Something, however, could be done to rally and refresh the scanty relics of the fighting force. There were in the town stores sufficient to supply the troops with food for some days. There were, apparently, fifty guns, some hundreds of horses, and Eblé’s reserve train of sixty pontoons with all its equipment. Six batteries were organised out of the artillery, each of six guns. Two went to Davout, who had saved only eight guns out of 150; two to Eugène, who had not one left; two were assigned to Latour-Maubourg—for what reason is not very clear. Mounted cavalry officers were collected into what was called the Sacred Squadron, under Grouchy. It has been stated that it was destroyed as soon as created; but it was certainly in existence a week later.
Severe orders were issued to destroy superfluous vehicles, and to hand over the horses thus freed to the artillery. Generals were restricted to a single vehicle, and soldiers were forbidden to possess carts or pack-horses. These orders were largely non-effective; there were not gendarmes and faithful troops enough to execute them, and too many people interested in resisting or neglecting them—as the passage of the Berezina was soon to show.
Reasonable and necessary as it undoubtedly was to diminish the mass of baggage and assist the artillery, it was surely the height of imprudence to destroy the bridge-train. Eblé, alive to the danger, pressed to be allowed to keep fifteen pontoons, but in vain, and he could only save 2 field forges, 2 waggons of charcoal and 6 of implements. At Smolensk he had seen to it that each man carried a tool, and a supply of clamps and large nails. To his wise precautions the piteous remnants of the Grande Armée were to owe their salvation. When Napoleon gave the order to burn the pontoons, Chichagov had been four days in possession of Minsk, and was already close to Borisov with his advance-guard! Comment is needless.
Victor remained at Chereia until November 10th. Oudinot, who had now recovered from his wound, resumed the command of the 2nd Corps. The army at Chereia was thus commanded by two independent generals who would probably disagree. Victor was the senior officer, but not definitely the commander-in-chief; and Napoleon in his orders merely bids him to concert measures with Oudinot. Probably on the 9th, Victor received an urgent order written by Napoleon at Mikalevka, to take the offensive and drive back Wittgenstein. He was told that the safety of the Grande Armée depended upon him. The Emperor admitted that it was much fatigued and that the cavalry was dismounted. “March!” ordered the falling giant. “It is the order of the Emperor and of necessity!”
On receipt of this pressing order Victor and Oudinot got under way. But the army was no longer what it had been a fortnight previously. The troops appear still to have been well clothed; they had availed themselves of convoys intended for the Poles. Food does not appear to have been lacking. But the weather was bitterly cold, the ground covered with snow, and the numbers were steadily dwindling. It is probable that the two corps did not muster over 30,000 men on November 14th. Wittgenstein, exclusive of Vlastov, had as many, and his position behind the Ula and the Lukomlia was strong. His army was now distributed in four small corps under Lieutenant-Generals Count Steingell, Prince Iachvil, Berg, and Major-General Fock.
Oudinot is said by De Chambray to have advocated a direct attack, but Victor considered it too risky, and it was decided to endeavour to turn the Russian left. On November 11th, therefore, the French army, the 9th Corps leading, advanced to Lukoml, about 10 miles south of Chasniki, and thence moved eastward across the Lukomlia and the Usveia upon Smoliani, a village lying beyond Wittgenstein’s left flank. On the 13th Partouneaux’s division, which formed the advance-guard, found that of Wittgenstein in position across the road and drove it back upon Smoliani with heavy loss, including several hundred prisoners. Wittgenstein, seeing that his left was threatened, changed front in that direction and sent forward Prince Iachvil to reinforce and rally the advance-guard. With the rest of his army he took up a position along the Lukomlia. His line extended for about a mile and a half, generally in advance of the frozen stream, its front being covered by three large ponds, beyond which lay Smoliani. Steingell’s troops were on the right and Berg’s on the left. Iachvil’s would form the centre. Fock’s division was stationed in the bend of the Ula below Chasniki.
On the morning of the 14th Partouneaux’s division moved upon Smoliani, Iachvil retiring steadily before him into the Russian main line. Partouneaux developed an attack on the village, and easily captured it, but was checked by the fire of the Russian artillery. Steingell then sent forward some troops and retook Smoliani. Round this outpost of the Russian line a brisk conflict lasted through the rest of the short winter’s day. Its possession was, indeed, of slight importance; and, since the Russians declined to be cowed by the threat of a turning movement, Victor’s bolt was practically shot. Except for an attempted demonstration by Victor’s cavalry on his right, the fighting elsewhere was confined to a cannonade. The 2nd Corps and the bulk of the Russian army were not engaged at all. On neither side were the losses heavy. Victor may have had about 1400 killed and wounded. The Russians claimed 900 prisoners—probably a great exaggeration. Their own losses during the two days probably totalled 2000.
Victor could now only retreat. He did not know the real state of the central army, but he did know that his dwindling force was Napoleon’s last reserve. On the 17th the two corps were once more about Chereia. There they might at least hope to hold back Wittgenstein from the vitally important high-road.
Wrede, after Polotsk, had, as has been seen, fallen back to cover Vilna. He retired through Glubokoië to Danilovichi, and was there reinforced by Coutard’s brigade, Lithuanian levies, and various drafts, until on November 18th he had some 11,000 men. Vlastov, after the action of Smoliani, had been drawn in by Wittgenstein, and Wrede reoccupied Glubokoië on the 19th, having previously sent Corbineau to rejoin Oudinot.
At Riga Essen had been succeeded in the command by Paulucci. The field force of the garrison was spread out on the left bank of the Düna. Its line was very extensive, and the troops on the left, under Lewis, were dangerously exposed. On November 15th, therefore, Macdonald made an attack upon them with Massenbach’s Prussian cavalry division, a brigade of Prussian infantry and one of Poles. Lewis, cut off and hotly pressed, only succeeded in escaping by crossing the Düna on the ice. This sharp lesson made Paulucci cautious, and some weeks passed away in tranquillity, Macdonald growing more and more uneasy at the bad news which began to filter through to him, and not at all on good terms with Yorck.