| 12-pounder guns | 35 | |
| 6 do. do. | 57 | |
| 6-inch howitzers | 13 | |
| 24-pounder do. | 17 | |
| Total guns | 122 | |
| 12-pounder spare gun-carriages | 6 | |
| 6 do. do. | 8 | |
| Howitzer do. | 6 | |
| 12-pounder waggons. | 74 | |
| 6 do. do. | 71 | |
| Howitzer do. | 50 | |
| Forge do. | 20 | |
| Imperial guard do. | 52 | |
| General total | 409 |
Exclusive of those taken by the Prussians, on the field and in the pursuit.
Our readers will give us credit for having observed a strict impartiality throughout our narrative of the battle; and in the same spirit would we desire to discuss those questions relating to it, which have given rise to so many false and exaggerated statements.
The first subject of controversy we shall notice, is the strange, but oft repeated charge, against Wellington’s military judgment, in choosing his position in front of Mont-St.-Jean, with a forest in his rear, in case of defeat. I must be excused if I show some little indignation at the repetition of this charge; a British soldier must be allowed to be as jealous of the fame of his illustrious commander, as our gallant opponents were of that of their idolized Napoleon. Well, what is the charge? That the Waterloo position was not well chosen for a retreat, having defiles and a wood in its rear.
We begin our examination of this point by remarking that Wellington chose the position, not in a hurry, nor because he was forced to do so, but most deliberately, and after having thoroughly reconnoitred it. He chose it with the conviction that he could well maintain it until the Prussians could form a junction with him; this accomplished, he knew that the French would not have a single chance left. He had but one apprehension; namely, that the enemy would push on by Hal, and turn the allied right. But Napoleon’s holding us too cheap, his impetuosity, or his desperation, brought him headlong upon our chosen position: the very best for our purposes between Charleroi and Brussels. Let the event assist the impartial reader in deciding which commander showed the better judgment in selecting his ground for action. But as far as the Duke is concerned, it is quite unnecessary to say anything in his defence. Nor should we have attempted to give a description of the Waterloo position, but for the judgment of Napoleon, at least as coming to us through the generals de Montholon, Gourgaud, de Las-Cases, Mr. O’Meara, etc., being so directly at variance with that practicality shown by the duke of Wellington, who, we supposed, had previously both taken up and successfully defended too many positions, not to know the local requisites of a good one, and particularly as opposed to a French army. Waterloo was not fixed upon at the spur of the moment, as I have elsewhere shown; in addition to which, the Duke, his staff, and most of our generals were so often over the ground before the battle, that the farmers complained of the damage done thereby to their crops. It may be well to observe, for the information of those who are unacquainted with the position and localities, that the main-road from the field of Waterloo to Brussels is a very wide and well paved one. The road to the capital by Braine-l’Alleud and Alsemberg is also paved[82]. Several cross-roads, in rear of our position, likewise traverse the forest of Soigne, and communicate with the high-road between this and Brussels. The trees of the forest, and the hedges, banks, and buildings on the sides of the roads, would have afforded excellent protection to light troops covering a retreat, and have materially aided to keep the pursuing enemy at bay. Close in rear of the allied army and along the verge of the wood, was a most advantageous ridge, which might have offered an excellent second position, and from whence the guns could command everything within their range. The forest of Soigne itself, composed of lofty trees, afforded a shelter which resolute men could not be easily driven from: being nearly free from underwood, it was everywhere passable for broken infantry and cavalry, and from which no earthly force could have dislodged us, unless we willed it. When the duke of Wellington, some years after the battle, was asked what he would have done, had he been driven from his position at Waterloo, his Grace replied, “I should have gone into the wood.” The impartial opinion of the celebrated and able military writer Jomini may with propriety be here cited:
“We have said that one of the essentials in a position is, that it should offer the means of retreat; which brings us to the consideration of a question created by the battle of Waterloo. Supposing an army to be posted in front of a forest, having a good road behind its centre and each of its wings; would it be compromised, as Napoleon asserts, in the event of its losing the battle? For my own part, I think, on the contrary, that such a position would be more favourable for retreating, than if the country were perfectly open; since a beaten army cannot traverse a plain without being exposed to the utmost danger. Doubtless, if the retreat should degenerate into a disorderly flight, a portion of the guns remaining in battery in front of the forest would probably be lost; but the infantry, the cavalry, and the rest of the artillery, would be able to retire with as much facility as across a plain. But if, on the contrary, the retreat takes place with order, nothing can possibly protect it better than a forest: provided always, there exist at least two good roads behind the lines; that the enemy be not allowed to press too close, before the requisite measures preparatory to retiring are thought of; and that no lateral movement shall enable the enemy to anticipate the army at the outlets from the forest, as happened at Hohenlinden. It would also greatly tend to secure the retreat, if, as was the case at Waterloo, the forest should form a concave line behind the centre; for such a bend would then become a regular place d’armes, in which to collect the troops and afford time to file them successively into the high-road[83]”.
General Jomini’s doctrine, with the grounds on which it clearly rests, will have more weight with the honest reader, (be he a military man or a civilian, Frenchman or an Englishman,) than the fond opinions of Napoleon’s admirers.
Let us now turn to the Duke of Wellington’s plans and expectations, and we shall have ample evidence of his quick perception, consummate skill and unrivalled judgment.
The Duke was at Vienna at the moment the news reached him of Bonaparte’s escape from Elba, and of his landing in France. The following letter records the first impressions made by this event in the Austrian capital, and the full conviction which Wellington immediately felt, that the enemy of Europe’s peace would be speedily overthrown.
To Viscount Castlereagh, K. G.