FOREIGN AFFAIRS.—CHINA AND JAPAN.
A.D. 1858-1859
The foreign transactions of 1858 have been partly related in the last chapter; the conclusion of a peace with China, which was hailed with great satisfaction in Europe, was among those transactions. After the peace a work was published by Mr. Laurence Oliphant, who held a position on the civil staff of Lord Elgin, relating the events of the war. Mr. Oliphant had been distinguished as a traveller and writer, and his work upon the mission of Lord Elgin to the Eastern seas naturally excited very great attention. In that work it transpired that Sir Michael Seymour, the admiral commanding the British fleet in the Chinese waters, did not heartily co-operate with Lord Elgin. The admiral disapproved, or affected to disapprove, of the actively hostile proceedings of Lord Elgin. He was for carrying on the war by blockades and compromises, after the fashion desired by certain merchants in China and in England connected with the Chinese trade, who did not wish China thoroughly opened to all nations, or to all English merchants, and who desired to go on much in the old way—dealing and quarrelling with the Chinese alternately, enduring all insults except personal oppressions, the plunder of property, and the stoppage of trade; so that a restricted intercourse with the Chinese might continue available to these merchants, already in the trade and experienced in Chinese intrigue, but calculated to deter others from entering a field of commerce so hazardous and uncertain. With this British merchant-clique the Manchester party in England sympathized. This at first seemed inconsistent with the principles of that party, which involved free trade with all nations. The system adopted in China, however, was believed by many of the party to work well enough for the trade of Manchester. Many of that school, who did not think so, believed that a Chinese war would prove so expensive, and inflame the minds of the Chinese so much, that on the whole it was better to patch up a peace any how, or endure a troublesome peace, rather than have open hostilities. The general conviction in Lancashire that a war anywhere, great or small, was injurious to the trade of the district, had much to do with the inveterate objection of the northern politicians to a Chinese war. A considerable number of influential persons, in the middle and northern counties of England especially, adopted the peace principles as a religious dogma. They held that war, under any circumstance, for whatever purpose, offensive or defensive, was a sin, and they deemed it their duty to oppose whatever government went to war. On a vote connected with the Chinese war the government of Lord Palmerston was defeated, by a combination of the tory and the Manchester parties: the latter, acting conscientiously as opposed to war; the former, taking a party advantage of the situation, and voting against the government for doing what, in office, they would do themselves. These two parties were strengthened by Lord John Russell, then in opposition, and a small section of Whigs led by him, who, in a spirit as factious and still less honourable, joined the great conservative party to throw out the Palmerston ministry. Sir J. Pakington, a determined Tory, became first lord of the admiralty, and the other lords were of course of the same party, they had come into office by a vote adverse to the Chinese war and to the Palmerston government for lending any sanction to it.
When Admiral Sir Michael Seymour learned these facts, he thwarted Lord Elgin as much as he could in the naval operations, especially in the Peiho. This Lord Elgin and Mr. Oliphant declared; and the admiral admitted that his slowness to cany out the plenipotentiary’s requisitions arose partly from disapproval of the policy that functionary was sent out to enforce. In fact, Sir Michael knew that he would be backed by a tory admiralty, at the head of which was such a thorough-going party man as Sir J. Pakington, in adopting their policy, and thwarting a whig plenipotentiary. Sir Michael judged correctly; his very bad conduct was pronounced exemplary by the admiralty, and the queen’s plenipotentiary was hindered and affronted with impunity. That was not the first time a British admiral acted similarly, very much to the injury and peril of his country. In the history of the British empire in the East there are various exemplifications of admirals setting at defiance or impeding the authorities which they were bound in duty to obey.
