"Leaving to a future period, then, minute recital of distressing occurrences, permit me to make a few observations as to the course that appears to be necessary to be pursued in order to save Greece from impending ruin:—1st. The chief leaders of the different factions should be removed from Greece,—those who have education, on missions to different states, as envoys, consuls, etc., and the others, as circumstances will permit. Else Greece will be a theatre of plunder and discord whilst they hold authority or have means to interfere in public affairs. 2ndly. Troops to the amount of four thousand, at least, are required to enforce obedience to salutary laws and regulations. 3rdly. Five hundred seamen from the northern nations of Europe or North America are indispensable for the suppression of piracy and to prevent the plunder of the islands. 4thly. Young Greek seamen should be employed by the civilized nations in their vessels of war and commerce. 5thly. The settlement of persons from all quarters of Europe, in numbers affording mutual protection, should be encouraged. Of course education at home, but more especially abroad, will improve the rising generation. For all those people now at the age of maturity in Greece there is no hope of amelioration. In regard to myself, I am ready, according to my engagement, to render any service in my power to Greece, and I shall feel great satisfaction if I am enabled to do so; but it is no part of my contract to place myself under the control of lawless savages. What might we not have done had the steam-vessels and five hundred good seamen been employed in Greece, when, with these barbarians, we have doubled the number of Greek national vessels of war, and destroyed twice as many of the enemy's squadron? I hope the President Capodistrias will not put his foot on shore in Greece, unless accompanied by a military force. If he does, he will afford corroborative proof of the impossibility of establishing a new order of things by the instrumentality of men who feel interested in the continuance of ancient habits and abuses."[12]
CHAPTER XXII.
LORD COCHRANE'S OCCUPATIONS ON BEHALF OF GREECE IN LONDON AND PARIS.—HIS SECOND LETTER TO CAPODISTRIAS.—HIS DEFENCE OF HIMSELF WITH REFERENCE TO HIS VISIT TO WESTERN EUROPE.—HIS RETURN TO GREECE.—CAPODISTRIAS'S PRESIDENCY AND THE PROGRESS OF GREECE.—LORD COCHRANE'S RECEPTION BY THE GOVERNMENT.—THE SETTLEMENT OF HIS ACCOUNTS.—HIS LETTER OF RESIGNATION.—THE FINAL INDIGNITIES TO WHICH HE WAS SUBJECTED.—THE CORRESPONDENCE THEREUPON BETWEEN ADMIRAL HEYDEN AND DR. GOSSE.—LORD COCHRANE'S DEPARTURE FROM GREECE.—HIS OPINIONS REGARDING HER.—THE CHARACTER AND ISSUES OF HIS SERVICES TO THE GREEKS.
[1828-1829.]
Lord Cochrane's absence from Greece was longer and less advantageous than he anticipated. Arriving in London on the 19th of February, 1828, he found that the English Philhellenes were tired out by the bad faith and the unpatriotic conduct of the Greeks, and that the English Government, which he had hoped to influence so far as to obtain an alteration in the Foreign Enlistment Act which would enable him to secure the services of a well-trained force of British seamen, was determined to give no help in the matter. He found, too, that the steam-vessels yet to be furnished in accordance with the old contract with Mr. Galloway were still unfinished, and that there would be no little trouble and delay, added to all that had already been endured, before their completion could be hoped for. Not disheartened, however, he went almost immediately to Paris, there to see what could be expected from the Philhellenes of the Continent.
"I have taken steps," he wrote to M. Eynard from Paris on the 2nd of March, "to cause one of our small steam-vessels to be fitted with proper engines, the expense of which I shall find means to defray. I hope the President will favour me with a communication at an early date, at least, to say whether he has means to pay and victual a few hundreds of foreign seamen, and thus put my mind at rest. For he must depend on foreign aid to support him in his government, protect commerce, and enable a revenue to be derived from the latent resources of Greece. The Greeks themselves will do nothing towards these objects; though there will not be wanting individuals who will endeavour, for their personal views, to persuade them to the contrary of this. My mind is not yet sufficiently tranquil to give detailed reasons for my opinion that things will not succeed in Greece without troops and other foreign aid; but such time will prove to be the case."
"Were the three great powers," he said in another letter to M. Eynard, dated the 17th of March, "pleased to aid the President with funds to a small amount, they would accomplish more for their own benefit and that of Greece, than by great fleets and armies. Four thousand troops, under the Greek Government, and five hundred seamen, would terminate the affair; but never will anarchy cease or piracy be put down, nor will Capodistrias be secure, unless he has, under his own authority, the means of enforcing obedience to the laws and regulations for the public good by sea and land. I have told you that the Greek seamen cannot be used to suppress piracy, and I may truly add that no Greeks of age to bear arms can become soldiers, though they learn readily enough to perform the military exercises. There neither is nor has yet been, since my arrival in Greece, one single company—not even the marines, with which so much pains was taken—that deserves the name of regular. Their ideas are quite repugnant to everything that constitutes the military character."
