FIELD-MARSHAL PRINCE GOLÉNISCHEV-KUTUZOV
Commander-in-chief of the Russian Armies in 1812
General Baron Levin Bennigsen, the stout antagonist of Napoleon in 1806-1807, was for a time Kutuzov’s principal assistant; but the two did not work well together, and eventually Bennigsen was retired. Bennigsen, a Hanoverian soldier of fortune, was as old as Kutuzov, but much more energetic. He appears to have been a selfish and jealous, but able, man, and in the following year once more did Russia good service. Barclay, according to Löwenstern, said of him, that despite his ability, he was a “veritable pest” to the army, owing to his egoism and envy; and this view is certainly borne out by a perusal of Bennigsen’s unreliable and self-laudatory memoirs.
General Matvei Ivanovich Platov, Ataman of the Cossacks of the Don, is probably better known to British readers than any of his colleagues. He was a burly, genial officer, uniting to considerable military talents the daring and good-humour which were even more important in the eyes of his wild followers. He was an ideal leader of irregulars; his ceaseless activity and energy will presently be more apparent.
Admiral Pavel Vasilievich Chichagov, Commander-in-Chief of the Army of the Danube, is a somewhat remarkable figure in Russian history. He perhaps owed some of his characteristics to his frequent association with Englishmen. He seems to have been somewhat impetuous and excitable; and certainly possessed a very independent temper, not hesitating to speak his mind to his despotic master. A seaman and diplomatist, placed in command of a land army at a great crisis, it would not have been strange had he failed badly, but this was far from being the case. Once clear of the Turkish embroglio he brought his army to the front with all speed; and though, as a general, too slow, he carried out his operations with a steady pertinacity, refusing to be diverted by contradictory orders. For Napoleon’s escape at the Berezina he was only very partially responsible; but the entire blame was laid upon him by the hasty injustice of his countrymen, and his career ended in voluntary exile many years later. It is not pleasant to find his name still rancorously assailed. The Tzar Alexander II was of a different opinion; one of the first ships of the Russian ironclad navy was named Chichagov.
Of the advisers who surrounded and influenced—not always for his good—the Tzar, the most prominent was the Prussian Phull. He had occupied an important position on the Prussian staff in the fatal year 1806, a fact which should surely have warned Alexander against his counsels. Certainly none but the Tzar had any confidence in him, and his utter lack of real military capacity was shown in the famous project of the camp at Drissa.
Of the staff-officers the most notable were Major-General Alexei Petrovich Yermólov and Colonel Baron Charles Toll. The former was an extraordinary personality, who seems to have retained more barbarian characteristics than any European military leader of modern times. He was a man of great courage, considerable ability, and remarkable will-power; but of a savage and unstable disposition. He could be guilty of gross cruelty to prisoners of war, and later, as Viceroy of the Caucasus, relied, as he admitted with cynical frankness, upon a policy of indiscriminate massacre. Yet he was a kind and considerate commander, beloved by his troops, and not ungenerous in his treatment of subordinates. This treacherous side of his character would induce him to intrigue against a rival, with whom he would then suddenly become reconciled on some impulse of generosity. He intrigued against Barclay, but wept bitterly when that ill-used chief left the army. It may have been hypocrisy, as Löwenstern says; but it really has more resemblance to one of those impulses which civilised men can hardly understand, but which are characteristic of barbaric natures, such as Yermólov’s. Yermólov’s policy of massacre failed to pacify Caucasia, and his successor Paskievich declared it to have been a gross blunder. Nevertheless, Yermólov has continued to this day to be the subject of somewhat indiscriminate eulogy. It is perhaps better to take the opinion of men who knew him. Barclay’s was terse and to the point: “An able man, but false and intriguing.” Alexander’s was pithy: “His heart is as black as his boot.” Clausewitz, who was little associated with him, admitted his ability.
Toll was a scientific soldier of considerable attainments, and played a distinguished part during the years 1812-1815.
Of the officers who, during the campaign, commanded detachments or army corps several were men of real distinction.
General Mikhail Andreïevich Miloradovich—“the Russian Murat”—was in charge of the advance-guard which pressed the French retreat. The Russian documents show that he was hardly so much the mere swordsman as Tolstoï would make him. Both in 1812 and 1813 Miloradovich distinguished himself greatly, showing himself to be as admirable in rear-guard command as he was in the leading of the pursuit.