All this while the Russian pressure on the East front had been growing and that prospective but fatal division of German forces was threatening to become more inevitable.
All this while, too, in order eventually to avoid that division more German reinforcements were pouring west.
As it stood at the beginning of October the position was thus: at Antwerp there was the Belgian army; at Ghent, under the command of Sir Henry Rawlinson there was the 7th British division of infantry, and the 3rd brigade of cavalry; there were some, though not many, British troops at Dunkerque; there were a few French troops at Bethune. Practically, however, between Ghent and the terminus of the French front west of Lens there were no Allied forces. Here was a gap of nearly 60 miles. If through that gap the Germans could push their way in strength, they could
(1) Separate the Belgian army and the British troops in Belgium from the rest of the Allied armies;
(2) Reach the coast and cut the most direct communications with England;
(3) Pursue their outflanking scheme by turning the right of the French line.
For the Germans the necessity for carrying out that scheme had day by day become more urgent. The opportunity at last seemed to lie to their hand. They proceeded to seize it.
Now let us turn to the other side. If General Joffre could close this gap and extend his line directly northwards to the coast, he would
(1) Save a considerable slice of territory and coast from German occupation;
(2) Keep open the most direct communication with England;