And here it may not be out of place to endeavour to point out by an example the difference between knowledge and wisdom, and at the same time elucidate more clearly how the former is to be made subservient to and the genetrix of the latter. We observe that a certain quartz-stone is round. We have learnt two facts, the nature and form of the stone. Now what is the value of those facts per se? The recipience of them has increased our knowledge, but is the mind strengthened or rendered one jot wiser? We trow not. But as a key or foundation to an aqueous theory of geology they are almost infinitely important. The Cogitative Mind perceives that the round stone must have once been an angular fragment broken off from some rock of quartz, and asks, “How came it broken off? and how came it round?” The answers are a whole system of geology; nay, perhaps an entire system of the universe a noögenism of the sublimest kind.[[25]] Have not these facts generated? Is it not clear that, if the physical units had remained metaphysical units they would have been valueless? but being submitted to the powerful energy of intense thought they become the parents of a noögenism, into which “the angels desired to look,” and at the first dawn of which, from the primæval chaos, “the morning stars sang together, and all the sons of God shouted for joy.”
Neither is this instance fanciful; for, while we write, it reminds us that this identical simple fact,—a round pebble on a common,—appeared to Paley to be one from which the mind could evolve nothing, and therefore he contrasted it with a watch, whose mechanism led the mind to theorize on its causes and origin; whereas, a recent commentator thereon justly observes, that the stone was as fertile a source of cogitation and as able a guide “from Nature up to Nature’s God,” as the watch was from itself to its maker.
From this example let us take warning, that facts be not to us nothing more than round stones. Let us be careful never to let our minds rest content with the mere accumulation of facts, but ever strive to build them up into something more useful and ennobling. Let us use them as bricks—mere logs of burnt clay in themselves, but fit to build glorious monuments of the sublime power of human invention. Let us remember that Ideas are the only things of real permanent value in this world; and that, though we may store our brain with Facts till our heads burst, unless those facts are to us only generators of Ideas, we have not, and cannot acquire a Cogitative mind; we may have Knowledge, but we have not Wisdom. A wise man hath wisely said, that “the wise man is”—not he who knoweth things, but—“he who knoweth the interpretation of a thing” [Eccles. viii. 21]; and for this purpose only it is that, “Wise men lay up knowledge” [Prov. x. 14], for “Wisdom finds out knowledge of witty inventions” [Prov. viii. 12].
In order to effectually discipline the mind to attentive study, and to save it from the strong temptation which is offered to desultory reading, it is advisable for the adult and partially educated student to form an hypothesis and read up to it. To reverse, in fact, the Baconian principles of philosophy, and to study from hypothesis to facts, and not from facts to hypothesis. This is, it is true, opposed to modern philosophical principles, but properly modified and carefully guarded against self-conceit and dogmatism, it is almost the only proper and effective mode of study. It is the ancient or Aristotelian mode; and though, when refuted by Bacon, as a mode of “discovering the sciences,” it had become shamefully abused and degenerate, it has produced more great original thinkers than the modern. Observe, that we recommend it only as a mode of study, i. e., of disciplining and exercising the mind, for beyond the purpose of training it should not be pursued. It is too dangerous to be prosecuted far, for the mind which has long formed and nursed up a favourite hypothesis is unwilling to abandon it, and is too apt to force all facts into accordance with it, instead of modifying or abandoning it as new facts arise.[[26]]
But the great advantages of this plan, as a training process, would appear to be—1st. That the mind being thus occupied with an hypothesis has always that to direct its researches in a settled, uniform, and definite course. 2nd. That every new fact accumulated is immediately compared with the hypothesis, and is incorporated or written off as contra, after this mental exercise, as occasion may require. Thus no fact ever comes into the mind without being subjected to thought and giving exercise to the important faculty of comparison. And this process of comparing, to which every fact must be subjected, will not only impress the fact and its comparatives on the memory, but will powerfully tend to exercise and strengthen the Cogitative powers; for there is no operation of mind which more actively calls into energy all the faculties at once than comparing, because to compare two things fairly we must (so to speak) know the length, breadth, depth, density and powers of each. 3rd. A steady habit of reading is acquired; we read with a definite aim—the establishment or refutation (we ought not to care which) of our hypothesis, and, however wide and discursive our reading, there is little danger of its becoming desultory—that curse and bane of modern mind. The Baconian process of accumulating facts before hypothesising, almost demands desultory reading, for the mind sees no fixed end towards which it shall arrive; it is not permitted to guess what may be the result of its studies, and hence too often loses all interest in them, and remains content with the barren accumulation of things.
What we would suggest may be thus illustrated: Let a man, intending to study history, first adopt an hypothesis—of course he must have some pre-knowledge. It matters not what the hypothesis, so that it is likely to involve a very wide field of inquiry. If he contemplate primæval history, let him adopt some such proposition as this, “Whether we can infer from the institutions of mankind that they all spring from one common ancestor?” Or this, “Whether any nation whose national records have been preserved were the first owners of the soil?”
Is it not obvious, that with some such proposition before the mind it will take much more interest in and more steadily direct its studies, and that facts will be more easily remembered, from their bearing on the hypothesis, than if merely received as naked, isolated units?
The only precautions to be taken are, not to be too strongly wedded to either side of our hypothesis, nor to sit down too soon satisfied that it is proved or disproved, nor to set up for teachers and discoverers, while we are only learners and making discoveries.
It will be seen hereafter that, notwithstanding what has been said, we differ not at all from Bacon himself; we differ only from his pseudo-disciples, who have no more in common with his enlarged views of the uses of science than the schools had with Aristotle, or the New Academy with Plato. Nevertheless, we well know that we shall be well abused by these disciples as an impugner of Bacon, and as a heretic to his philosophy, just as your pious people condemn as an infidel or atheist every one who denies any dogma which their wild enthusiasm has grafted on the Bible. It is not in religion alone that bigotry is to be found.
Bacon himself pursued the mode of study which we suggest. At fifteen he formed an hypothesis, and devoted his whole life to its elucidation. The hypothesis round which, as a centre, he gathered every fact within his reach was this: Whether or not the Aristotelian was the best mode of cultivating the mind, and of discovering the sciences?