The Governor-General's minute, just read, is this. "I entirely acquit Mr. Goodlad of all the charges: he has disproved them. It was the duty of the accuser to prove them" (the accuser, namely, the commissioner). "Whatever crimes may be established against Rajah Debi Sing, it does not follow that Mr. Goodlad was responsible for them; and I so well know the character," &c., &c., &c.

Now your Lordships perceive he has acquitted Mr. Goodlad. He is clear. Be it that he is fairly and conscientiously acquitted. But what is Mr. Hastings's account of Rajah Debi Sing? He is presented to him in 1781, by Gunga Govind Sing, as a person against whose character there could be no exception, and by him accepted in that light. Upon the occasion I have mentioned, Mr. Hastings's opinion of him is this: "I so well know the character and abilities of Rajah Debi Sing, that I can easily conceive that it was in his power both to commit the enormities which are laid to his charge, and to conceal the grounds of them from Mr. Goodlad, who had no authority but that of receiving the accounts and rents of the district from Rajah Debi Sing, and occasionally to be the channel of communication between him and the Committee."

Thus your Lordships see what Mr. Hastings's opinion of Debi Sing was. We shall prove it at another time, by abundance of clear and demonstrative evidence, that, whether he was bad or no, (but we shall prove that bad he was indeed,) even he could hardly be so bad as he was in the opinion which Mr. Hastings entertained of him; who, notwithstanding, now disowns this mock Committee, instituted by himself, but, in reality, entirely managed by Gunga Govind Sing. This Debi Sing was accepted as an unexceptionable man; and yet Mr. Hastings knows both his power of doing mischief and his artifice in concealing it. If, then, Mr. Goodlad is to be acquitted, does it not show the evil of Mr. Hastings's conduct in destroying those Provincial Councils which, as I have already stated, were obliged to book everything, to minute all the circumstances which came before them, together with all the consultations respecting them? He strikes at the whole system at once, and, instead of it, he leaves an Englishman, under pretence of controlling Gunga Govind Sing's agent, appointed for the very purpose of giving him bribes, in a province where Mr. Hastings says that agent had the power of committing such enormities, and which nobody doubts his disposition to commit,—he leaves him, I say, in such a state of inefficiency, that these iniquities could be concealed (though every one true) from the person appointed there to inspect his conduct! What, then, could be his business there? Was it only to receive such sums of money as Debi Sing might put into his hands, and which might have been easily sent to Calcutta? Was he to be of use as a communication between Debi Sing and the Committee, and in no other way? Here, then, we have that English authority which Mr. Hastings left in the country,—here the native authority which he settled, and the establishment of native iniquity in a regular system under Gunga Govind Sing,—here the destruction of all English inspection. I hope I need say no more to prove to your Lordships that this system, taken nakedly as it thus stands, founded in mystery and obscurity, founded for the very express purpose of conveying bribes, as the best mode of collecting the revenue and supplying the Company's exigencies through Gunga Govind Sing, would be iniquitous upon the face and the statement of it. But when your Lordships consider what horrid effects it produced, you will easily see what the mischief and abomination of Mr. Hastings's destroying these Provincial Councils and protecting these persons must necessarily be. If you had not known in theory, you must have seen it in practice.

But when both practice and theory concur, there can be no doubt that a system of private bribery for a revenue, and of private agency for a constitutional government, must ruin the country where it prevails, must disgrace the country that uses it, and finally end in the destruction of the revenue. For what says Mr. Hastings? "I was to have received 40,000l. in bribes, and 30,000l. was actually applied to the use of the Company." Now I hope I shall demonstrate, if not, it will be by some one abler than me demonstrated, in the course of this business, that there never was a bribe received by Mr. Hastings that was not instantly followed with a deficiency in the revenue,—this is clear, and what we undertake to prove,—and that Debi Sing himself was, at the time Mr. Hastings came away, between twenty and thirty thousand pounds debtor to the Company. So that, in truth, you always find a deficiency of revenue nearly equal, and in some instances I shall show double, to all the bribes Mr. Hastings received: from whence it will be evident that he never could nor did receive them under that absurd and strange idea of a resource to government.

