At the same time these events were scarcely the cause of hostilities—they merely hastened them. Whatever diplomacy might do, neither Napoleon nor Alexander had any belief in the permanence of the truce which had been called in 1807. Soon after his second marriage Napoleon had observed to Metternich that war with Russia was in the nature of things. The retention of strong garrisons in the Prussian fortresses on the Oder, the steady increase in the forces of the Grand Duchy of Warsaw, and the continued occupation of Danzig, almost on the Russian frontier, were measures which can hardly be regarded as directed otherwise than against Russia. Moreover, besides the troops of Napoleon’s German vassals, an army of 100,000 Frenchmen occupied Germany. It is absurd to suggest, in the face of all this, that war was forced upon Napoleon by Russia—except, of course, in so far as independent action of any kind always challenged his hostility.

Whatever Alexander’s personal feelings might be—and there is no doubt that he was to some extent fascinated by the French Emperor’s personality—he was gradually forced into the conviction that peace was impossible. In 1810 he appointed as War-Minister General Barclay de Tolly, an officer who had greatly distinguished himself in the French and Swedish wars; and the reorganisation of the Russian forces was energetically proceeded with. Count Arakcheiev, Alexander’s harsh and brutal, but undoubtedly industrious and energetic, minister, had already done much, especially in the direction of improving the arsenals and reserves of arms. Barclay’s measures were steadily directed to preparing for a war on the western frontier. The country was surveyed, roads examined and improved, magazines formed, fortifications planned and begun, and, above all, troops steadily concentrated. Progress was, however, slow. Apart from the backward state of the country as a whole, divided counsels in the Imperial Cabinet, the poverty of the exchequer, and the strain of the long and by no means successful Turkish war, it was necessary to proceed cautiously, for fear of provoking Napoleon too soon into offensive action.

The preparations were, in fact, entirely defensive in character, and appear very modest beside Napoleon’s vast armaments and fortifications on territory which was not his own. The Russian ministers, indeed, appear to have been generally rather over-confident of their country’s ability to resist a French invasion. Some of them, at any rate, wished to take up arms in 1811, counting on the support of Austria and Prussia. They pointed out that Napoleon would calculate upon Russia’s steady weakening owing to loss of trade, and that therefore speedy action was desirable. The Grand Chancellor, Count Rumiantzev, was a strong partisan of the French alliance. Alexander himself, though determined to stand firm against aggression, was not anxious for war, and apparently hoped that it might be avoided—as indeed it might have been, but for the fact that peace with England, which was desired by, and necessary to, Russia, implied from Napoleon’s standpoint war with France. The impression which the Russian Government generally conveyed in foreign countries was one of great irresolution.

This impression was indeed somewhat erroneous. The war-party in Russia was by far the larger of the two into which public opinion was naturally divided, since it included nearly everyone whose interests were adversely affected by the Continental system—in other words, the majority of the nobles and merchants. It was, however, divided, comprising a narrowly patriotic section which looked merely to the preservation of Russian territory, and another, naturally smaller, consisting of men who saw more or less clearly that to ensure European peace Napoleon must be not merely repelled, but crushed once and for all. The peace-party though small was very influential, including the Chancellor Rumiantzev, Alexander’s own mother, and his brother Constantine.

Ultimately, of course, everything depended upon the character of the Tzar, and this was such as to give the friends of France great hopes of being able to influence him. Alexander was essentially a dreamer, much under the influence of vaguely exalted aspirations which were terribly contrasted with the mass of selfishness, luxury, and brutality which environed and repelled him. He was impulsive rather than calmly and steadily determined, and both at Tilsit and Erfurt Napoleon had dominated him. Probably he hoped to do so again. He was bitterly disappointed, and his vexation inspired the libellous remarks upon Alexander’s character which occasionally pass for serious history. Alexander I was neither a great statesman, a great general, nor a hero. He was, as far as we can see him, a kindly and well-meaning man, somewhat dreamy and irresolute in general, called by an inscrutable providence to rule, from the midst of a luxurious Court and through a corrupt bureaucracy, a very backward and undeveloped realm. He was often shocked by the conditions about him, but lacked the moral courage to suppress them. But, like many other dreamers, he could at times rise to the occasion. He was intellectual enough to act both as general and statesman, by no means with discredit in either case, and morally elevated enough to play, in 1812, something at any rate of the part of a hero.

