" To Admiral 4,750
" Secretary, for distribution 5,000
" May and Lukin, prize agents, as per balance
of account, July 15, 1824 5,324
———
160,462
Original amount 200,000
———
Balance to be accounted for 39,538
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The above were not the whole amounts paid, but they are all that a search amongst my numerous papers at present furnish; and as the original accounts, as has been previously stated, were sent to Rio de Janeiro, a more precise balance cannot here be drawn; but even this is sufficient to carry conviction to any reasonable mind, that the sums above stated were disbursed in ordinary routine, and should make the Brazilian administration ashamed to say, that "the First Admiral never sent in his accounts of the 200,000 dollars entrusted to him," thus inducing an unworthy inference that they were not disbursed; though any man possessed of common understanding could never believe that a squadron, constituted as the Brazilian Marine was, would obey orders and cheerfully act in unison with me, knowing that their prize money was on board—of which I unwarrantably held possession!
These explanations are more humiliating to the Brazilian administration than to myself—though for so many years the subject of unmerited obloquy from their denial of accounts which must unquestionably have been in the possession of the Administration of 1825. But I must carry these explanations yet farther. With the exception of 4750 dollars for my own necessities, I took none as my share, though entitled to an eighth in all cases, and to a fourth in the absence of other ships whenever important services were performed by the flagship alone. Neither had I received from the Imperial Government a single dollar of the customary emoluments due to me, though, had these been honestly paid according to the usages of nations and the stipulations of the Emperor's decree of December 11, 1822, my share ought to have been more than double the whole amount entrusted to me to man the ships and satisfy the officers and men. Still I did not appropriate the 39,000 dollars which remained, after paying the men, but determined to withhold it till I saw what course the prize tribunal at Rio de Janeiro intended to pursue; and, if that course were not satisfactory, then to appropriate it as a right, although it was wholly inadequate to the services rendered, for which I had been loaded with Imperial honours and national thanks, without a shilling of emolument, notwithstanding the capture of a hundred and twenty bona fide enemy's ships—the expulsion of their fleet and army—and the annexation of more than one half the empire. But more of this in another place.
On my return to Pernambuco, I found General Lima in quiet possession of the city, and as the Piranga had brought me instructions from His Imperial Majesty, that, as soon as order was restored, a force should proceed to Parà, and depose the, General-at-Arms there nominated, I applied to General Lima for a small military detachment to effect that object; but he declined—on the ground, that in the present state of affairs in Pernambuco, it was not practicable to diminish his force.
It was not at Parà only that irregularities prevailed: even at Maranham serious disturbances had broken out, with the avowed intention, on the part of the insurgents, of deposing the Governor acting under the authority of His Imperial Majesty—to whom this new attempt at revolution was as yet unknown. In short, the order to depose the General-at-Arms at Parà had unexpectedly resolved itself into the necessity of tranquillizing the whole of the Northern provinces, which were only waiting the result of Carvalho's measures at Pernambuco, openly to declare against the Imperial authority.
The dissatisfaction in the Northern provinces originated solely in the anti-Brazilian system of Government pursued at Rio de Janeiro, which in the estimation of all at a distance was Portuguese rather than Brazilian. As they were either ignorant, or did not believe, that the patriotic intentions of the Emperor were overruled or thwarted by the Portuguese faction in the administration, which, holding in reality the reins of power, left to His Majesty little more than nominal authority.
It was not, then, to be wondered at, that the inhabitants of these distant provinces, who, only a year before, had welcomed me as their liberator from Portuguese oppression, and as the representative of constitutional authority, should now be dissatisfied with what they rightly considered an unnational system of government—preferring to submit to a bad government of their own choosing rather than to one thus arbitrarily imposed upon them.
To avert revolution required able presidents, well skilled in the management of public affairs; but, in place of these, men of an opposite character had, for the most part, been chosen by the administration.
It was no less essential that the Generals-at-Arms, or military commandants, should be temperate and unprejudiced; but those placed in this responsible position used their authority in the most obnoxious and arbitrary manner. It was, no doubt, difficult to find proper men; or, if they existed amongst the Brazilians, the jealousy of the Portuguese party in the administration prevented their elevation to power; the aim of that faction being disorder, as auxiliary to their anti-imperial views. This had been strikingly evinced by the instructions given to disembark General Lima's force at Alagoas, instead of near the seat of disturbance; thus entailing loss of time and a difficult and tedious march, which might have ended in failure, had it not been for the distraction caused by the threatened bombardment of Pernambuco by water, and the demonstration made to shew how easily it would be effected, when means for a destructive attack were complete; the result was, that—knowing my return from Bahia, with everything in readiness for an attack in earnest, could not be delayed beyond a few days, no serious opposition was offered to the occupation of the city by the force under General Lima.
The reports of increased disaffection in the Northern provinces becoming daily more precise, it was necessary to take advantage of the panic which the recovery of Pernambuco had occasioned; the more so, as serious commotions had arisen, whilst a strong disposition to revolt was almost universally manifested. As General Lima had refused me a military detachment—and as the Pedro Primeiro and Piranga could render him no further assistance, I considered it more in conformity with His Majesty's interests to visit the Northern ports with these ships; taking also the Cacique and Atalanta, for the performance of services to which the larger vessels were not adapted. The mere presence of these off the disaffected ports would, I knew, suffice to restore order, by affording inferential demonstration that, if force were required, it was ready to be applied.