Bagration, however, was not satisfied. He was in a mood which would probably have induced him to quarrel with anything that Barclay did. He told Arakcheiev that the War-Minister’s head-quarters were so choked with Germans that a Russian could not live there, and that constant marching and counter-marching would drive him mad. To Yermólov he wrote that he had neither hay, straw, bread nor a position, and that Barclay must either do something or else supersede him (Bagration). He expected that Napoleon would amuse them by demonstrations about Rudnia, and move on Smolensk by their left. It is not clear whether this anticipation of the French Emperor’s intentions was the result of careful reflection, or simply due to the natural tendency of every commander to imagine himself the especial object of the enemy’s attentions.
The result was that Barclay, in despair, gave Bagration a free hand. He empowered him to withdraw upon Smolensk if he judged it necessary, and in general to take his own measures for the protection of the Russian left flank. The unfortunate War-Minister was beset by open and secret foes, and this, added to the responsibility which weighed upon him, probably explains this extraordinary step, which practically amounted to an abdication of the supreme command.
On the 12th, accordingly, Bagration withdrew towards Smolensk. On the same day, however, Barclay received fresh information that the French were in force near Poriechie. It was absolutely baseless, but he could scarcely discredit it, more especially as he was obsessed by the idea of an attack from that quarter. He wrote to Bagration that he expected an attack on the 15th, and took up a position between the Kasplia lake and the village of Volokovaia, about 22 miles north-west of Smolensk. He called up Bagration to Katan and Nadva, about 8 miles farther north-west, in order to guard his own left. On the 13th the Second Army was retiring on Smolensk, and the 7th Corps had actually reached the place when Barclay’s order of recall arrived.
This seems almost to have disturbed Bagration’s mental balance. He complained bitterly of the constant counter-marching, which was steadily exhausting and depleting the Second Army. For this there was good excuse, but little for the violent letters which he wrote to Yermólov, in which he describes Barclay as a traitor worthy of death. The latter had certainly carried his cautious policy too far, since another march in advance on the 9th or 10th would have shown that there were no large forces in his front, and he was certainly in a state of great irresolution. Still, seeing the character of his adversary, this was, at any rate, excusable, and one may fairly ask why the masses of Russian light cavalry had not better enlightened the situation.
It must be said in defence of Bagration that however much he allowed his fiery temperament to master him, and though his letters to a dangerous intriguer like Yermólov were subversive of all military subordination, he did not himself set the example of disobedience. On the 14th he counter-marched the 8th Corps on Katan, pushing Sievers’ and Vassilchikov’s cavalry, with a supporting brigade of the 7th Corps, on towards Volokovaia. The bulk of the 7th Corps was at Smolensk, and the men needed rest, so that Raievski did not commence his march until 7 p.m. As he moved off, cannonading was heard in the direction of Krasnoï. Towards 10 o’clock an aide-de-camp arrived from Neverovski with the news that French troops were advancing by the south bank of the Dnieper. Bagration had also, by some means, received intelligence, for soon after came orders from him to halt. In the night, Raievski received a fresh order to return to support Neverovski. At daybreak on the 15th the 7th Corps re-entered Smolensk.
On the morning of the 14th the Grand Army began to advance from Rasasna. Murat led the way with Nansouty’s, Montbrun’s and Grouchy’s corps and the light cavalry of the 1st and 3rd Corps; and behind him came Ney’s three infantry divisions. In rear of Ney came Davout’s corps, and then the Guard. Eugène was crossing at Rasasna; the 8th Corps was marching from Orsha on Davout’s right, and the 5th farther out, covered towards the south by Latour-Maubourg. Between two and three in the afternoon the advance-guard reached Krasnoï, occupied by Neverovski’s division.
Various French writers have expressed astonishment at this small force having been left exposed, and apparently by accident on the south side of the Dnieper. All this is, of course, little better than nonsense, or, at best, adulation of Napoleon’s genius, which was so great that it robbed his opponents of common sense! The sending of the 27th Division along the left bank of the river was a perfectly rational measure of precaution. It was in observation, and not intended to abide the attack of a greatly superior force, though it was quite capable of dealing with a division or flying detachment. By whichever bank the Russian leaders chose to operate they could not leave the other unobserved, especially since the French held the crossings at Orsha and elsewhere. The mistake—presumably Bagration’s—appears to have been in not stationing the infantry closer to Smolensk and sending only the cavalry to observe the Orsha road.
Krasnoï is a small town about 30 miles from Smolensk. Neverovski’s cavalry outposts were about Liady, a few miles west. They were driven out by Grouchy’s corps, which formed Murat’s left wing; and Neverovski learned that overwhelming forces were marching upon him.
