“All letters agree in stating that a panic overtook the —— when ordered to charge. I hear on all sides that it would be a wise and prudent measure on the part of the governor-general to recall Lord Gough from the Punjaub, and restrain his ill-judged valour within our peaceful provinces. His lordship fancied himself at Donnybrook Fair, and was in the thick of it, in the mêlée, and lost to sight!
“P.S.—The 56th regiment native infantry was brought out of action with three hundred men, under the command of its junior captain, a cadet of 1840!”
These communications, although affording intelligence which was, unfortunately, too true, were in several respects erroneous. They placed matters in a gloomy aspect, which was not justified by the facts. The battle of Chillianwallah, however doubtful as a victory, and however disastrous as to the loss which we experienced, neither perilled the existence of British rule in India, nor shook the hold of the English upon the Punjaub. The arrival of the despatches, and the issue of an extraordinary gazette, in some measure reassured the public; and as Lord Gough was decidedly and deservedly a favourite, people became anxious that before Sir Charles Napier should arrive out and take the command of the army, his lordship might be enabled to revenge Chillianwallah by a well-fought battle and decided victory. The friends of Lord Gough even entertained the hope that he might conclude the campaign by the entire dispersion of the Sikh army, and the reconquest of the Punjaub. It was very generally felt that the ministry, whatever their private feeling and private intentions, had shown too much eagerness to disclaim him, and to signify, by making their only measure for the emergency in India the appointment of a new commander-in-chief, that they supposed the blame of any misfortunes there to have been exclusively with Lord Gough. Military men pointed out that the previous policy of Lord Hardinge, and the immediate policy of Lord Dalhousie, both as it regarded their military and political management, invited the resistance to our power which had been awakened. The chief apprehensions entertained arose from the course which Gholab Singh and Dost Mohammed might pursue. The former, with his Sikh soldiery, occupied positions that kindled some suspicion of his intentions, while he had, as an ostensible ally, omitted to strike a single blow in our favour. He had collected, it was alleged, one hundred and fifty pieces of cannon; and he was represented as having declared that his control over his own soldiers was imperfect, and that their sympathy was wholly with the troops of Chuttur and Shere Singh. As it was not uncommon for the native princes, when hesitating between the British and their enemies, to represent their soldiers as untrustworthy and dangerous to themselves, Gholab’s account of himself, his province, and his army, caused him reasonably to be suspected. Dost Mohammed rendered substantial aid to Shere Singh; at least twelve thousand Affghans were encamped under the command of that general, and fresh levies were said to be descending the passes from Peshawur and from Candehar towards Scinde. Reports had arrived in England that all the Affghan chieftains were in arms, and that the war of the prophet was proclaimed. The Affghan infantry were without discipline, and out of their own fastnesses it was presumed that they would not display courage; but some supposed that, subjected to the Sikh discipline, and led by Sikh officers, as well as by their own chiefs, they would prove formidable, being physically a fine race, and naturally brave. The reinforcements sent by them, however, were chiefly composed of cavalry, and their efforts as auxiliary to our enemies were too tardy to influence materially the fortunes of the war; by degrees these facts became known at home, and the absence, in Lord Gough’s despatches, of any alarm, and the entire confidence breathed through them and the official tidings from the Indian government, at last wholly reassured the English public.
The following is the list of ordnance and ordnance stores captured from, the enemy in the action of the 13th of January:—
Six of these guns had carriages and limbers, and six were without limbers; all of the pattern nearly in use with our field-pieces.
Two ammunition carriages (one partly destroyed by explosion), one platform-cart, one hundred and forty-four cartridge-liners fixed to shot, sixteen cartridges unfixed, and eighteen port-fires, were also taken.
