CHAPTER XI.
Napoleon’s plans of campaign.—His letter to Ney, and proclamation to the Belgians.—His sanguine expectations, and utter disappointment.—Opinions of French authors on the circumstance of Napoleon’s not reaching Brussels.—Their inconsistencies.—Desire of Napoleon to make his marshals responsible for errors he committed.—Opinion of M. de Vaulabelle.—Napoleon’s charges against Grouchy; impossibility of the latter’s preventing a portion of the Prussians reaching the field of Waterloo.—The Emperor’s charges against Ney refuted.—Admirable conduct of Ney during the campaign.—Mode of history-writing at St.-Helena.—The battle not fought against the French nation.—Napoleon’s character.—Motley composition and equivocal loyalty of part of the allied army.—Refutation of the charge that the Duke was taken by surprise; credulity of some English writers on this subject.—His Grace’s admirable precaution.—Foreign statements, that the Prussians saved us, examined.—The tardy cooperation of the Prussians produced, not the defeat, but the total rout of the French.—Conversation of Napoleon at St.-Helena.—Gourgaud’s account.—Opinions of the Duke and lord Hill.—Ney’s testimony in the Chamber of Peers.
What were Napoleon’s plans, and how sanguine were his expectations, will be placed beyond all doubt by the following letter, written to the prince de la Moskowa, the renowned Ney, who had joined the army but the evening before, and by his proclamation addressed to the Belgians.
To the Prince de la Moskowa.
“Charleroi, June 16th, 1815.
“COUSIN,
“I send you the present letter by my aide-de-camp, general Flahaut. The Major-General (Soult) must have already dispatched orders to you, but you will receive these sooner, because my officers are faster than his. You will receive the general order of the day; but I wish to write to you in detail, because it is of the very highest importance.
“I advance marshal Grouchy with the third and fourth corps of infantry upon Sombreffe, and my guard upon Fleurus, where I shall be in person before mid-day. If I find the enemy there, I shall attack him, and drive everything before me as far as Gembloux. There I shall decide, according to the events of the morning, what is to be done. My decision will be made, perhaps at three o’clock, perhaps in the evening. My intention is, that the moment I have determined on my plan, you should be in readiness to march on Brussels. I will support you with the guard, which will be at Fleurus or at Sombreffe; and I should like to reach Brussels to-morrow morning. You should set forward this evening, if I can form my plan in time for you to hear from me to-day, and you should march three or four leagues before night, and be in Brussels at seven to-morrow morning.
“You can dispose of your troops in the following manner: One division two leagues in advance of Quatre-Bras, if there should be no obstacle: Six divisions of infantry about Quatre-Bras, and one division at Marbais, in order that I may have its assistance, should I want it, at Sombreffe; but this is not to delay your march: Count de Valmy’s corps, which contains three thousand cuirassiers of élite, at the intersection of the Roman way with the Brussels road, in case I should need it; as soon as ever I have formed my plan, you will order this division to rejoin you.