He judged justly of its effects because he relied upon essentials. On the one hand the Germans had a huge superiority in numbers. They had also at this time a superiority in heavy guns. On the other hand the Allies held the superior position. Further, they had a decisive superiority in field guns; not a numerical superiority, but one based on the greater power and accuracy of the "75" gun as compared with the German converted "77" gun. In 1899 just after the German Government had completed rearmament of its artillery with the "77," the French brought out the "75," the first really practicable quick-firing field gun until then known. This invention revolutionised modern gunnery. To meet it the Germans were forced to "convert" their "77" into a quick-firer. Their gun, however, remained distinctly inferior and out-classed. Neither in muzzle energy, muzzle velocity, nor consequently in range was it any match for the French weapon. Leading the way as they always have done in artillery improvements, the French had evolved, besides, a novel system of "fire discipline," for using this gun scientifically and with the maximum of effect. That system had already justified itself by striking results. In no small degree it was the "75" gun which had crushed the German resistance on the Marne. In no small degree, too, it was the "75" which had ruined the German attack upon Rheims. The "75" had withered the attempted turning movements from Noyon, and north of the Somme with the breath of death. Clearly, apart altogether from its strategical conception, sound and great at once as that conception was, General Joffre's plan of military envelopment was inspired by the aim of giving the widest effect to this superiority in gun-power. Here again is one of the facts of the war which has not been estimated at its right value, and has misled many critics of the Western "deadlock."
Now the German Higher Command well knew that in field artillery they were out-classed. The "75" has a muzzle energy of 333 foot-tons as compared with the 241·7 foot-tons of the German "77." The French artillerists also had solved the problem of the "universal shell," that is of a projectile combining the effects of a high explosive shell with those of a shrapnel shell. With the Germans this problem was still in the stage of experiment. In order to off-set such marked disadvantages the German Government had gone in largely for heavy howitzers. When the war broke out they had undoubtedly a superiority in that class of weapon. The French scheme of rearmament with howitzers had only begun. This was perhaps one reason for the German precipitancy. Upon their superiority in heavy howitzers they now largely relied for their second contemplated "drive."
Artillery, however, is not the final word. Nor was this placing of the British Force on the northern wing of the German armies in any sense an accidental choice of location. It was certain that the German attack, initiated with their heavy cannon, would be driven home, if it could be driven home, by assaults in mass formation from their infantry. The necessity then was for a force which could be relied upon in any event to stop such rushes. That force was pre-eminently the British army. The British army were a body of expert riflemen. They were more. They, and they alone, were armed with a rifle capable of firing 15 rounds "rapid." Delivered by troops who can keep cool under the experience, 15 rounds "rapid" will stop the densest rush ever organised. The British army had shown themselves able to do it. They formed the element of the Allied forces which in a case like this could, if it were humanly possible, save the situation.
It will be seen, therefore, that the scheme of the Allied generals though it seemed to lack spectacular magnificence, was business, and was in every sense and emphatically war.
CHAPTER III
THE EVE OF YPRES
The plan of the Allied commanders, at once original and bold, was decided upon at that conference at the British head-quarters on the Aisne. From the first in this war the French Intelligence Service has shown itself excellent. The French Head-quarters Staff has not only been well and reliably informed of the enemy's preparations and movements, but promptly informed. In this instance the prospective movements were a matter of almost certain inference. Given the motives of the German Government, and the military principles favoured by the German Staff, both quite well known, and what they would do and how they would try to do it, was a conclusion that a general much less sagacious than Joffre might safely draw. The exact extent and character, however, of the German preparations, and the degree to which those preparations had been advanced was definite information of a valuable kind.
It is apposite here to note its effect. On September 9 the Belgians made a sortie in force from Antwerp, and on the following day recaptured Malines and Termonde. In consequence of this part of the German reinforcements, three army corps, which were on the march from Liège and had already reached the French frontier, had to be recalled. That army became engaged in the first attack upon Antwerp. The object, their diversion, had been gained. When, after discovering that an attack upon Antwerp was hopeless without heavy siege guns, they finally reached the front in France, the purpose for which they had been dispatched, that of attempting to outflank the Allies to the west of Noyon, had become impracticable.
We know now that the German Government had determined to avenge this disappointment by the capture of Antwerp. That, however, for the reasons already stated was fully expected. The siege employed another German army from September 25 to October 9. True, the Germans had the satisfaction of occupying the city, and of such political effects and impressions as that occupation produced. On the other hand there can be no sort of doubt that had those troops, thrown through the gap which then existed between Ghent and Bethune, seized Calais, and been able hold to the line from the coast to Bethune, the military effect would have been twenty times more serious. Instead of doing that the German Government swallowed the bait of Antwerp, only to discover when too late, and when they had let the critical days pass, that the hook was the British army at Ypres, which during a month's furious fighting in the effort to retrieve their error cost the Germans over 300,000 casualties, and what was worse, the wreckage of their Western campaign.
Before entering on a description of the operations which, in fact, during the later weeks of October and the first two weeks of November decided the future course of the war, it is advisable to have in mind a clear picture of the terrain of this mighty and memorable conflict.
If the reader looks at a map of France he will see that from the outlet of the Somme, the coast of the English Channel takes a sudden bend to the north, and that not far from Calais it swerves sharply round again to the east. If from near the mouth of the Somme we draw a line running north-east, that line, roughly parallel to the line of the coast from the point at which the shore bends round near Calais, will mark approximately the boundary of a difference in the height of the country above sea level. South-east of this line the country is considerably higher. North-west of it the country is as a whole low-lying and flat. In fact the line may be called an inland coast divided from the sea by a stretch of flats having an average breadth of some twenty-five miles. The eastern area of these flats is the Pas de Calais; the western area Flanders.