The Life of Thomas, Lord Cochrane, Tenth Earl of Dundonald, Vol. I

by Earl of Thomas Barnes Cochrane Dundonald; H. R. Fox Bourne

Lord Cochrane, as we have seen, accepted this invitation; not, however, without some misgivings, which, in the end, were fully justified. Having quitted Valparaiso on the 18th of January, 1823, he arrived at Rio de Janeiro on the 13th of March. He had not been there a week before he discovered that, while all classes were anxious to secure his aid, the Emperor Pedro I. stood almost alone in the desire to treat him honourably and in a way worthy of his character and reputation. Vague promises were made to him; but, when a statement of his position was asked for in writing, very different terms were employed. He was only to have the rank of a subordinate admiral, with pay of less amount than the Chilian pension that he had resigned. His employment was to be temporary and informal, subjecting him to the chance of dismissal at any moment. When, however, resenting these trickeries, he announced his intention of proceeding at once to Europe, and accepting the Greek service offered to him, a different tone was adopted. Under the Emperor's signature he was appointed, on the 21st of March, First Admiral of the National and Imperial Navy, with emoluments equal to those he had received from Chili.

He did not then know, though he was soon to learn it by hard experience, how strong, even at the imperial court, was the influence of the Portuguese party, and by what meanness and trickery it sought to maintain and augment that influence. "Where the Portuguese party was really to blame," he afterwards said, "was in this,—that, seeing disorder everywhere more or less prevalent, they strained every nerve to increase it, hoping to paralyze further attempts at independence by exposing whole provinces to the evils of anarchy and confusion. Their loyalty also partook more of self-interest than of attachment to the supremacy of Portugal; for the commercial classes, which formed the real strength of the Portuguese faction, hoped, by preserving the authority of the mother country in her distant provinces, to obtain as their reward the revival of old trade monopolies which, twelve years before, had been thrown open, enabling the English traders—whom they cordially hated—to supersede them in their own markets. Being a citizen of the rival nation, their aversion to me personally was undisguised—the more so, perhaps, that they believed me capable of achieving at Bahia, whither the squadron was destined, that irreparable injury to their own cause which the imperial troops had been unable to effect. Had I, at the time, been aware of the influence and latent power of the Portuguese party in the empire, nothing would have induced me to accept the command of the Brazilian navy; for to contend with faction is more dangerous than to engage an enemy, and a contest of intrigue is foreign to my nature and inclination."

Having entered the Brazilian service, however, Lord Cochrane applied himself to his work with characteristic energy and success. He hoisted his flag on board the Pedro Primiero on the 21st of March, and put to sea on the 3rd of April. His squadron consisted of the Pedro Primiero, a fine and well-appointed ship, rated rather too highly for seventy-four guns, commanded by Captain Crosbie; of the Piranga, a fine frigate, entrusted to Captain Jowett; of the Maria de Gloria, a showy but comparatively worthless clipper, mounting thirty-two small guns, under Captain Beaurepaire; of the Liberal, under Captain Garcaõ. He was accompanied by two old vessels, the Guarani and the Real, to be used as fireships. Two other ships of war, the Nitherohy, assigned to Captain Taylor, and the Carolina, were left behind to complete their equipment, and the first of these joined the squadron on its way to Bahia, which, being the nearest of the disaffected provinces, was the first to be subdued.

The coast of Bahia was reached on the 1st of May, and Lord Cochrane was arranging to blockade its capital and port, on the 4th, when the Portuguese fleet came out of the harbour. It comprised the Don Joaõ, of seventy-four guns; the Constitucaõ, of fifty; the Perola, of forty-four; the Princeza Real, of twenty-eight; the Regeneracaõ, the Dez de Fevereiro, the San Gaulter, the Principe de Brazil, and the Restauracaõ, of twenty-six each; the Calypso and the Activa, of twenty-two; the Audaz, of twenty; and the Canceicaõ, of eight; being one line-of-battle ship, five frigates, five corvettes, a brig, and a schooner. Lord Cochrane did not venture with his small and as yet untried force to attack the whole squadron, but he proceeded to cut off the four rearmost ships. This he did with the Pedro Primiero, but, to his disgust, the other vessels, heedless of his orders, failed to follow him. "Had the rest of the Brazilian squadron," he said, "come down in obedience to signals, the ships cut off might have been taken or dismantled, as with the flag-ship I could have kept the others at bay, and no doubt have crippled all in a position to render them assistance. To my astonishment, the signals were disregarded, and no efforts were made to second my operations." The Pedro Primiero, after fighting alone for some time, and during that time even doing but little mischief, by reason of the clumsy way in which her guns were handled, had to be withdrawn.

