Retiring to San Lorenzo, after the fight in Callao Bay on the 28th of February, Lord Cochrane occupied the island, and from it blockaded Callao for five weeks. On the island he found thirty-seven Chilian soldiers, whom the Spaniards had made prisoners eight years before. "The unhappy men," he said, "had ever since been forced to work in chains under the supervision of a military guard—now prisoners in turn; their sleeping-place during the whole of this period being a filthy shed, in which they were every night chained by one leg to an iron bar." Yet worse, as he was informed by the poor fellows whom he freed from their misery, was the condition of some Chilian officers and seamen imprisoned in Lima, and so cruelly chained that the fetters had worn bare their ankles to the bone. He accordingly, under a flag of truce, sent to the Spanish Viceroy, Don Joaquim de la Pezuela, offering to exchange for these Chilian prisoners a larger number of Spaniards captured by himself and others. This proposal was bluntly refused by the Viceroy, who took occasion, in his letter, to avow his surprise that a British nobleman should come to fight for a rebel community "unacknowledged by all the powers of the globe." Lord Cochrane replied that "a British nobleman was a free man, and therefore had a right to assist any country which was endeavouring to re-establish the rights of aggrieved humanity." "I have," he added, "adopted the cause of Chili with the same freedom of judgment that I previously exercised when refusing the offer of an admiral's rank in Spain, made to me not long ago by the Spanish ambassador in London."

Except in blockading Callao and repairing his ships little was done by Lord Cochrane during his stay at San Lorenzo. On the 1st of March he went into the harbour again and opened a destructive fire upon the Spanish gunboats, but as these soon sought shelter under the batteries, which the O'Higgins and the Lautaro were not strong enough to oppose, the demonstration did not last long. Unsuccessful also was an attempt made upon the batteries, with the aid of an explosion-vessel, on the 22nd of March. The explosion-vessel, when just within musket-range, was struck by a round shot, and foundered, thus spoiling the intended enterprise. But other plans fared better.

At the beginning of April, Lord Cochrane left San Lorenzo and proceeded to Huacho, a few leagues north of Callao. Its inhabitants were for the most part in sympathy with the republican cause, and the Spanish garrison fled at almost the first gunshot, leaving a large quantity of government property and specie in the hands of the assailants. Much other treasure, which proved very serviceable to the impoverished Chilian exchequer, was captured by the little fleet during a two months' cruise about the coast of Peru, both north and south of Callao. Everywhere, too, the Spanish cause was weakened, and the natives were encouraged to share in the great work of South American rebellion against a tyranny of three centuries' duration. "It was my object," said Lord Cochrane, "to make friends of the Peruvian people, by adopting towards them a conciliatory course, and by strict care that none but Spanish property should be taken. Confidence was thus inspired, and the universal dissatisfaction with Spanish rule speedily became changed into an earnest desire to be freed from it."

Having cruised about the Peruvian coast during April and May, Lord Cochrane returned to Valparaiso on the 16th of June. "The objects of the first expedition," he said, "had been fully accomplished, namely, to reconnoitre, with a view to future operations, when the squadron should be rendered efficient; but more especially to ascertain the inclinations of the Peruvians—a point of the first importance to Chili, as being obliged to be constantly on the alert for her own newly-acquired liberties so long as the Spaniards were in undisturbed possession of Peru. To the accomplishment of these objects had been superadded the restriction of the Spanish naval force to the shelter of the forts, the defeat of their military forces wherever encountered, and the capture of no inconsiderable amount of treasure." That was work enough to be done by four small ships, ill-manned and ill-provisioned, during a five months' absence from Valparaiso; and the Chilians were not ungrateful.

Their gratitude, however, was not strong enough to make them zealous co-operators in his schemes for their benefit. Lord Cochrane was eager to start upon another expedition, in which he hoped for yet greater success. But for this were needed preparations which the poverty and mismanagement of the Chilian Government made almost impossible. He asked for a thousand troops with which to facilitate a second attack on Callao. This force, certainly not a large one, was promised, but, when he was about to embark, only ninety soldiers were ready, and even then a private subscription had to be raised for giving them decent clothing instead of the rags in which they appeared. For the assault on Callao, also, an ample supply of rockets was required. An engineer named Goldsack had gone from England to construct them, and, that there might be no stinting in the work, Lord Cochrane offered to surrender all his share of prize-money. The offer was refused; but, to save money, their manufacture was assigned to some Spanish prisoners, who showed their patriotism in making them so badly that, when tried, they were found utterly worthless. There were other instances of false economy, whereby Lord Cochrane's intended services to his Chilian employers were seriously hindered. The vessels were refitted, however, and a new one, an American-built corvette, named the Independencia, of twenty-eight guns, was added to the number.

