difficulties would be thrown in its way, and we should at last be obliged to decide without its final report, having thrown away our time here in waiting for it.
I mentioned that the character of the local Government was 'disrespect and disobedience.' That nothing but a long continuance of strict rule could bring India into real subjection. It was this disobedience which was the chief source of increased expenditure. It arose in a great measure from the unequal hand which had been held over them—the indulgence of the Court of Directors—and the great delays in the communication with India arising out of the system of correspondence. I had endeavoured to remedy that, and hoped to get an answer to letters within the year. It was now two years and a half. I had likewise endeavoured to make arrangements for steam communication by the Red Sea. I hoped to be able to send a letter to Bombay in sixty days.
The Cabinet seemed generally to acquiesce in the expediency of only having a Committee this year.
At first they all seemed to think the continuance of the government in the Company a matter of course. I told them that even with the China trade the Government could not now go on without great reductions of expenditure, and that I hoped the Cabinet would not come to a hasty decision upon a question involving so many important political and financial considerations. The present system was not one of great expense, but it was one involving great delay—and delay was expense, and not only expense but abandonment of authority. It was in this point of view that I hoped the Cabinet would look at the question when it came before them.
I mean to go quietly to work; but I mean, if I can, to substitute the King's government for that of the Company. [Footnote: This was not carried out till 1858, after the great mutiny.] I am sure that in doing so I shall confer a great benefit upon India and effect the measure which is most likely to retain for England the possession of India.
We afterwards spoke of the Batta question. I read Lord Wellesley's letter, and stated the opinions of Sir J. Malcolm, Sir Archibald Campbell, and Sir J. Nicholls.
I stated that it seemed the feeling in the army was excited more by the apprehension of further reductions than by the establishment of the half- Batta stations; that if concessions were made to the Bengal army, the other armies would be discontented and further demands would be made.