Memoir of the early campaigns of the Duke of Wellington, in Portugal and Spain, / By an officer employed in his army

by Earl of John Fane Westmorland

These persons conceived that it was possible to enter Madrid; and they are supposed to have purposed, in so doing, to effect a revolution, to displace the government of the Junta Suprema, and to seize it for themselves.

The capital was believed to be the most advantageous place for the execution of these projects; first, because the triumph of its successful deliverance would secure popularity to those who had effected it; and next, because the existing government had ever been most unpopular in that city. With these views, therefore, General Arisaga was ordered to break up at once from his position at La Carolina, and to march directly upon Madrid. This order was neither communicated to Lord Wellington, nor to any of the Spanish generals in the command of other corps.

General Arisaga, in conformity with his instructions, moved with considerable rapidity through the whole of La Mancha, and arrived on the 8th of November upon the Tagus, in the neighbourhood of Ocaña. The French (who were surprised at the boldness of this operation), concentrated their troops behind the Tagus, and after a sharp rencontre with the Spanish advanced guard, upon the 12th, they passed that river, and attacked the Spanish army. General Arisaga had placed his whole force in two columns of battalions, separated by a ravine, and with a corps in advance of considerable strength, which was in possession of a village which covered his front. The French began the engagement by the attack of this village; but, under cover of some ground about it, they turned the right column of the Spanish army, charged it, and in a very short time totally dispersed it. The left column was as yet untouched, but General Arisaga was so confounded by the destruction of his right, that he does not appear to have made any disposition for its retreat, or for the support of the attack that was coming upon it. The Spanish cavalry, which was retiring with considerable precipitation, first threw this corps into confusion by galloping through a considerable portion of it; the French, who were fast coming up with the remainder of it, completed its dispersion; and thus destroyed in a few hours the whole army that had been marched against them. The Spaniards lost their guns, their baggage, their equipments, and out of 45,000 stand of arms, not more than 13,000 were brought back to the Carolina. The loss in killed, wounded, and prisoners, was immense; a great portion of the soldiers, who had dispersed during the action, never returned to the army; so that the greatest number that was ever collected, of individuals who had been present at Ocaña, did not amount to more than 25,000 men.

So decisive a defeat produced great consternation throughout the country; the only considerable army that remained to fight for the cause of Spain had been totally destroyed; and to enlightened and unprejudiced minds, it was no longer doubtful that the French might at any time march, unresisted by any military force, to the walls of Cadiz. This opinion was far, however, from being general in Spain. All true Spaniards were yet bound to believe that the battle of Ocaña was unfortunate from some unforeseen accident; that such was never likely to happen again; and that the forces which were collected at the Carolina would yet form an impenetrable barrier to the advance of the French armies, and protect the Andalusias, till the necessary numbers should be collected to fall with certain destruction upon the forces of the invader. If a doubt was started upon any part of this position, one general answer was given, that a cat could not pass through the defile of Despeña Perros, much less a French army. Thus you were requested to be convinced, that no force the enemy could bring would ever succeed in penetrating to the southward of the Sierra Morena; or in subjugating the people of Andalusia.

Marshal Soult, who had been appointed Major-General of the French armies, a short time before the battle of Ocaña, seized the opportunity, which was offered by the destruction of the central army of Spain, to detach a considerable corps against the Duke del Parque, who had lately succeeded in occupying Salamanca. The French were fortunate enough to bring his army to action at Alba de Tormes, and, in spite of the good conduct of some of his troops, entirely to disperse it. The defeat of this corps laid the north of Portugal open to the incursions of the French; the whole of Castile fell into their possession; Salamanca became a depôt, from whence they could prepare the means of a powerful attack; and there no longer remained a force that could oppose or delay their operations.