After nearly three months' stay at Valparaiso, he again set sail on the 12th of September, 1819. Admiral Blanco was his second in command, and his squadron consisted of the O'Higgins, the San Martin, the Lautaro, the Independencia, the Galvarino, the Araucano, and the Puyrredon, mounting two hundred and twenty guns in all. There were also two old vessels, to be used as fireships.

The fleet entered Callao Roads on the 29th of September. On this occasion there was no subterfuge. On the 30th Lord Cochrane despatched a boat to Callao with a flag of truce, and a challenge to the Viceroy to send out his ships—nearly twice as strong as those of Chili in guns and men—for a fair fight in the open sea. The challenge was bluntly rejected, and an attack on the batteries and the ships in harbour was then planned. On the 1st of October, the smaller vessels reconnoitred the bay, and there was some fighting, in which the Araucano was damaged. Throughout the night of the 2nd, a formidable attack was attempted, in which the main reliance was placed in the Goldsack rockets; but, in consequence of the treacherous handling of the Spanish soldiers who had filled them, they proved worse than useless, doing nearly as much injury to the men who fired them as to the enemy. Only one gunboat was sunk by the shells from a raft commanded by Major Miller, who also did some damage to the forts and shipping. On the night of the 4th, Lord Cochrane amused himself, while a fireship was being prepared, by causing a burning tar-barrel to be drifted with the tide towards the enemy's shipping. It was, in the darkness, supposed to be a much more formidable antagonist, and volleys of Spanish shot were spent upon it. On the following evening a fireship was despatched; but this also was a failure. A sudden calm prevented her progress. She was riddled through and through by the enemy's guns, and, rapidly gaining water in consequence, had to be fired so much too soon that she exploded before getting near enough to work any serious mischief among the Spanish shipping.

By these misfortunes Lord Cochrane was altogether disheartened. The rockets, on which he had chiefly relied, had proved worthless, and, one fireship having been wasted, he did not care to risk the loss of the other. He found too that the Spaniards, profiting by the warning which he had previously given, had so strengthened their booms that it was quite impossible, with the small force at his command, to get at them or to reach the port. His store of provisions, also, was nearly exhausted, and the fresh supply promised from Chili had not arrived. He therefore reluctantly, for the time, abandoned his project for taking Callao.

He continued to watch the port for a few weeks, however, hoping for some chance opportunity of injuring it; and, in the interval, sent three hundred and fifty soldiers and marines, under Lieutenant-Colonel Charles and Major Miller, in the Lautaro, the Galvarino, and the remaining fireship, commanded by Captain Guise, to attack Pisco and procure from it and the neighbourhood the requisite provisions. This was satisfactorily done; but the sickness of many of his men caused his further detention at Santa, whither he had gone from Callao. On the 21st of November the sick were sent to Valparaiso, in the charge of the San Martin, the Independencia, and the Araucano. With the remaining ships, the O'Higgins, the Lautaro, the Galvarino, and the Puyrredon, Lord Cochrane proceeded to the mouth of the River Guayaquil. There, on the 28th of the month, he captured two large Spanish vessels, one of twenty and the other of sixteen guns, laden with timber, and took possession of the village of Puna. At Guayaquil there was another delay of a fortnight, owing to a mutiny attempted by Captains Guise and Spry, whose treacherous disposition has already been mentioned.

Not till the middle of December was he able to escape from the troubles brought upon him by others, and to return to work worthy of his great name and character. Then, however, sending one of his ships, with the prizes, to Valparaiso, and leaving two others to watch the Peruvian coast, he started, with only his flag-ship, upon an enterprise as brilliant in conception and execution as any in his whole eventful history. "The Chilian people," he said, "expected impossibilities; and I. had for some time been revolving in my mind a plan to achieve one which should gratify them, and allay my own wounded feelings. I had now only one ship, so that there were no other inclinations to consult; and I felt quite sure of Major Miller's concurrence where there was any fighting to be done. My design was, with the flag-ship alone, to capture by a coup de main the numerous forts and garrison of Valdivia, a fortress previously deemed impregnable, and thus to counteract the disappointment which would ensue in Chili from our want of success at Callao. The enterprise was a desperate one; nevertheless, I was not about to do anything desperate, having resolved that, unless I was fully satisfied as to its practicability, I would not attempt it. Rashness, though often imputed to me, forms no part of my composition. There is a rashness without calculation of consequences; but with that calculation well-founded, it is no longer rashness. And thus, now that I was unfettered by people who did not second my operations as they ought to have done, I made up my mind to take Valdivia, if the attempt came within the scope of my calculations."