By December, 1865, conventions had met in all of the states where Johnson had appointed provisional governors. The ordinance of secession had been repealed or had been declared void; slavery had been abolished. All but two states had repudiated the Confederate debt, and all but two had adopted the Thirteenth Amendment. State governments had been organized and representatives and senators had been generally elected. In fact, all of the eleven seceding states save Texas were ready, or in the process of getting ready, to be restored to the privileges of citizenship and participation in the legislation of the land.
During all this time, every effort had been put forth to induce Johnson to call a special session of Congress. Of its own volition, that body could not assemble until the regular time of meeting. The President, however, refused. He thoroughly disagreed with such radicals as were led by Charles Sumner of Massachusetts, Ben Wade of Ohio, and Thaddeus Stevens of Pennsylvania. His own theory of reconstruction was in accord with Lincoln’s ideas. It had been approved by the Cabinet. Johnson’s firm conviction was that, for the good of everyone concerned, he must put it into execution and he felt he could carry it out more easily without interference from Congress. He had begun his administration with the expressed approval of Northern leaders on his policy toward the South. But to delegate to himself, as he did, the handling of matters of such vital national importance, however they might have been approved, incurred criticism that never abated and that soon developed into open hostility.
He reiterated the Monroe Doctrine in reference to the occupation of Mexico by the French forces under Maximilian and threw down the gauntlet by stating that “now that the Civil War is over, the attention of the administration will be directed, among other matters, to that objectionable invasion.” This statement, coming from a man whose forcefulness in his office was already making itself felt, was most disturbing news to the hostile foreign financiers who had invested fully $600,000,000 in Confederate bonds, to say nothing of the vast sums expended on Confederate ships, supplies, and Southern cotton. Many of Mr. Johnson’s friends believed that this foreign antagonism started the propaganda against him. At any rate, a cabal of slander and distrust was started that resulted in the most trying situation a president was ever called upon to face. Abroad and at home, a torrent of abuse broke out.
The Thirty-ninth Congress was chiefly Republican. Thirty-nine of the fifty senators were of this party, while the political disparity in the House of Representatives was even greater.
Trouble started at once, for both Houses began to form a policy regarding the Southern States without waiting for the customary presidential message which, upon its receipt, did not meet with the approval of Congress. To add to the tension, twenty-two senators elect and a much larger delegation of representatives elect, representing the seceded states, sought seats in the legislative body. Both Houses of Congress refused admission to the waiting applicants, in spite of the fact that their state governments had been reorganized and had approved the Thirteenth Amendment.
A joint committee was appointed to consider the terms of reconstruction of the Southern States, and until this committee should report, no action would be taken to seat the waiting legislators elect. Congress thus repudiated what Johnson had done toward reconstruction and made it clear that it regarded the restoration of seceded states to a full participation in government a matter for legislative and not executive decision.
The Republican house leader, Thaddeus Stevens, was bitter against the South. He declared it to be his conviction that the Confederate states had been out of the Union, insisting that they were conquered territory, entirely under the disposition of Congress—a theory diametrically opposed to that of Abraham Lincoln and Johnson. Stevens attacked President Johnson’s policy in vigorous terms, denouncing it from every standpoint. Secretary of State Seward sought to have the subject brought into amicable discussion, but his efforts to get a friendly or even unbiassed hearing for the administration policy not only failed utterly but aroused a bitter contest that was aggravated on both sides by the persistent lampooning of the Chief Executive by the foreign press.
Photo. by Brady
ANDREW JOHNSON’S FIRST TAILOR SHOP
Now a Museum in Greeneville, Tennessee