Lord Cochrane, who, it will be remembered, was chiefly instrumental in the election of Count John Capodistrias as President of Greece in April, 1827, had hoped much from his government. His confidence was not a little shaken by the long delay which the President had shown in entering on his office, and when Capodistrias arrived, in Greece, only a few days after Lord Cochrane's departure, his first acts were calculated to shake that confidence yet more. He introduced many solid reforms; but in other respects clung to the old and bad traditions of the people, and, which was yet worse, allowed himself to be guided by some of the worst placehunters and most skilful abusers of national power, whom he ought to have most carefully avoided. Lord Cochrane began to perceive this before he had been six weeks out of Greece. He yet hoped, however, that wise counsels and good government would prevail, and he tendered his advice, while he reported his own movements, in a second letter which he addressed to Capodistrias.
"The information which your excellency must have acquired since your arrival in Greece," he wrote to him on the 22nd of March, "may have convinced you of the facts briefly touched on in the letter which I had the honour to address to you on the 1st of January, and may also have proved to you the impossibility, under existing circumstances, of my rendering service to Greece, otherwise than by the course I have pursued. Although, on my arrival in England, I was disappointed at finding other ministers than those I expected in the counsels of his Britannic Majesty, yet I had an opportunity of making facts known to influential individuals in proof that the interests of England would be best promoted by a liberal policy towards Greece, and by placing that country, without loss of time, in the rank of an independent state, having boundaries the most extensive that could be conceded. Since then, I have had several conversations here with the gentlemen of the Paris Greek Committee, and I have advised them to assure the ministers that large naval and military armaments are not required for the expulsion of the Turkish and Egyptian forces from Greece, or to protect that country from farther attempts at invasion by the before-mentioned powers; that for the speedy regulation of the internal affairs of Greece, and the support of your authority, it would be far preferable and infinitely less costly for the mediating powers to place in your hands the means of maintaining four or five thousand troops, together with five hundred seamen, and apply a portion of the vast sums they will save to the education of the rising generation of Greeks abroad and at home, and to the encouragement of whatever will tend to direct the talent and genius of the young people most speedily into the course which will entitle Greece to rank amongst the civilized nations of Europe. Whether this advice shall be listened to or not, I am satisfied that my opinion is correct, and that a multitude of foreign troops, in the pay of rival foreign nations, would contribute less to the objects these nations profess to have in view than a much smaller force under your own authority, more especially when it is considered that these troops could in no way interfere with the internal arrangement and police of the country, unless by usurping, or at least superseding the authority which ought to be exclusively vested in your excellency as chief of the Greek Government. Besides, knowing, as I do, the jealous character of your countrymen, the facility with which they listen to surmises and reports, the diversity of interests amongst the rival chiefs, and the intrigues practised by base and worthless individuals, I have little doubt but that such mixture of troops of different nations would give rise to a state of anarchy more injurious to Greece than that which at present exists. Whether such anarchy might be prevented by one nation alone taking upon itself the internal arrangement of Greece seems doubtful; for, to enforce laws, however just and necessary, by troops in foreign pay, against the opinion and habits of a people who have no just notion of the reciprocal duties of civilized society, would be in their estimation to erect a military despotism, and would call forth resistance on their part even to the most salutary changes. I have also recommended, as an additional security against a multitude of evils, an immediate demarkation of the boundaries of Greece, or, at least, an acknowledgment of your excellency as President. The outfit of two or three steam-vessels still unfinished is going on, and I shall find means to accomplish this object in a way that will render them equal if not superior in velocity to most of the steamboats in general use. But, as no pecuniary means could be obtained in England to procure seamen and purchase provisions, coals, and other necessaries, I came to Paris, in the hope that the Greek Committee might enable me to give orders regarding these arrangements, so indispensable to the navigating of these vessels to Greece. The Paris Committee, however, intimate that they have no funds; and the Chevalier Eynard assures me that the moneys collected by him are exhausted. I therefore await with anxiety your answer to the letter which I had the honour to address to you previous to my departure from Greece."
No answer came from Capodistrias. He sent a message to Lord Cochrane asking him to sell him the little Unicorn, which had conveyed him to England, but said nothing about his own return. Believing that the allied powers would do for him all that was necessary in naval resistance of Turkey, he was not sorry to be deprived of an associate in the actual service of Greece as powerful as Lord Cochrane.