The work of Lord Elgin was not destined to prove stable in China. The treaty was broken when the English minister, the Honourable Mr. Bruce—sent to Pekin for its ratification—appeared in the Peiho. Fortifications had been thrown up; the approach of the English and French envoys refused; their escorts were attacked; and after a desperate effort on the part of the small allied squadron to force its way up the Peiho, it was beaten back with terrible slaughter, by a large Tartar army defending the fortified obstructions raised against its progress. The British admiral, Hope, after displaying extraordinary gallantry, was terribly wounded. The allied French and English withdrew, and awaited reinforcements and the further orders of their governments. Those governments resolved to enforce the treaty, and conquer a passage to Pekin. Large forces, comparatively with those of former expeditions against the Chinese, were sent forth, and such was the attitude of affairs when the period to which this History is conducted closed.
The treaty of Lord Elgin with the Emperor of Japan did not work so smoothly as was expected, any more than that with China. The ratification of the treaty, was effected on the 11th of July, 1858; soon after, the Japanese government attempted to evade it by seeking to confine foreigners to a small island about ten miles from Yeddo, and to establish the same sort of surveillance over them as they formerly exercised at the Dutch settlement of Décima. They further sought to establish a new coin as the only one to be used in commercial dealings with foreigners, but at the same time forbidding its currency among the natives, so that all payments in the new coin would have to be exchanged at the government treasury for the old itzabon; and the relative values fixed by the government produced a depreciation of 66 per cent, on foreign coins, which, according to treaty, were to be received at their intrinsic value as metal. Mr. Alcock, the British consul-general, issued a protest, and stopped the trade. The calm and firm attitude he assumed had the desired effect. Soon after, a variety of dishonest and extraordinarily scandalous practices on the part of the British traders exasperated the Japanese people and government. The interference of the English consul to restrain the nefarious practices of his countrymen, and maintain the character of his country, restored matters to a peaceful aspect.
It is remarkable, that during the state of things recorded in the foregoing chapters, of British relations with China and Japan, that a large trade took place. The following is taken from an issue of the Chinese Telegraph at the close of 1859:—
“The aggregate amount of our trade with China, imports and exports, including those of India, in 1857, reached £22,122,469, although there was a cessation of the tea trade with Canton. Last year, even with the effects of the commercial panic of the previous year, and the stoppage of Canton trade, the aggregate commerce with China, British and Indian, was over £20,000,000, exclusive of any colonial trade, Australian, or with the Archipelago. In 1833, the declared value of the British manufactures exported to China was only £630,578; in 1840 it was as low as £524,198; and at the close of the war of 1842 it stood at £969,381. In a few years after the opening of the five new ports to foreign commerce, the value of British goods shipped had increased fully 50 per cent., while it has now nearly tripled in value.
“The import and consumption of tea in this country has more than doubled since the consular ports were thrown open. So also with silk. As we have formerly shown, the demand has been extensive, and China can supply enormous quantities. From a trivial export, silk has become the second great staple of shipment. Although our imports from China have hitherto consisted chiefly of three or four principal staples, there is no reason, looking at the extensive resources of that vast empire, why they should continue so restricted. Something has even been done of late years in this respect. Chinese wool has come in to some extent, having risen in some years to half a million of pounds; although, from its harsh quality, and mixed and dirty character, it is only fitted for coarse woollens, yet it is saleable at low prices. There are other drugs, besides camphor, rhubarb, and essential oils to be obtained thence. A demand has sprung up for sugar, and we can draw supplies from China as well as from Manilla. There are other spices too, besides cassia lignea, to be procured from China.
“In addition to the exports to Great Britain, China exports tea, silk, drugs, and sundries to the continent of Europe, North and South America, Australia, New Zealand, India, and the various settlements of the Eastern Archipelago. The Indian trade has now reached about £10,000,000 in value, one article, opium, constituting the chief export; and this, since the recent treaty, had increased in value by upwards of £1,500,000. The shipments of cotton from India to China would seem to be declining. Whether this arises from a greater demand from England, an increased home production in China, or the internal rebellion, we are not prepared to state. The American imports from China, since the opening of the five ports, have more than doubled in value.