At that failure Lord Cochrane was reasonably chagrined. Worse than the fact that the Portuguese had escaped uninjured for this once, was the knowledge that he could not hope thoroughly to punish them without first effecting great reform in the materials at his disposal. On the 5th of May he wrote to the Government to complain of the miserable condition of the ships and crews provided for him by the Brazilian Government. "From the defective sailing and manning of the squadron," he said, "it seems to me that the Pedro Primiero is the only one that can assail an enemy's ship-of-war, or act in the face of a superior force so as not to compromise the interests of the empire and the character of the officers commanding. Even this ship, in common with the rest, is so ill-equipped as to be much less efficient than she otherwise would be. Our cartridges are all unfit for service, and I have been obliged to cut up every flag and ensign that could be spared to render them serviceable, so as to prevent the men's arms being blown off whilst working the guns. The guns are without locks. The bed of the mortar which I received on board this ship was crushed on the first fire, being entirely rotten. The fuses for the shells are formed of such wretched composition that it will not take fire with the discharge of the mortar. Even the powder is so bad that six pounds will not throw out shells more than a thousand yards. The marines understand neither gun exercise, the use of small arms, nor the sword, and yet have so high an opinion of themselves that they will not assist to wash the decks, or even to clean out their own berths, but sit and look on whilst these operations are being performed by seamen. I warned the Minister of Marine that every native of Portugal put on board the squadron, with the exception of officers of known character, would prove prejudicial to the expedition, and yesterday we had clear proof of the fact. The Portuguese stationed in the magazine actually withheld the powder whilst this ship was in the midst of the enemy, and I have since learnt that they did so from feelings of attachment to their own countrymen. I enclose two letters, one from the officer commanding the Real, whose crew were on the point of carrying that vessel into the enemy's squadron for the purpose of delivering her up. I have also reason to believe that the conduct of the Liberal yesterday in not bearing down upon the enemy, and not complying with the signal which I had made to break the line, was owing to her being manned by Portuguese. The Maria de Gloria also has a great number of Portuguese, which is the more to be regretted as otherwise her superior sailing, with the zeal and activity of her captain, would render her an effective vessel. To disclose to you the truth, it appears to me that one half of the squadron is necessary to watch over the other half. Assuredly this is a system which ought to be put an end to without delay."

Other indignant complaints of that sort, which need not here be repeated, were reasonably made by Lord Cochrane. The bad equipment of his squadron, both in men and in material, had hindered him, at starting, from achieving a brilliant success over the enemy, and though his subsequent achievements were of unsurpassed brilliance, he was to the end seriously hindered by the wilful and accidental mismanagement of his employers.

Lord Cochrane lost no time, however, in correcting by his own prudent action the evil effects of this mismanagement. Not choosing to run the risk of a second failure, and believing that two good ships would be more serviceable than any number of bad ones, he took his squadron to the Moro San Paulo, where he transferred all the best men and the most serviceable fittings to the flag-ship and the Maria de Gloria. There he left the other vessels to be improved as far as possible, directing that instruction should be given in seamanship to all the incompetent men who showed any promise of being made efficient, and that several small prizes which he had taken on his way from Rio de Janeiro should be turned into fireships for future use. With the two refitted ships he then went back to Bahia, to watch its whole coast and blockade the port.

The wisdom of this course was at once apparent. Several minor captures were made; the supplies of Bahia were cut off, and the enemy's squadron was locked in the harbour for three weeks. Lord Cochrane went to the Moro San Paulo on the 26th, leaving the Maria de Gloria to overlook the port, and then the Portuguese fleet ventured out for a few days. It dared not show fight, however, and was driven back by the flag-ship, which returned on the 2nd of June. "On the 11th of June," said Lord Cochrane, "information was received that the enemy was seriously thinking of evacuating the port before the fireships were completed. I therefore ordered the Maria de Gloria to water and re-victual for three months, so as to be in readiness for anything which might occur, as, in case the rumour proved correct, our operations might take a different turn to those previous intended. The Piranga was also directed to have everything in readiness for weighing immediately on the flag-ship appearing off the Moro and making signals to that effect. The whole squadron was at the same time ordered to re-victual, and to place its surplus articles in a large shed constructed of trees and branches felled in the neighbourhood of the Moro. Whilst the other ships were thus engaged, I determined to increase the panic of the enemy with the flag-ship alone. The position of their fleet was about nine miles up the bay, under shelter of fortifications, so that an attack by day would have been more perilous than prudent. Nevertheless, it appeared practicable to pay them a hostile visit on the first dark night, when, if we were unable to effect any serious mischief, it would at least be possible to ascertain their exact position, and to judge what could be accomplished when the fireships were brought to bear upon them.

"Accordingly," the narrative proceeds, "having during the day carefully taken bearings at the mouth of the river, on the night of the 12th of June, I decided on making the attempt, which might possibly result in the destruction of part of the enemy's fleet, in consequence of the confused manner in which the ships were anchored. As soon as it became dark we proceeded up the river; but, unfortunately, when we were within hail of the outermost ship, the wind failed, and, the tide soon after turning, our plan of attack was rendered abortive. Determined, however, to complete the reconnoisance, we threaded our way amongst the outermost vessels. In spite of the darkness, the presence of a strange ship under sail was discovered, and some beat to quarters, hailing to know what ship it was. The reply, 'An English vessel,' satisfied them, however, and so our investigation was not molested. The chief object thus accomplished, we succeeded in dropping out with the ebb-tide, now rapidly running, and were enabled to steady our course stern-foremost with the stream anchor adrag, whereby we reached our former position."

That exploit was more daring than Lord Cochrane's modest description would imply; and, though the bold hope that it might be possible for a single invading ship to conquer the whole Portuguese squadron in its moorings was not realized, the effect was all that could be desired. The Portuguese Admiral and his chief officers were at a ball in Bahia while Lord Cochrane was quietly sailing round and amongst their squadron, and the report of this achievement was brought to them in the midst of their festivities. "What!" exclaimed the Admiral, "Lord Cochrane's line-of-battle ship in the very midst of our fleet! Impossible! No large ship can have come up in the dark." When it was known that the thing had really been done, and that the construction of fireships at the Moro San Paulo was being rapidly proceeded with, the Portuguese authorities, both naval and military, considered that it would be no longer safe to remain in Bahia Harbour. They were seriously inconvenienced, moreover, by the success with which Lord Cochrane had blockaded the port and all its approaches. "The means of subsistence fail us, and we cannot secure the entrance of any provisions," said the Commander-in-Chief, in the proclamation intimating that the so-called defenders of the province were thinking of abandoning their post. This they did after a fortnight's consideration. On the 2nd of July the whole squadron of thirteen war-vessels and about seventy merchantmen and transports, filled with a large body of troops, evacuated the port.