THE NAVY AND LAND ESTIMATES.
The number of forces to be employed by sea and land in the ensuing year indicated great designs: 28,000 seamen, and 50,000 men for the land-service being voted. Yet great as this force was, it was not considered sufficient for the emergency even by the opposition, who said that the establishment was far too great for peace, and far too small for such a war as ministers were embarking in. This, indeed, was the opinion of Lord Barrington, secretary at war, who used his utmost endeavours, both with the ministers and the king, to obtain a force commensurate with the undertaking. He in particular urged the necessity of reducing America by means of a powerful fleet, stating it as his opinion that its reduction could never be accomplished by the army, which was the staff on which ministers rested. But it was in vain that Lord Barrington warned and advised his colleagues in office, and counselled the king. It was held, that at present the naval force must be accompanied with an army, and the estimates of ministers were made and carried accordingly. The sentiments of Lord Barrington on this subject are fully shown in a letter which he wrote at an earlier date to the Earl of Dartmouth, then secretary for America. In this letter he remarked:—“First, I doubt whether all the troops in North America, though probably sufficient for a pitched battle with the strength of the province, are enow to subdue it, being of great extent and full of men accustomed to firearms. If the Massachusets—with whom the inhabitants of Connecticut and Rhode Island are said to have made common cause—were conquered they must be kept under by large armies and fortresses, the expense of which would be ruinous and endless. Second, because the most successful conquest that can be imagined must produce the horrors and bloodshed of civil war. Third, because a conquest by land is unnecessary, when the country can be reduced, first, by distress, and then to obedience, by our marines totally interrupting all commerce and fishery, and even seizing all the ships in the ports, with very little expense and bloodshed. To this might be added the punishment of the factious chiefs by impeachment or bill, if their persons can be secured; but till then any judicial proceedings would provoke, not hurt, and confer the palm of martyrdom without the pain of it, which is the perfection of fanatical beatitude. In respect to the other colonies south of New England, a strict execution of the Act of Navigation, and other restrictive laws, would probably be sufficient at present; and a small addition of frigates and sloops would so execute those laws as to prevent all commerce with foreign states. Those colonies should also be left to deal with the Indians, the mother country withdrawing the establishments made since the beginning of the late war for the management of the Indian affairs, and kept up till this day at a great expense. Though we must depend on our smaller ships for the active part of this plan, I think a squadron of ships of the line should be stationed in North America, both to prevent the intervention of foreign powers, and any attempt of the colonies to attack our smaller vessels by sea.” Lord Barrington next advised the removal of the troops from Boston to Canada, Nova Scotia, and East Florida, till they could be successfully employed, and then continued: “If these ideas are well-founded, the colonies will in a few months feel their distress; their spirits, not animated by any little successes on their part, or violence of persecution on ours, will sink; they will be consequently inclined to treat, probably to submit to a certain degree; and in my humble opinion, the whole is then over, for then, with dignity, we may make them concessions.” Had this system of blockade been adopted, there can be little doubt but America would have been preserved to England, for the Americans had then no fleet or any formidable fortifications on their coast. The advice, however, was rejected, and Lord Barrington was only prevented resigning office by the express desire of the king. But though Lord Barrington not only did not concur in the plans pursued by ministers, but sought to set them aside, yet as secretary of war, he obtained the chief odium of their failure. The principal blame, however, seems to be attached to the king: the plans were in reality his own, and he imposed them upon Lord North and the administration.
PETITION OF NOVA SCOTIA.
At the opening of this session, a petition was presented to both houses from Nova Scotia, which proposed to grant to his majesty in perpetuity a duty of poundage, ad valorem, on all commodities imported into the colony, not being the produce of the British dominions in Europe or America, bay-salt only excepted, by which means the amount of the revenue would keep pace with the wealth of the province. Ministers conceived that this loyal petition would serve as an example to the other colonies, and therefore gave it their support. They suggested a duty of eight per cent.; but objections were drawn from the unproductiveness compared with the old duties, and the small chance of other colonies following the example of a district which had always occasioned an expense to government, and ministers themselves finally abandoned it: nothing was heard of the petition after it went into committee.
PETITION OF CONGRESS.
On the 7th of November, a copy of the petition of congress alluded to in the king’s speech was laid before the lords. On its presentation, the Duke of Richmond seeing Mr. Penn below the bar, moved for his being examined before they entered upon the discussion of the petition. This was rejected by a majority of fifty-six against twenty-two, and the noble mover then made another motion, that Mr. Penn should be examined on the next day, which, after a long debate was conceded. The examination was conducted by the Duke himself, and the opinions elicited from it were, that the members of congress were men of character and intelligence; that the people considered themselves able to resist the arms of Great Britain employed to enforce the obnoxious acts; that the war was begun in defence of their liberties, and not with any desire of obtaining independence; that unless conciliatory measures were immediately pursued, it was probable connexions with foreign powers would be formed, which they would not be easily induced to renounce; and that they were dissatisfied with the reception of their petitions, though inclined to acknowledge the authority of Great Britain in all matters, except taxation. Penn was an honest man, and doubtless sincere in his sentiments, but he had certainly been deceived, like many others, and even some members of the congress itself. On this evidence, however, the Duke of Richmond moved that this petition, hollow as it must have appeared to men of deep reflection, was sufficient ground for a conciliation of the differences existing between America and the mother country. He was supported by Lords Shelburne and Sandwich, but the refusal to answer the petition was defended by Lords Dartmouth and Lyttleton, and the motion was negatived by a majority of eighty-six against thirty-three. On the side of government the Americans were denounced by Lord Lyttleton as audacious rebels; their sentiments as insiduous and traitorous; and their expressions of loyalty, false and hollow. On the other hand, opposition justified their conduct, and patted them on the back by assurances, that their native courage and the nature of their country rendered them an invincible people. Indeed, it cannot be doubted, that the views taken by the opposition in the British parliament, and the sentiments which they uttered on every favourable occasion, had the effect of confirming the colonists in their opposition to government, and stimulating them to increased exertions in order to gain a free, full, and final triumph.