The marines who, with affectionate fidelity, had borne off Major Miller, had been careful to protect him from fire, though two out of the three who carried him were wounded in the act; and when, on arriving at the beach, they were invited by him to enter the boat, one of them, a gallant fellow named Roxas, of whom I had spoken highly in my despatches from Valdivia, on account of his distinguished bravery, refused, saying, "No, Sir, I was the first to land, and I mean to be the last to go on board." He kept his word; for on his Commander being placed in safety, he hastened back to the little band, now nearly cut up, and took his share in the retreat, being the last to get into the boats. Such were the Chilenos, of whom the mean jealousy of the Minister of Marine, Zenteno, refused to allow me a thousand for operations at Callao—which could have been conducted with ease, as Valdivia had been captured with less than a third of that number.
Our force being now seriously diminished, and feeling convinced that the fanatics of Chiloe were devoted to the cause of Spain, there was nothing left but to return to Valdivia, where, finding that the Spaniards who had been dispersed in the neighbourhood were committing excesses, I despatched Major Beauchef with 100 men to Osorio to secure that town, the relief being accepted with great joy even by the Indians, of whom, wrote Major Beauchef to me, "I have embraced more than a thousand Caciques and their followers. They have all offered their services to fight in the patriotic cause; but as circumstances do not require this, I have invited them to return to their own lands, and have received their promises to be ready if the country should call for their services." The Spaniards being driven from Osorio, the flag of Chili was, on the 26th of February, hoisted on the castle by Major Beauchef, who returned to Valdivia.
There being nothing further to require my presence, I placed the O'Higgins under the orders of my secretary, Mr. Bennet, to superintend her repairs, and embarked in the Montezuma, for Valparaiso, taking with me five Spanish officers who had been made prisoners, amongst whom was Colonel Fausto De Hoyos, the Commandant of the Cantabria regiment.
On my departure, the Spaniards, elated by their success at Chiloe, combined with those who had been driven from Valdivia, in an attempt to recover their lost possessions, but Major Beauchef, having timely intelligence of their intention, set out to meet them. A number of volunteers having joined the patriot force, Major Beauchef on the 6th of March encountered the enemy on the river Toro, and instantly attacked them, when, in about an hour, the Spanish officers mounted their horses and fled in a body, leaving the men to their fate. Nearly three hundred of these immediately surrendered, and Major Beauchef—having captured the whole of the arms and baggage—returned in triumph to Valdivia.
On the 27th of February, I arrived at Valparaiso, in the Montezuma, amidst the most lively demonstrations of enthusiasm on the part of the populace, and warm expressions of gratitude from the Supreme Director. But my reception by his ministers was wholly different. Zenteno, through whose orders I had broken, declared, that the conquest of Valdivia "was the act of a madman! that I deserved to have lost my life in the attempt; and even now ought to lose my head for daring to attack such a place without instructions, and for exposing the patriot troops to such hazard;" afterwards setting on foot a series of intrigues, having for their object the depreciation of the service which had been rendered, so that I found myself exposed to the greatest possible vexation and annoyance, with not the slightest indication of national acknowledgment or reward to myself, officers, or men.
The chagrin of Zenteno and the bad passions of his adherents were further enhanced by the congratulatory addresses which poured in on both the Supreme Director and myself from all parts, the people declaring, contrary to the assertions of Zenteno, that I had acted, not from any feeling of personal vanity, but from a conviction of the national utility of the act; and that by its accomplishment the valour of the Chilenos had been so displayed as to shew that they had the utmost confidence in their officers, and hence possessed the moral as well as physical courage necessary for further achievements.
Notwithstanding the envious dissatisfaction of Zenteno, the government was compelled, in deference to the popular voice, to award medals to the captors, the decree for this stating that "the capture of Valdivia was the happy result of the devising of an admirably arranged plan, and of the most daring and valorous execution." The decree further conferred on me an estate of 4,000 quadras from the confiscated lands of Conception, which I refused, as no vote of thanks was given by the legislature; this vote I finally obtained as an indemnification to myself for having exceeded my orders; such being necessary after Zenteno's expressions of ill-will towards me on account of breaking through instructions.
Situated as Chili then was, it is impossible to over-rate the importance of this acquisition—the capture of a noble harbour protected by fifteen forts, and the magazines with their vast amount of military stores, being even secondary to the political advantages gained by the Republic.
The annexation of this province, at one blow conferred on Chili complete independence, averting the contemplated necessity for fitting out a powerful military expedition for the attainment of that object, vitally essential to her very existence as an independent state; because, so long as Valdivia remained in the hands of the Spaniards, Chili was, in her moments of unguardedness or disunion, in constant danger of losing the liberties she had, as yet, but partially acquired.
The resources of the province of Valdivia, together with those of Conception, had contributed the means whereby the Spaniards maintained their hold upon the Chilian territory. Not only were they deprived of these resources—now added to those of Chili—but a great saving was effected by exonerating the Republic from the necessity of maintaining a military force in the southern provinces, as a check upon both Spaniards and Indians, who, at the moment of our conquest of Valdivia, were being let loose in all directions against the Chilian patriots.