French writers for the most part consider Lubino, or Valutina-Gora as they call it, a victory, but to regard it thus is merely to make a mock of the word. A battle is not necessarily fought for the possession of a few yards of ground. Barclay had fought at Lubino in order to secure the safe passage of his right column into the Moscow road. This had been successfully achieved, and very heavy loss inflicted on the pursuers, who had failed to capture a single gun or any appreciable amount of baggage. Napoleon regarded the battle as a mere advance-guard engagement. Had he realised its real importance he would not have failed to send forward everything available. Barclay must have been disastrously defeated, and probably driven northward with the remains of his army.

The French had on the field at Lubino about 50,000 men, of whom perhaps 37,000 were seriously engaged. The number of Russian troops successively brought into action was probably about 30,000. The losses were naturally heavy. Gérard alone reported 2297 killed and wounded, and Ney can hardly have lost less than 4000. Junot probably overestimated his losses at 700, but, including casualties among Murat’s cavalry, the French total must have been over 7000. The losses of the Russians were probably rather less, as they were standing on the defensive, and for the most part succeeded in repelling attack, nevertheless, they were very heavy—probably in the neighbourhood of 5000. Few prisoners were taken—not more than some hundreds on both sides.

It is impossible to conclude this chapter without some remarks upon the strategy which led up to the battles about Smolensk. It is tolerably certain, judging from the evidence of documents, that Napoleon’s plan of marching upon Smolensk by the left bank of the Dnieper was a preconceived one. Considered by itself, there is little to say of the manœuvre. It was in no way hazardous, since the left flank of the columns moving from Vitebsk was covered by forests, and once across the Dnieper the march was protected by the river against a Russian flank attack. Moreover, having two lines of supply, Napoleon risked nothing by moving his army across from one to the other.

The manœuvre was certainly unexpected by the Russian leaders—except perhaps by Bagration—and it is clear that it was only the firmness of Raievski and the prompt return of the main army that saved Smolensk from falling into Napoleon’s hands.

Nevertheless, when we turn from the manœuvre to its purpose it seems doubtful whether it was by any means the best under the circumstances.

Napoleon’s object was the bringing to bay of the Russian main army and the crushing of it in a decisive battle. As the Russians had chosen to take the offensive, the opportunity was apparently in his hands. Barclay might march fast enough to force an engagement before Davout could arrive from Orsha, but even so Napoleon could meet him with equal or superior numbers. If Barclay returned to the defensive, Napoleon’s best manœuvre was to advance to Poriechie, threatening the Russian communications with Moscow. To reopen them Barclay and Bagration must either give battle or retreat eastward in all haste, in which case Smolensk would fall of itself. The utmost that could be expected of the march south of the Dnieper was that the Russians might be forestalled at Smolensk.

The modern French opinion appears to be that this forestalling was the essence of the plan, and that Napoleon, having occupied the city, intended to debouch from it and attack Barclay and Bagration in the rear.

To the writer it appears that all criticism must necessarily base itself upon the fact that Napoleon’s strategy was preconceived. Before he knew anything of the Russian plans he had practically made up his mind to advance on Smolensk by the left bank of the Dnieper. The offensive movement of the Russians produced no change in his resolution.

It is highly probable that his determination was taken on grounds not purely military. He must by now have recognised that warfare in Russia was subject to conditions which did not obtain in Germany or Austria. His opponents were elusive; but there were certain places regarded by soldiers and people as holy, which the popular voice would probably force the generals to make a show of defending. He therefore resolved to threaten Smolensk directly, believing that thereby the Russian army would be constrained to give battle.