Assault of Dullah by General Wheeler.—Lord Gough was unable to undertake any active operations after the severe losses at Chillianwallah, until he should receive reinforcements. These he expected from Mooltan, under Whish, and also a brigade of Wheeler’s force, which had been actively engaged in another direction, where he had been detained by the obstinacy of a rebel chief named Earn Singh. This redoubtable chieftain was ascendant in the Baree Doab, and he occupied a strong fortified position on the heights of Dullah. In the middle of January Wheeler attacked this position, but so inaccessible was the fastness that the most he could, do, and that with considerable loss, was to drive out Ram Singh and his followers, whereas the gallant general hoped to accomplish either his capture or destruction. On the 11th, Wheeler ordered the 4th native infantry to take up a position to the northward of the enemy’s post, so as to intercept him in case he should be obliged to evacuate the fort, and retreat in that direction; the main force tarried at Shorpore, where they had been in quarters, until the 13th, the sappers, pioneers, and labourers being engaged in making a practicable road through an exceedingly difficult country consisting of defiles and “ghauts.” This road was laid for about seven miles, as far as the village of Cote on the course of the Ravee, about three miles distant from Ram Singh’s position. On the 14th, the little army of General Wheeler took up ground under the Dullah heights. That day and the next was occupied in cutting roads, transporting guns and mortars upon elephants, and making arrangements for storming the fort. On the morning of the latter day, Captain Hicks, of the 3rd native infantry, was dispatched with four companies of that regiment, and Mr. Hodgson, with two companies of the Guide corps, to take post west of the Dullah heights, on the opposite bank of the Ravee. The precautions taken by detaching these bodies of men were necessary from the topographical character of the neighbourhood. The Ravee, debouching from the mountainous region in which it has its birth, flows through a beautiful valley, where a series of hills runs from east to west, presenting an unequal ridge; on this ridge, overlooking the river, the little village of Dullah was situated, in which Ram Singh had so cleverly fortified himself. In every direction from the village the rock dipped almost perpendicularly, beside being protected by the river, which wound partly around it. Access was by paths, partly lying in hollows formed by former streams, and partly cut through the rock. These paths were circuitous, and nearly covered with brushwood, admitting only by single file of an approach to the platform on which the village rested. On either side of the path were precipices from twenty to eighty feet deep, and huge boulders lay profusely across the way. A few men could defend such a position against very many. The 4th native regiment was to advance against the face of this defence, from the direction where it had taken post some days, and the signal was to be the firing of a gun from the British camp. The 3rd and the Guides were at the same moment ordered to advance, at the same signal, against the west of the ridge, and crown a height visible from head-quarters. As soon as the success of this detachment was ascertained, the remainder of the 3rd regiment, and two hundred men of the 2nd irregular cavalry, who, with Lieutenant Swinton, had volunteered to serve on foot, were to advance upon another face of the ridge, from the little village of Chulbarah, where they had been posted; this party, ascending a spur of the hill on its left, was to co-operate opportunely with the advance of the other detachments. Major Fisher, at the head of a body of regular native infantry and irregular cavalry, with guns mounted upon elephants, were in support, and to ascend (the cavalry, of course, dismounting) when the various detachments had come well into action. There was yet another point upon which an ascent was to be attempted—that which was in front of the camp of the British. Major Davidson, with a few hundred Sikh auxiliaries, regular and irregular, supported by two companies of the 1st Sikh light infantry, under Lieutenant Peel, was ordered to make this attempt.
At the moment for action, the signal gun was fired, but no one appeared to take any notice of it—no men were seen to make their way along the ridge. There was a long pause on the side of the British, the guns of the enemy at the same time firing. None of the detachments appearing on the ridge, Major Butler was ordered to attempt to storm it, in conjunction with the other party already appointed to ascend in front: this was happily accomplished, after a very sharp conflict. Major Davidson was shot through the hand, Lieutenant Peel was mortally wounded, and Lieutenant Christie killed. The detached parties, trusting to native guides, were purposely misled, and thus could not come into action. Ram Singh had by this means the way kept open for his retreat when resistance was no longer possible, and all the skilful arrangements that had been made to catch the eagle in his eyrie were thwarted by the treachery of the natives, who had been, unfortunately, too implicitly trusted in an important service.
Retreat of Shebe Singh from Chillianwallah.—On the 12th of February Shere Singh struck his tents, and retired from the strong positions which he had so skilfully occupied. Lord Gough threw forward his cavalry, but the Sikh general interposed the whole of his mounted force, covering effectually his retreat. On the 15th the English general learned that the Sikhs were at Wuzeerabad, and his spies informed him that the sirdar was marching upon Lahore. It is probable that these reports were correct, but the approach of a portion of General Whish’s army defeated the project. The cavalry of Whish were pushed on to the Chenab, preventing the passage of the ford of Wuzeerabad. The sirdar swept the whole district of supplies, and sent messengers to Chuttur Singh informing him of his dangers, and intimating that he would take post at Goojerat. Chuttur Singh hastened to the support of Shere, and their united forces constituted a splendid army of eighty thousand men, with fifty-nine pieces of cannon, most of them of large calibre, and worked by a choice body of artillerymen. While Whish guarded the fords of the Chenab, Wheeler hastened to join Lord Gough, having cleared the Baree Doab of Ram Singh and his adherents. On the 16th his lordship left Saporee, and arrived at Sundalpoor, a village only a few miles from the Chenab, which separated his army from that of the victor of Mooltan. The latter skilfully fabricated a bridge of boats at Hurreke Puttum, and joined the commander-in-chief. While this was being accomplished, a body of Affghans from Dost Mohammed Khan, who professed to be neutral, joined the enemy. The entire number of Lord Gough’s army, after every accession, scarcely exceeded twenty-five thousand men. The enemy, when joined by the Affghans, nearly quadrupled the forces of the British general. Lord Gough, however, determined to attack him, and on the 20th reconnoitred his position with that object. Shere Singh made the village of Goojerat his head-quarters: this place lay between the Jhelum and the Chenab, nearer to the former; a small river ran nearly around it, but was at that juncture very low, so that its bed was in some places nearly dry. Between this river and the city, the enemy had taken his position.
Lord Gough resolved upon his plan of attack, and early on the 21st put it into execution.