Sir John Davis determined upon seeking redress for the various insults and outrages which had been inflicted, whatever might be the propriety of requesting the concession of such advantages as the merchants sought. In the opinion of Sir John, who knew the Chinese well, no demand would meet with attention which was not backed with military force. Orientals comprehend only that argument which Europeans regard as the dernier resort. The Chinese authorities were taken by surprise, or they would have prepared for resistance, and met the military demonstration of the English governor with defiance or stratagem. Major-general D’Aguilar commanded the British troops. As soon as he received the directions of the plenipotentiary, he consulted with Captain M’Dougall in command of her majesty’s ship Vulture. These officers agreed that the force at their disposal was inadequate to the enterprise, but that, as audacity and promptitude were the best weapons with oriental nations, it would be well to act at once with such forces as they could employ. General D’Aguilar considered it also important to impress practically upon the mind of the Chinese authorities the possibility of the garrison and the naval force at Hong-Kong being sufficient, without aid from India or England, to chastise any affronts or injuries offered to British persons, honour, or interests. It had been well if, in subsequent events, similar views had been entertained by British officers and British governments. The promptitude of the general’s action harmonised with the wisdom and boldness of his opinion. By midnight of the day on which he received his orders, the troops were embarked; and at nine o’clock the following morning the squadron arrived at the Bocca Tigris. The Vulture then lowered her boats, into which the general ordered two detachments, the one under Lieutenant-colonel Brereton, the other under his own immediate orders. On landing, all the batteries were seized, the guns spiked, the ammunition destroyed, and the garrisons sent, unmolested, away. This bold measure was necessary to the safety of the general’s small force, for had he left these batteries in his rear, his return would have been endangered. At six o’clock, the squadron arrived at Whampoa. As the Vulture was of too large a draught to proceed higher, the troops were placed on board the steamers Pluto and Corsair. Sir John Davis accompanied the general in the Pluto. At eleven o’clock the squadron arrived before several forts, which were attacked. Lieutenant-colonel Brereton, landing, took two of them by a coup de main, blowing in the gates with gunpowder, and instantly seizing and spiking the guns. General D’Aguilar and his party were received by the other two forts with round and case shot, but the boats pushed in, blew open the gates, and spiked the guns, the garrison retreating by the rear. The expedition then proceeded to the French Folly Fort, a stronger place than any of those already captured, and situated on one of the narrowest bends of the river. The British swooped down upon this place as an eagle upon its prey, and their rapidity was rewarded by its immediate capture, for a few minutes delay and the guns of the work would have given our troops a reception more warm than welcome. Four other batteries were taken and spiked on their way up river by the general and commodore, and by six o’clock in the evening the troops were landed in the factories. Eight hundred and seventy-nine pieces of Chinese cannon had been spiked, to the amazement of the enemy, who had no time to recover from the panic into which so sudden an incursion threw them. The general, upon landing, placed the factories in a state of efficient defence by barricades, and such other means as were at his immediate command. The Chinese commissioner, Keying, now waited upon Sir John Davis, but refused to comply with his demands; the next day, however, the high commissioner requested another day’s delay. This was granted, and the terms demanded were ultimately agreed to by the commissioner. General D’Aguilar withdrew the troops, except a company of sappers, and the light company of the 18th royal regiment of the line. These were ordered to remain until what was promised should be fully executed. This feat of the English general’s was one of the most dashing ever executed with so small a body of men. The whole military force did not amount to one thousand men, and the naval force could only afford a few hundred sailors and marines for land operations. Audacity and rapidity carried the day—the grand secret of success in Asiatic warfare.
The Chinese, however, had no intention of observing the treaty; and when all appeared to be adjusted, six British subjects, who made a short excursion, in agreement with one of its clauses, were barbarously murdered. They were attacked by the whole population of the place which they visited. The Englishmen, when at last compelled to defend themselves, slew one and wounded several of their assailants. It required much negotiation to secure the punishment of some of the murderers, four of whom were decapitated, and a few others received minor punishments.
