It would have been easy for the flagship also to have taken prizes, but about this I cared nothing,—my great object being to prevent the enemy from landing troops elsewhere, and with this view I determined on closely following the ships of war and transports—leaving the Brazilian frigates to exercise their own discretion in disabling the convoy. It may be considered an act of temerity for one ship of war thus to chase thirteen; but, encumbered as they were, and, as I knew, short of provisions, I felt assured of accomplishing my object.
The enemy—being greatly annoyed at our perseverance in following, and still more so at the loss of so many of the convoy—on the morning of the 4th, gave chase to the flagship with the whole squadron, endeavouring to hem her in, and at one time we were pursued so closely inshore, that there was some danger of getting embayed, but the handling and superior sailing qualities of the Pedro Primiero enabled her to out-manoeuvre them and get clear. On seeing this, the Portuguese squadron, finding further chase unavailing, gave us a broadside which did no damage, and resumed its position in the van of the convoy, to which we immediately gave chase as before, and as soon as night set in, dashed in amongst them, firing right and left till the nearest ships brought to, when they were boarded—the topmasts cut away—the rigging disabled—the arms thrown overboard—and the officers compelled to give their parole not to serve against Brazil until regularly exchanged—an event not likely to happen.
Keeping well up with them on the 5th—as soon as night set in, this mode of attack was repeated, when we took a Russian vessel filled with Portuguese troops, and disabled her in like manner. Of the merchantmen within reach we took no notice, as it was impolitic to weaken the crew of the flagship by manning prizes, whilst, as we saw nothing of the remainder of the Brazilian squadron, there was no other means of preventing their escape.
The prudence of preserving the crew of the flagship entire, was now well exemplified. After taking possession of the Russian transport, at dusk, I observed half-a-dozen large ships detach themselves from the main body of the convoy, and suspecting some valid reason for the movement, immediately gave chase. Though they crowded all sail, we came up with them on the following morning, and singling out a large frigate-built ship, filled with troops, we fired upon her till she brought to. On boarding, we found her to be the Gran Para, containing—with the others—a division of several thousand troops, destined to maintain Portuguese authority in the province of Maranham—as, indeed, I had been informed at Bahia. The private signals and instructions of the Portuguese admiral—obtained by Flag-Lieutenant Grenfell from her captain—put me in possession of the whole arrangement, which was thus luckily frustrated.
As it was of importance not to let any of these troopships escape, Captain Grenfell was ordered to disable the Gran Para, cutting away her main and mizen masts, throwing the arms and ammunition overboard, taking possession of the regimental flags, and compelling the officers, as before, to give their parole not to serve against Brazil. This done, the other transports were successively boarded and disabled, so far as was consistent with not leaving them positive wrecks on the water; for with my single ship, to have made prisoners of so numerous a body of troops was manifestly impossible.
The brig Bahia having opportunely hove in sight, I seized four of the vessels carrying troops, and ordered Captain Haydon to convoy them to Pernambuco, to the President of which province I addressed the following letter:—
Pedro Primiero, July 7th, 1823.
ILLUSTRIOUS AND EXCELLENT SIR,
The abandonment of Bahia by the enemy, in consequence of the rigours of blockade—and the capture of half of his army, ensigns, artillery, and stores, are events which you will be gratified to learn. Part of the captured officers and troops I send in for your disposal, having engaged that they shall be treated after the manner which may justly be expected from the high character of the Government of His Imperial Majesty, and the customary practice of all European states. I have to request that you will be pleased to order their disembarkation without delay.
We require seamen to finish the war. If you will be pleased to grant the bounty of 24 dollars per man, as at Rio—charging the same to the Government—you will render an essential service to your country. I do not mean Portuguese seamen—who are enemies; but able seamen of any other nation, and I need scarcely say, that from my knowledge of the character of the men, I should prefer British seamen to all others.