The events which followed will best and most briefly be depicted by a quotation from the author’s work already referred to.
Four days after the declaration of war, the sultan made a formal demand for the allied fleets to enter the Dardanelles. The demand was complied with, and the ministers of the Western powers presented the admirals with great “pomp and circumstance” to the sultan. The further request of the sultan that the fleets or a portion of them should pass also the straits of the Bosphorus was refused by the ambassadors, on the ground that the Western powers were not at war with Russia. In vain the foreign minister of the sultan urged the danger to which his ships and coasts were exposed in the Black Sea. The answer was, that Prince Gortschakoff had promised to make the war on the part of Russia strictly defensive; and that Count Nesselrode, in his circular despatch (above referred to), had repeated that promise. There was, in the opinion of the ambassadors, no reason for doubting the good faith of the Russian government; and they would not, by a demonstration so hostile as that of sending the fleets into the Enxine, provoke Russia to change the character of the war, and make it one of offensive operation. The reply of the Turkish minister was, that Russia could not make the war offensive upon the shores of the Black Sea if the fleets were to cruise there and that the only chance of her being able to convert the war upon the Danube into one of active offensive operations, was her having command of the Black Sea for the easy transport of stores of all kinds to the vicinity of the armies. This reasoning, irrefutable although it obviously was, and most important as it soon and fatally proved itself to be, was met by the reply that the ambassadors had no instructions for any demonstration more active than the assemblage of the fleets for the protection of Stamboul. Again the Turkish minister pressed upon the ambassadors and admirals the exposed situation of the coast of the Black Sea and the Turkish squadron within its waters; and showed that, for the present, there was no necessity for the allied fleets in the Sea of Marmora; that the sultan, in calling them through the Dardanelles, contemplated their further progress through the other straits; that the Russians could not endanger the capital until they had forced the Danube, captured Shumla and Sophia, forced the passes of the Balkan, and were victors at Adrianople; or, from the eastern frontier, had pushed a victorious campaign from the Caucasus, through Asia Minor. It was, however, in vain that the enlightened men then in the Turkish foreign-office demonstrated that if the fleets were sent to defend Turkey, the Black Sea was their appropriate sphere of action: the admirals had no orders, and the ambassadors would give them none, and pleaded the absence of any discretionary power.
While the fleets spread the tricolor and the union-jack upon the gentle breezes of the Bosphorus, Omar Pasha, with frame of iron and intellect of light, seemed to do everything, as well as direct everything, upon the northern frontier of Bulgaria; and only just allowed the fifteen days’ “notice to quit” to expire, before he showed Russia and the world that the Turks had a general, and that with a general they were still soldiers, as when the blazing scimitar of Orchan first flashed upon Europe, or Byzantium shook before the thunder of the artillery of Mohammed II. They were still worthy of their father, Osman, the “Bone-breaker;” and, in hand-to-hand combat, an overmatch for the boors of Russia, both in courage and strength. It must be said, to their disadvantage, that they were not very precise concerning the declaration of war; for on the very day it was declared, and without the knowledge of their chief, a semi-brigade hurried over the river, fell upon a Russian detachment, routed it, seized a considerable booty, and, like true Bashi-bazouks, were away again upon their own side before the foray could be chastised.
With the end of October, the time granted to Prince Gortschakoff by Omar Pasha expired; by whom strong detachments were immediately expedited to the Russian side of the disputed river. Crossing at once in several places, they were soon established in some force upon the frontier of Wallachia, and pushing forward a strong advance-guard upon the Russians, the latter skirmished, refused battle, and slowly and sullenly retreated upon Slatina. The Turks fought and gained several sanguinary battles on the Danube during the month of November, which was followed by various contests, less important, but scarcely less sanguinary.
The month of November, however glorious to the Turkish armies, was disastrous to its navy. The fleet lay in the harbour of Sinope, upon the Black Sea. The Russians, contrary to the official declaration made to the allies, to confine the war to defensive operations, resolved to attack the Turkish fleet by a surprise. The enterprise of the Russian admiral was successful. The unsuspecting Turks were surprised; no opportunity of surrender was given; the attack led, not to a battle, but to a massacre. The whole fleet was destroyed, with an unsparing barbarity and a vindictive bloodthirstiness that must leave a stain for ever upon the pages of Russian history.
War continued to roll along the Bulgarian and Wallachian frontiers to the close of the year; the Turks displaying undaunted heroism, and surpassing the Russians in nearly every soldierly quality, so that the Russian armies lost by battles and marches 35,000 men, exclusive of the sick and wounded.
Prodigious efforts were made by the Russian emperor and the nation. The people contributed voluntarily 150 millions of silver rubles for the expenses of the war between the date of Omar Pasha’s crossing the Danube to the end of the year. Of this vast sum the clergy contributed nearly one-half. All Russia was wrought up to a pitch of fanatical enthusiasm for the war, and every heart burned with ambition to see the Greek cross upon the dome of St. Sophia.
Tidings of the massacre of Sinope flew through Europe, and every man out of Russia, Austria, and the countries inhabited by Greeks, perused the harrowing story with indignation and disgust. In England and France the popular feeling against the tardiness of their governments rose high. The English ministry never regained the confidence of the public. The Earl of Aberdeen, Mr. Gladstone, Mr. Sidney Herbert, and the Duke of Newcastle, were known to be the members of the cabinet chiefly accountable for the policy of respect and timidity towards Russia, which had caused the British nation to take so tame and unworthy a part. The diplomatists continued to lose time by tedious and worthless negotiations, giving Russia the advantage of calling forth and organizing her resources, and fomenting by her agents sedition and insurrection among the Greek subjects of the Porte.
Little was effected by the hostile powers upon the theatre of Asia after the declaration of war during that year, but the clangour of arms resounded on the shores of the Black Sea, and along the confines of the two great empires.