The retreat of any army—and most of all the retreat of a huge mass army—is not a simple matter. On the contrary, it is a most difficult and complex operation in the most favourable circumstances. Here, however, was not one mass army, but a line of mass armies, occupying a front forming a right angle, and opposed on each arm of that right angle by forces which had proved stronger than they. So situated, they could only retreat with any chance of safety by falling directly back; but either arm of the angle if it fell directly back must obstruct the retreat of the other; and if they fell directly back each at the same time, their movements must become exactly like those of the blades of a pair of scissors as they are being closed. A retreat under such conditions is a military impossibility.
Not a few fantastic motives have been attributed to the Germans, more particularly as regards the terrible struggle in West Flanders, but the plain truth of the matter is that here stated.
Now if we turn to the strategy of the Allies, bearing their governing motive in mind, we shall find that it rested primarily on the attack launched against the German positions north of the Aisne and round Rheims.
That attack wrecked the German scheme for resuming the offensive, and was the most effective means of assuring that end. It is impossible indeed not to recognise that the feat which reduced a force like the German armies to immobility is a masterpiece of strategy wholly without parallel in the annals of war. Whether we look at the breadth and boldness of its conception, at the patience and command of organisation with which it was carried out, at the grasp it displayed of the real conditions governing the operations of modern mass armies, or at the clear purpose and unswerving resolution with which it was followed, the plan equally calls forth surprise and admiration.
From the military standpoint, victory or defeat is the answer to the question: Which side has accomplished the purpose it had in view?
The German purpose of re-seizing the initiative was not accomplished. The German scheme of turning either one or both flanks of the Allied line was not accomplished. That is military failure.
From the beginning of October, when the struggle round Rheims was at its height, the feature of the campaign broadly was that the weight of the fighting passed progressively from the centre of the fighting front to the wings—to West Flanders on the one side, and to the Argonne and the Upper Meuse on the other. Progressively the Allied forces were placed where it was intended they should be placed. They accomplished the purpose which it was intended they should accomplish—that of keeping the main military strength of Germany helpless while they wasted that strength. That is military success.
To sum up. The Germans entered France with a force of more than a million and a half of men. The like of such a military expedition the world till then had never seen. The plan of it had been studied and worked out in detail for years. On the preparations for it had been bestowed a colossal labour. It appeared certain of success. It was defeated by an exercise of military skill and resource which, however regarded, must stand as one of the greatest records of mastery in the art of war.
FOOTNOTE:
[33] Some 70,000 motor-cars and motor-omnibuses are said to have been employed.