I must re-state to your Lordships, because I wish you never to forget, that this Committee of Revenue was, in their own opinion, and from their own certain knowledge and mere motion, if motion can be attributed originally to instruments, mere tools; that they knew that they were tools in the hands of Gunga Govind Sing. There were two persons principal in it,—Mr. Shore, who was the acting President, and Mr. Anderson, who was President in rank, and President in emolument, but absent for a great part of the time upon a foreign embassy. It is the recorded opinion of the former, (for I must beg leave to read again a part of the paper which has already been read to your Lordships,) that "the Committee, with the best intentions, best abilities, and steadiest application, must, after all, be a tool in the hands of their dewan."

Now do you believe, in the first place, that men will long have abilities, will long have good intentions, and will long, above all, have steady application, when they know they are but tools in the hands of another,—when they know they are tools for his own corrupt purposes?

In the next place, I must beg leave to state to you, that, on the constitution of this Committee, Mr. Hastings made them all take a solemn oath that they would never receive any present whatever. It was not enough to trust to a general covenant; it was not enough to trust to the penal act of 1773: he bound the Committee by a new oath, and forced them to declare that they would not receive any bribes. As soon as he had so secured them against receiving bribes, he was resolved to make them inefficient,—a good way to secure them against bribes, by taking from them the power of bribe-worthy service. This was a good counter-security to their oath. But Mr. Hastings put a dewan there, against whom there was no security; he let loose this dewan to frustrate their intentions, their application, their abilities, and oath: that is, there was a person at that board who was more than the board itself, who might riot in peculation and plunder from one end of the country to the other. He was there to receive bribes for Mr. Hastings; the Committee were to be pure with impotent hands; and then came a person with ample power for Mr. Hastings himself. And lest this person should not have power enough in this Committee, he is made the general bribe-broker to Mr. Hastings. This secret under-current, as your Lordships will see, is to counteract everything, and, as fast as one part is rendered pure, totally to corrupt all the rest.

But, my Lords, this was not the private opinion of Mr. Shore only, a man of great abilities, and intimately acquainted with the revenue, who must know when he was in a situation to do good and when not. The other gentleman whom I have mentioned, Mr. Hastings's confidant in everything but his bribes, and supposed to be in his closest secrets, is Mr. Anderson. I should remark to your Lordships, that Mr. Anderson is a man apparently of weak nerves, of modest and very guarded demeanor, as we have seen him in the House of Commons; it is in that way only I have the honor of knowing him. Mr. Anderson being asked whether he agreed in the opinion and admitted the truth of his friend Mr. Shore's statement relative to the dewan of the Committee, his answer was this: "I do not think that I should have written it quite so strong, but I do in a great measure agree to it: that is, I think there is a great deal of truth in the observation; I think, in particular, that it would require great exertion in the Committee, and great abilities on the part of the President, to restrain effectually the conduct of the dewan; I think it would be difficult for the Committee to interpose a sufficient control to guard against all the abuses of the dewan."

There is the real President of the Committee,—there the most active, efficient member of it. They are both of one opinion concerning their situation: and I think this opinion of Mr. Anderson is still more strong; for, as he thinks he should have written it with a little more guard, but should have agreed in substance, you must naturally think the strongest expression the truest representation of the circumstance.

There is another circumstance that must strike your Lordships relative to this institution. It is where the President says that the use of the President would be to exert his best abilities, his greatest application, his constant guard,—for what?—to prevent his dewan from being guilty of bribery and being guilty of oppressions. So here is an executive constitution in which the chief executive minister is to be in such a situation and of such a disposition that the chief employment of the presiding person in the Committee is to guard against him and to prevent his doing mischief. Here is a man appointed, of the greatest possible power, of the greatest possible wickedness, in a situation to exert that power and wickedness for the destruction of the country, and without doubt it would require the greatest ability and diligence in the person at the head of that Council to prevent it. Such a constitution, allowed and alleged by the persons themselves who composed it, was, I believe, never heard of in the world.