The Battle of the Rivers

by Edmund Dane

The battle of the Aisne, destined to develop into the longest conflict on record—it extended over two whole months—began on the afternoon of Sunday, September 13. To follow its complexities it is necessary clearly to grasp, not only the military purposes or objectives the two sides had immediately in view, but the respective situations of the opposing masses as regards fighting efficiency. When operations are on this gigantic scale a certain amount of imagination must be exercised to realise even the barest facts.

From Compiègne eastward to Rheims the Allied line was formed by the 6th French, the British, and the 5th French armies. To the first for the moment was assigned the duty of forcing the passages of the Aisne from below Soissons, clearing the enemy off the western end of the ridge, and pushing him up to Noyon on the Oise.

The business which fell to the British army was that of delivering a frontal attack on this natural hill fortress from Soissons as far as Craonne.

The 6th French army, which by a vigorous forward thrust had driven the enemy out of Rheims, was to push up through the transverse gap to Berry-au-Bac, and assault the hostile positions on the hillsides along the east side of the gap. Along these hills the Germans had settled themselves in force. Here, too, there were many chalk quarries and caves, which the Germans were using as shelters and stores.

At first sight it might well seem that the frontal attack undertaken by the British was not strictly a necessary operation. Clearly, the feasible way of driving the Germans out of their fastness was to turn the flanks of the position on the west through Lassigny and Noyon, and on the east through Berry-au-Bac. The main operation was, of course, that of turning the position from the west, for the right of the German position remained its vulnerable point. It was essential, however, to the success of that operation that General von Kluck should not be able to meet it in force until, at all events, the Allied troops had taken a firm grip.

Now, if the British army had assumed a merely watching attitude on the south side of the Aisne, and had in consequence been able to extend their line from the south of Craonne down the river to, say, Attichy, some ten miles below Soissons, that, while leaving nearly the whole strength of the 6th French army free to undertake the turning movement, would at the same time have left General von Kluck also free to throw his main strength against it.

A vigorous and pressing attack along his front was consequently essential, in order to keep his main force employed. Not only was the attack essential, but it had to be launched against him without delay, and before he could recover from the effects of his retreat.

Including the troops recalled from Amiens, Generals von Kluck and von Bülow had under their command, nominally at any rate, ten army corps. If, deducting losses and war wastages, we put their strength in effectives at not more than the equivalent of six corps—it could have been very little more—yet six corps was, in the positions they held, a force fully able to cope with the nine corps making up the three Allied armies pitted then against them. Bearing in mind, indeed, the natural defensive advantages of the ridges on which the Germans had established themselves, and their facility for moving troops either for the purposes of defence or of counter-attack, their strongholds could have been held by three corps, leaving the remainder to be used on the flank for active operations.

Intended to frustrate that manœuvre, the British attack compelled the German commanders to await, before they could make any such attempt, the arrival of reinforcements. On both sides there was now a race against time. French reinforcements and reserves had to be brought up and massed against the flank of the German position. Many of those troops had, however, to cover long distances afoot. The movements of mass armies are comparatively slow. After all, the roads and railways traversing a country have a capacity which is limited. Some idea of what such movement involves may be formed from the traffic on a popular bank holiday. In the case of armies there is, in addition to human numbers, the artillery, the munitions, the camp equipment, the foodstuffs, and all the rest of the transport. No one, therefore, can be surprised that by the time these masses could be concentrated on the German flank, there were German masses who, under the same conditions, had been hurried forward to meet them. From the very necessities of time and space the race resulted to a great extent in a draw.

The Battle of the Aisne is in every respect unique. A battle in the ordinary sense of field operations it was not. It was a siege. Nothing at all like it had ever occurred before in war. There have been many sieges of banditti in mountain retreats. There have been sieges in old times of fortified camps. There had never been the siege under such conditions of a great army.