Nevertheless, Alexander was naturally slow in finally forming his resolution to fight to the death, and the causes here detailed made preparations for war also tardy. As it was, however, they were quickly detected by Napoleon, and used by him as the grounds for diplomatic protests and for pushing forward his own armaments.

Barclay’s preparations, in brief, included the increase of the number of the regiments of the Russian army, the completion to war strength of two battalions per infantry, and four squadrons per cavalry, regiment; the organisation of depôts to complete the third battalions and fifth squadrons with all speed, and the concentration on the western frontier of all available forces—ultimately including 9 army corps, 2 independent divisions, 5 reserve cavalry “corps,” and 3 corps of irregular horse. Information concerning the state of Napoleon’s forces, especially in Germany and the Grand Duchy of Warsaw, was carefully collected, and the possible theatre of war studied and surveyed. The fortifications carried out had a purely defensive character, and cannot be for a moment compared with Napoleon’s constant provocative preparations in Germany and Poland. Riga was fortified, and fortifications were projected at Dünaburg, where the St. Petersburg-Vilna road crossed the Düna. Other works were planned at Borisov on the Berezina, where the river is crossed by the Moscow-Warsaw high-road. Kiev, the famous old Russian city on the Dnieper, was also fortified, as was Bobruisk on the Berezina. A glance at the map will show how absolutely defensive these fortifications were. Riga is 150 miles from the frontier, and all the other places much farther back. As a fact some of them were not completed, hardly even begun, when war broke out.

These preparations were due in their inception to Barclay, but there were others which were inspired by the unpractical advisers immediately about the Tzar. Wellington’s Torres Vedras campaign had made a great sensation in Europe, and General Phull, Alexander’s Prussian instructor and adviser, had projected a great entrenched camp at Drissa, a town that was literally nowhere. It covered nothing; it was hardly even tactically well placed. It is a striking indication of the confusion in the Russian councils that, practically behind the back of the War-Minister who was nominally responsible for military preparations, a vast amount of time and labour was wasted on this pretentious and unprofitable camp of refuge. In a sentence, Drissa was absolutely useless. Yet the man who conceived this almost childish idea of drawing Napoleon against his will upon an arbitrarily placed entrenchment, and inducing him to waste time and lives before it, passed for a scientific soldier! The amount of time and labour expended on Drissa rendered all the other works slow in construction, and Dünaburg was hardly commenced when the war broke out.

Napoleon’s preparations were naturally influenced by no chimerical ideas—except in so far as he appeared inclined to renew in 1811 his old plan of an invasion by sea of England! All through 1810 and 1811 the arming and strengthening of German and Polish fortresses was continued, and the bulk of the disposable French troops were collected in three so-called corps of observation in the northern provinces and in Germany. They numbered some 200,000 men. From Italy he could draw about 50,000 French and Italian troops. The contingents of his German vassals numbered nearly 130,000. The Grand Duchy of Warsaw could furnish some 50,000. Prussia was practically helpless, and Napoleon imposed upon her a treaty of alliance which required her to furnish 20,000 men, and subjected her to wholesale plunder by the Grande Armée on its passage through her territories. Napoleon was to make such requisitions as he pleased, and payment was to be arranged for them later! The misery caused, however, unfortunately for him, did not destroy Prussia, and only added to the heavy debt of vengeance soon to be paid. For the moment, however, Prussia had reached the depths of humiliation. Austria, though sorely humbled and distressed, was in a far more independent position; and Metternich’s address succeeded in concluding a treaty by which Austria was to be indemnified for any territorial losses that she might sustain by a reconstitution of Poland, and should furnish an auxiliary corps of about 30,000 men. There was, of course, no guarantee that Napoleon would keep the first condition, and in all probability he would never have done so had the contemplated events come to pass; but that he consented to it, even nominally, indicates that he was anxious to conciliate Austria. Austria, on her side, furnished to the Grande Armée some 40,000 men in all.