Lord Wellington saw the absolute necessity of removing his army to the north of the Tagus, to oppose the invasion which was thus preparing. He had no longer any Spanish armies that he could co-operate with; the only two, of any considerable force, with which he was in communication, had brought destruction upon themselves, without either listening to his counsels, or communicating to him their movements; they were now no longer in a state to be of any assistance to him, nor could he protect them against the powerful reinforcements which were arriving from Germany to the French, and which bid fair to over-run the whole of the Peninsula. The system of war was now to be completely changed. When Lord Wellington entered Spain, the Spaniards had an army of considerable strength, with which he had hoped to co-operate with effect against a comparatively small and extended force of French. The tables were now reversed; the Spanish armies could scarcely be said to have any military existence; they had proved that, while in strength, they were not to be depended upon, much less were they to be looked to for any assistance in their present state. The French were marching an army of more than 100,000 men into the country; so that a defensive war was the only one which could be carried on against them. Lord Wellington was convinced that the hostility of the Spaniards to the French was not to be overcome: although their armies were beaten from the field, yet the determined opposition of the people repelled the yoke which was attempted to be forced upon them. The nature of the country was favourable to a protracted, desultory warfare; and its extent and poverty seemed to bid defiance to a subjection, which, to be made complete, would require a more considerable force than France seemed able to afford, or Spain could produce the means of supporting. As far as experience could lead to any conclusion as to the future, in the new warfare which the Spanish nation was waging against its invaders, there appeared no advantage to the enemy from the occupation of any part of the country, for any period of time. The moment a province was evacuated, it rose in more determined hostility, than it had shewn before its invasion. No advantage accrued to the French from either violent or conciliating measures; they were always looked upon as enemies; and, after months of peaceable occupation, if they exposed themselves unprotected by numbers in the provinces which they had considered as subdued, they were sure of meeting with the same hostility they had from the first experienced.

With this state of things to direct Lord Wellington in the system of warfare upon which he was called upon to decide, he felt no hesitation in prescribing to himself, and to the allies, a conduct which should protract the war; should lead the enemy to extend his forces; should encourage the whole people of the Peninsula to intercept his communications; and should give the governments of the countries engaged in the contest, the opportunity of increasing and improving the more regular means of resistance or attack.

Lord Wellington moved his army in the beginning of December, from the neighbourhood of Badajos to the North of the Tagus. It arrived, in the first weeks of January, in the new cantonments which had been prepared for it; they extended from Coimbra to Pinhel, while a corps, under Lieutenant General Hill, was left at Abrantes. In this position the army went into winter-quarters: it was abundantly supplied, and was employed only in recruiting itself from the dreadful effects of the preceding campaign, and the sickness which had followed it. Head-quarters were placed at Viseu.

While Lord Wellington was employed in this movement, Marshal Soult concentrated the French armies in La Mancha; for the purpose of making an irruption into the southern provinces of Spain.

The British officers who had been at the Carolina were satisfied, that, notwithstanding the boasted impossibility of forcing the Spanish army at the pass of Des Peña Perros, there was in reality nothing easier. The pass itself was strong, but no fortifications, which deserved that name, had been thrown up to defend it. The old road from Madrid, by the Puerto del Rey, was almost unobserved; and the force which was employed to defend the position of the Sierra Morena, which was fifty leagues in extent, did not exceed 25,000 men, most of them the unfortunate fugitives from the battle of Ocaña. With such an army, it would have been impossible for the most able commander to have defended the entry into Andalusia; but even that chance was denied the Spaniards, for they still had General Arisaga at their head. The Junta Suprema was urged to make some exertion to recruit the Spanish forces, and to prepare for the struggle which was fast approaching; but that body could only prove its patriotism by echoing the national cry, that Spaniards were invincible. Several nuns, who believed themselves inspired prophetesses, were produced to the loyal inhabitants of Seville, to assure them, that if ever the French should see the walls of that town, the fire of heaven would fall upon them, before they should reach its gates. In many other towns the same prophetic inspiration descended upon the nuns; they foretold in every instance the destruction which awaited the invaders; but the misfortunes they were themselves to suffer, appear not to have been so correctly foreseen by them. The preparations of the French in La Mancha seemed, however, at last to have roused the Junta from its state of apathy; Seville and the world were called as witnesses of its new vigour, by a decree for the fabrication of 100,000 knives, to be distributed amongst the voluntary defenders of the country. This piece of absurdity will hardly be credited by those who were not at Seville at the moment; yet it is a fact which stands recorded amongst the vigorous measures of the Junta, and will hereafter be a standard to judge of the hands to which the defence of Spain was at that time intrusted. The credit of the Junta, which had been fast declining, was completely destroyed by the promulgation of this decree; to raise itself again in the estimation of the public, it published an order for the assembling of the Cortes; but its race was nearly run, all confidence in it was gone, and a few days more completed the term of its existence.