CHAPTER IV THE BATTLE OF THE MARNE
Why, then, if it was so necessary and the object of it so important, was the move begun by General von Kluck on September 3 a false move?
It was a false move because he ought to have stood against the forces opposed to him. The defeat of those forces was necessary before the attack against Sezanne could be successful. Conversely, his own defeat involved failure of the great enterprise.
Instead, however, of facing and continuing his offensive against the forces opposed to him, he turned towards Sezanne. By doing that he exposed his flank to the Allied counter-stroke.
This blunder can only be attributed to the combined influences of, firstly, hurry; secondly, bad information as to the strength and positions of the Allied forces; thirdly, the false impression formed from reports of victories unaccompanied by exact statements as to losses; and fourthly, and perhaps of most consequence, the failure of the Crown Prince of Germany in the Argonne.
General von Kluck doubtless acted upon imperative orders. His incomplete information and the false impression his advance had created probably also led him to accept those orders without protest. But it should not be forgotten that the Commander primarily responsible for the blunder, and for the disasters it involved, was the Crown Prince of Germany.
Primarily the Crown Prince of Germany was responsible, but not wholly. In the responsibility General von Kluck had no small share. He was misled. When the British force arrived at Creil General Joffre resolved upon and carried out a masterly and remarkable piece of strategy. The British army was withdrawn from the extreme left of the Allied line on the north-east of Paris, and transferred to the south-east, and its former place taken by the 6th French army. This move, carried out with both secrecy and rapidity, was designed to give General von Kluck the impression that the British troops had been withdrawn from the front. That the ruse succeeded is now clear. So far from being withdrawn, the British army was brought up by reinforcements to the strength of three army corps. Leaving out of account a force of that strength, the calculations of the German Commander were fatally wrong.