Sir James Graham's answer was very terse. "I have had the honour," he wrote on the 23rd of January, "of receiving your lordship's letter, in which you tender your services to take command of the Baltic Fleet. I consider the tender highly honourable to you; but I cannot give any other assurance."
No other assurance would have been of any avail. The Earl of Aberdeen's Cabinet, having lost the confidence of the country, was dissolved almost immediately after that letter was written, to be replaced by an Administration in which Lord Palmerston was Premier, and Sir Charles Wood First Lord of the Admiralty.
To Lord Palmerston the Earl of Dundonald wrote on the 13th of February. "The high position of our country being at stake on the result of the war," he said, "and our long-established naval renown pledged on the successful conduct of affairs in the Baltic, I addressed my kind friend Lord Lansdowne, who has been long conversant with the objects which, by his advice, I now offer to your lordship's notice as First Minister of the Crown, conjointly, if you judge proper, with that of the Cabinet over which you preside." He then briefly described the principle of his secret plan, adding, "I respectfully offer to execute this plan, and answer for its success, against Cronstadt, and against all minor strongholds in the Baltic."
Four weeks elapsed before that letter was answered. In the meanwhile Lord Dundonald, beginning to despair of a satisfactory hearing from any Minister of State, unless he was induced thereto by a popular demand, addressed a petition to the House of Commons, urging the importance of his plans, and praying for "a searching inquiry, to ascertain whether the aforesaid secret plans are capable speedily, certainly, and cheaply to surmount obstacles which our gallant, persevering, and costly armies and fleets have failed to accomplish." His reasons for so doing he explained in a letter addressed to the "Times" on the 10th of March.
"Peace," he there said, "being desirable not only for the interests of our country, but for those of the world at large, and the negotiations now pending being doubtless injuriously influenced by the obstinate resistance of Sebastopol (which could be overcome in a day), and by the impossibility of successfully attacking Cronstadt by naval means (which might be as speedily reduced), I have drawn up a petition to Parliament in order that secrecy and silence on my part, and deficiency of information on that of the public, may no longer prove injurious to the success of our arms. Hostilities having proceeded so far, assuredly it is more expedient to reduce a restless nation to a third- or fourth-rate power, than be ourselves reduced. Let not my motive be mistaken. I have no wish to command a fleet of 100-gun ships, or to attack first-rate fortresses by incased batteries or steam gunboats. That which I desire is, first, secretly to demonstrate to competent persons the efficiency of my plans, and then to obtain authority, during eight or ten days of fine weather, to put them in execution. The means I contemplate are simple, cheap, and safe. They would spare thousands of lives, millions of money, great havoc and uncertainty of results. Their consequences might, and probably would, effect the emancipation of Poland, and give freedom to the usurped territories of Sweden. Those who judge unfavourably of all aged naval commanders assuredly do not reflect that the useful employment of the energies of thousands and tens of thousands of men can best be developed and directed by a mind instructed by long observation matured by reflection;—an advantage to which physical power, that could clear its way by a broadsword, can bear no comparison. My unsupported opinion in regard to a naval enterprise in 1809 proved to be correct. Every other undertaking in the British service, and as Commander-in-Chief in Chili, Peru, Brazil, and Greece, was successful, and so would the protracted and unaccomplished undertaking, so injurious to the result of negotiation, have succeeded, had I possessed sufficient influence to be patiently listened to."
The petition aroused much interest among the public, but was unheeded by the House of Commons, and therefore produced very slight effect on the Ministry. "My published petition," wrote Lord Dundonald to Viscount Palmerston on the 17th of March, "has brought me numerous letters, and, amongst others, a communication, I believe from high authority, that if I do know any means whereby to spare the slaughter that must take place on storming Sebastopol, I ought to make it known. I wish I could impart to your lordship what I feel under the present circumstances, and how anxiously I desire that a speedy decision may succeed the lingering delays that I have so long endured."
A few days after that, chiefly through the assistance of his friend Lord Brougham, Lord Dundonald obtained an interview with Lord Palmerston, at which he further detailed his plans, and urged that they should be promptly employed in hastening a conclusion of the war with Russia. To Lord Palmerston he also wrote again on the 31st of March. "It has occurred to me," he said, "that the supposed inhumanity of my plans may have caused the use of the word 'inexpedient' in the report of the commission appointed in July last by the Admiralty, and may even now influence the decision of the Cabinet. Perhaps another view may have been taken of the consequences of divulging my plans, as regards the security of this kingdom." To these possible objections he urged that no conduct that brought to a speedy termination a war which might otherwise last for years, and be attended by terrible bloodshed in numerous battles, could be called inhuman; and that the most powerful means of averting invasion, and, indeed, all future war, would be the introduction of a method of fighting which, rendering all vigorous defence impossible, would frighten every nation from running the risks of warfare at all.
Those arguments appear to have had some weight; but, after further correspondence, Lord Palmerston's Government, like all the other Governments to which they had been offered, refused to put the plans in execution. Further evidence in their favour was obtained from some eminent scientific men; and it was put beyond dispute that, though they might not have such deadly efficacy as Lord Dundonald anticipated—on which point the critics spoke with hesitation—they could not fail, if properly applied, in producing very important results. But it was all in vain. All that Lord Palmerston would agree to was to have the experiment tried on a small scale at Sebastopol, and by two Engineer officers who were to be instructed in their work by Lord Dundonald. Lord Dundonald consented to the trial, if it was conducted by his son, Captain the Honourable Arthur Cochrane, R.N. But this was not agreed to, and the whole project fell to the ground.
At that result Lord Dundonald was hardly more disappointed than was a large section of the English public. Friends and strangers, soldiers, sailors, newspaper writers, and merchants, wrote to him from London, Edinburgh, Liverpool, Birmingham, Belfast, and all other parts of the kingdom, urging that, if the enterprise was not undertaken by Government, it should be executed by means of a private subscription. "I am perfectly convinced," wrote one, "that you can do all the injury to the Russian fortifications that you say you can do. If miserable jealousy at the Admiralty refuses you the means, take them from those who, like myself, are very proud to be your countrymen. I am not a rich man, but I shall gladly subscribe one hundred pounds to any scheme that you will propose and carry out yourself." "If your lordship will appeal to the country," wrote another, "in less than a week you will receive subscriptions to any amount. You will then be independent of Government routine, and the public will, without further delay, have an opportunity of testing the value of your invention, towards which the eyes of all Europe are anxiously turned at the present juncture."
Those suggestions, and the evidence afforded by them of a widespread sympathy in his efforts to render a last great service to his country, afforded real satisfaction to Lord Dundonald; but their adoption was quite impossible. As a British officer, he could not for a moment think of entering upon a warlike project independently of the State. Therefore he left the work on which his heart was set undone, and soon—though by no means so soon as he could have made it—the Russian war was brought to a conclusion.