It may be prudent to observe that we utterly repudiate the doctrine of the Phrenologists, that the form of the Body affects the manifestations, and even properties, of the Mind.
We contend that the Mind forms the Nose, and not the Nose the Mind. We have carefully endeavoured to avoid phraseology which should induce a supposition that we entertain the latter absurdity; but here enter this protest once for all, lest a want of precision in our language, or the obtuseness of critics, should cause us to be charged with it.
It is in vain to require proof of a material connection between the Nose and the Mind, for it is utterly impossible to demonstrate to sense the seat of the divine particle. Material organs cannot apprehend immaterial existence: they even fail to perceive some of the more tenuous materialisms, air, light, heat, electricity, &c., which are known only by their effects. It is in vain to deny physiognomy—of which Nasology is only a department—because we cannot understand by what processes mind acts on the features; because we cannot see any material organisms which operate to contract the muscles in laughter or pain, or which impel the blood to or from the countenance when consciousness or fear affects the mind. It is in vain to deny the blush or the pallor because we know not how the pulsations of the heart and the flow of blood are affected by mental impressions. It is one of the strongest proofs of the immateriality of the soul, that while its existence cannot be denied, it cannot be anatomically demonstrated, nor rendered visible to sense. The mode in which Mind acts on Matter is one of the arcana of Nature, which, perhaps, human science will never penetrate. It is a secret reserved for that state in which the mind will act independently of material media. However numerous and plausible the theories propounded to explain the mystery, they all terminate like the Indian’s world-supports, and the chain of connection breaks at the last link. It is, therefore, in vain to deny physiognomy because we can demonstrate no material connection between the mind and the features, nor would any sane objector insist on such demonstration; yet such demonstration has been insisted on, and the absence of it adduced as a fundamental objection both to physiognomy and phrenology by critics at a loss for valid objections.
And here we might descant, at considerable length, and with much show of learning, on the influence of the Mind over the Body. We might impugn the wisdom of those who, undertaking to cure either, have forgotten that they were so intimately united and mutually dependent, that they could not be treated separately with success. We might show that the first step of the physician towards curing mental disorder, is to free the body from disease; and that of him who would cure the body, is, ofttimes, to apply his remedies to the derangement of the mind. But, though by so doing we might swell our pages and eke out an additional chapter—an important consideration if we were a mere book-maker—we shall not, as we have some qualms of conscience whether it would be quite germane to the matter in hand. It might not, however, be out of place to remind the reader that physiognomy, or the form which mind gives to the features, is universally recognised. A pleasant mouth, a merry eye, a sour visage, a stern aspect, are some of the common phrases by which we daily acknowledge ourselves to be physiognomists; for by these expressions we mean, not that the mouth is pleasant or the visage sour, but that such is the mind which shines out from them. If it were the face alone which we thus intended, we should never trouble or concern ourselves about a human countenance, nor be attracted, nor repulsed by one, any more than if it were a carved head on a gothic waterspout, or a citizen’s door-knocker. We all acknowledge the impression given by the mind to the mouth and the eyes because they express Temper and the Passions—those feelings which more immediately interest us in our mutual intercourse—and because they change with the feelings; now flashing with anger, or sparkling with pleasure, compressing with rage, or smiling with delight.
But because the Nose is uninfluenced by the feelings which agitate and vary the mind, and, is, therefore, immovable and unvaried, no one will hear the theory of Nasology broached without incredulity and risibility. Because the Nose is subject only to those faculties of mind which are permanent and unfluctuating; and is, therefore, likewise permanent and unfluctuating in its form, men have paid no attention to its indications, and will, accordingly, abuse as an empiric and dotard the first Nasologist. But, is there, à priori, any thing so unreasonable in attributing mental characteristics to the Nose, when we all daily read each other’s minds in the Nose’s next-door neighbours, the eyes and mouth? Is not the à priori inference entirely in favour of a negative reply? And that, à posteriori, it may confidently be replied to in the negative will, it is hoped, presently appear.
There is here room for another long disquisition to point out the advantages of Nasology. How that the permanency and immobility of the Nose forbid hypocrisy to mould it to any artificial feelings, as the eyes and the mouth may be. And how this immobility, together with its prominency and incapability of being concealed, like bad phrenological bumps, render it a sure guide to some parts of our fellow-creatures’ mental organization. But it would be premature to do this before proving somewhat of the truth of Nasology; and when that is done, no one will deny that it has its uses, though it may be disputed what those are.
Nevertheless, we must earnestly protest against the fallacy of attempting to judge what any person is from his Nose; we can only judge of natural tendency and capacity—education and external circumstances of a thousand different kinds, may have swerved the mind from its original tendency, or prevented the development of inherent faculties. It is in this unfair and uncharitable asserting dogmatically the disposition and character, vices and virtues, of a man, that phrenologists so greatly err; whereas they ought to confine their inferences from external development of organs, to capacity and tendency only.
The impossibility of giving such numerous pictorial illustrations as the subject properly demands, will confine the examples adduced to those only of which portraits are well known and easily accessible. If, therefore, the proofs are thought insufficient in number, it must be attributed to this circumstance alone. It would have been easy to have swelled them by a number of names, the right of which to be included in the lists the majority of persons would have been unable to verify. Nevertheless, the examples will be found much more numerous and more easily verifiable than those which have been deemed sufficient to establish Phrenology as an hypothesis, if not as a science; and, had we, like the principal expounder of Phrenology,[[3]] dragged in as ‘proofs’ nameless gentlemen of our acquaintance, we might have still further extended the lists of examples. But it seemed to our humble judgment, to be demanding more from the reader’s good nature than would be compatible with sound criticism, to ask him to accept such unsupported dicta as proofs. Of course, very many of the examples by which our own mind has been satisfied have been drawn from personal observation, among friends and acquaintance; and not only have these been the most numerous proofs, but also by far the most satisfactory, as they afforded the most exact and undeniable profiles, and the most noticeable mental characteristics. The slightest incorrectness in the artist, may render useless a pictorial example; but when we are looking upon the original itself, there can be no mistake. A thousand minutiæ of character may escape a biographer, which appear plainly in the man himself.
Nevertheless, we felt so strongly how unfitting it would be to offer such mere personal observations as proofs, that we have carefully refrained from admitting any example which is not open to the observation of almost every one.
This is a drawback which we feel greatly; it reduces our instances to a hundredth part of those which might be adduced; but we must submit to it, only asking of the reader’s generosity to take it into account. Another favour which we beg is, that the reader will suspend his judgment until the subject is concluded, and he has the whole system, with all its proofs, before him.