Whenever the French found that the British displayed vigour towards the Chinese, they made out a grievance, and sent an armed force to demand redress somewhere. Their object seemed to be to show that France also was a great nation, and could enforce respect. Two French ships of war appeared in the Bay of Touron during this year, to demand redress from the government of Cochin China, for injuries alleged to have been inflicted upon French Roman Catholic priests. Their demand not having been at once complied with, and some treachery on the part of the natives having been detected, the French ships opened fire upon the war-junks, sinking and destroying many, and slaying more than a thousand men.
The conduct of the Chinese to Europeans generally, during the year 1847, kept them, the British more especially, in a constant sense of danger. Applications were made for reinforcements, but, notwithstanding the prodigious armaments of England in India, and her resources elsewhere, it was with extreme difficulty that any additional force could be obtained. The following parliamentary papers show the perilous routine necessary on every occasion when our officers require even the most paltry reinforcement. General D’Aguilar applied to Major-general Smelt, the officer commanding at Ceylon, for two guns and a few artillerymen. In a month after, General Smelt wrote to Lord Fitzroy Somerset, the military secretary at the Horse-Guards, informing him that if he (General Smelt) heard again from General D’Aguilar that the reinforcement was necessary, he would send it! but that, in doing so, he should leave Ceylon all but utterly unprotected, so far as artillery was concerned. Lord Torrington, the governor of Ceylon, at the same time communicated this “great fact”—that two guns and a few men were wanting at Hong-Kong—to Earl Grey, the colonial minister, who, at the latter end of November, sent a despatch to General D’Aguilar, telling him not to do anything against the Chinese without authority from home! The discretionary power in the hands of Sir John Davis, and the promptitude, energy, and enterprise of the general, obtained, with less bloodshed than frequently occurred in a street riot in Canton, redress of grievances, a recognition of rights, and a series of important concessions. If it had been necessary to refer these disputes to the Colonial Office at home, everything would have been frustrated. Possibly a grand expedition, at an enormous expense, would have gone out in a year or so afterwards, and an expenditure of British as well as Chinese life on a large scale have resulted. In spheres so distant, men thoroughly competent to act ought, in both civil and military matters, to be appointed, and the honour of the country should be committed to their hands. With a small force, complete in itself, at the disposal of such men, more could be effected at the moment for the honour and interests of the country than by long and roundabout despatches, passing through so many hands that one fool in authority nullifies all, as a bad link in an otherwise good chain renders the whole useless. Omitting the other portions of the correspondence, the following letter from Major-general D’Aguilar, dated Hong-Kong, August 21, 1847, to Major-general Smelt, reveals sufficiently the incompetent arrangements for British interests in China, in 1847:—
“Although I have not the pleasure of your personal acquaintance, your character and services are so well known to me, that I venture to address you without form or ceremony. I have every reason to hope that things will settle down here peaceably, but I have no positive assurance of it; and if circumstances should occur to oblige me to go to Canton again, I am but badly off for artillery. I can never hope to surprise the Chinese defences a second time; and whatever I do must be done in form, and with reference to the altered position of things.
“Under these circumstances, I write to ask if you can spare me half a company of artillery, with their proportionate number of field-guns and ammunition complete. I should only want them for six weeks, and I promise you to send them faithfully back the moment the service is over.
“Should the contingency—the possibility of which is on the cards—occur, I shall endeavour to avoid taking the field before the end of November, when the cool weather will add strength to our exertions; and I will take care to give you the earliest notice of my intention. In the meantime, perhaps, you would kindly prepare Lord Torrington for this request on my part, and afford me your interest in giving effect to it, should circumstances render it necessary.
“A couple of 9-pounders, with the half-company of artillery, would be the best; but if they are not to be had, then anything your people are supplied with.”
On receipt of the above, Major-general Smelt wrote as follows to Lieutenant-general Lord Fitzroy Somerset.
The letter was dated Colombo, Ceylon, September 22nd, 1847:—