Tormazov, with diplomatic courtesy, complimented the Saxon officers on their really creditable defence, and returned them their swords. He could not, however, push his advance. His commissariat was defective and supplies were running short. He had also his prisoners to dispose of. His infantry were fatigued with hard marching on execrable roads. He therefore was obliged to halt for two days, which Reynier utilised to effect his retreat. He appealed for help to Schwarzenberg, who informed Napoleon that Reynier was too weak to resist Tormazov, who was estimated to be 40,000 strong, and that he must perforce turn back to his rescue from Nesvizh. On August 2nd he reached Polonka, 18 miles from Slonim, now occupied by Reynier. Tormazov, leaving Kobrin on the 30th, occupied Pruzhani and Antopol and pushed out detachments; while Kruchov’s force crossed the Bug and made reconnaissances towards Warsaw. The Poles were panic-stricken; and Loison, the Governor of Königsberg, thought it necessary to advance towards Bielostok with nearly the whole of his force—some 10,000 men. More than this Tormazov could not do. He was still very short of supplies; every march in advance took him farther from his base, and he had the Pinsk Marshes in his rear.
Napoleon, probably with some misgivings, informed Schwarzenberg on July 31st that he was to support Reynier according to his information, which, as he was on the spot, must necessarily be better than that of the Emperor. On August 2nd he placed the 7th Corps under his orders, and instructed him to march against Tormazov and drive him into Volhynia. The Government at Warsaw meanwhile was making desperate efforts to form a field force at Zamosc, under General Kosinski.
On August 3rd the Austrians and Saxons were in close communication, and on the 4th the united force began to advance. Tormazov’s advanced guards were attacked on August 8th and driven back, except at Pruzhani, from which Lambert was only expelled on the 10th after a well-contested rear-guard action. Tormazov, finding his outposts everywhere assailed by superior forces, ordered Markov and Kamenski to Gorodeczna, about half-way from Pruzhani to Kobrin. Lambert and Markov united there in the night of the 10th-11th, and next day Kamenski also arrived. Melissino’s detachment and the other advanced guards, under Generals Chaplitz and Prince Khovanski, could not rejoin under some days. Tormazov therefore had only 24 battalions, 36 squadrons, and 3 regiments of Cossacks, amounting with artillery to about 21,000 men. In artillery, however, he was strong, having 84 pieces, a large proportion of which were heavy.
The Russian position was a fairly strong one, if defended by adequate numbers. The Pruzhani-Kobrin road passes over a low plateau, at the foot of which flows a marshy stream. This plateau is some three miles long and a little less in breadth. It extends roughly east and west, its eastern extremity being opposite Gorodeczna. West of it is a valley about a mile in breadth, beyond which rises a second plateau, thickly wooded, through which another road leads from the village of Cherechev to join that to Kobrin some miles south-west of Gorodeczna. The eastern end of the plateau was also shut in by woods. Besides the causeway across the marsh at Gorodeczna, there was a second at Poddubno about three miles above, and a third a mile farther on at the Cherechev road. Obviously all should have been guarded; but only that at Gorodeczna was actually held. The reasons for this extraordinary oversight are not clear. It is possible that Tormazov expected a turning movement on the right rather than the left. It is also possible that he did not intend to fight a general action, but only a rear-guard engagement, in order to gain time for Chaplitz, Khovanski and Melissino to close up. Apparently also he considered that Schwarzenberg and Reynier were following him in one column on the Kobrin road. In any case he merely kept the bulk of his force opposite Gorodeczna. His opponents were moving in two columns, the Austrians upon Gorodeczna, Reynier with the Saxons on the right towards Poddubno. Schwarzenberg had made considerable detachments to guard his communications, but his entire force can hardly have numbered less than 36,000 men, including 12,000 Saxons, with 96 guns.
Reynier pointed out to Schwarzenberg that Tormazov’s negligence afforded opportunities for a flanking movement. Schwarzenberg assented and supported him with Siegenthal’s division, Hesse-Homburg’s brigade of Bianchi’s division, and a brigade of light cavalry, while with the rest of his forces he observed the main Russian force. Tormazov was drawn up in three lines on the Kobrin road, facing Gorodeczna, Markov’s 12 battalions in front line, Kamenski’s 12 (temporarily commanded by Prince Cherbatov, Kamenski being ill) a verst to the rear, Lambert with the cavalry behind Cherbatov.
In the night of the 11th-12th a Saxon detachment seized the Poddubno dyke. Tormazov apparently heard of this about 9 a.m. on the 12th and promptly sent Cherbatov with 10 battalions, 2 dragoon regiments and 24 guns to Poddubno. This appeared temporarily to secure the left, but about noon Siegenthal arrived and threatened a direct attack, while Reynier, who had moved the bulk of his corps along the Cherechev road, debouched from the woods and menaced the Russian rear. Tormazov at first simply fronted Cherbatov to the left, leaving the guns and a single infantry regiment at Poddubno, and covered the new front with the fire of 24 more guns brought up from the reserve. It soon, however, became evident that the turning movement was being executed by considerable forces, and that Cherbatov could not withstand it unaided. Tormazov thereupon called up Markov with 8 battalions to prolong Cherbatov’s line, and Lambert with 4 battalions and 24 squadrons to cover the left flank. Lambert deployed across the Cherechev road, barring it against the farther advance of General Zechmeister with his Austrian cavalry and Saxon infantry. Schwarzenberg on his side, instead of attacking the weak detachment now before him at Gorodeczna, sent another infantry brigade and one of cavalry to the right, and himself proceeded thither.
At 3 a.m. Frimont’s Austrian cavalry and Trautenberg’s infantry at Gorodeczna were demonstrating against weak detachments, while nearly the whole Russian army had faced to the left and rear. Tormazov, considering that the extension of the hostile line afforded an opportunity for piercing it, developed a fierce attack by Cherbatov’s infantry upon Sahr’s Saxon brigade, which was driven back, barely saving its artillery from capture by the Russian dragoons. To extricate it General Bianchi led forward Lilienberg’s brigade, while Schwarzenberg, now at Poddubno, ordered Hesse-Homburg’s across the stream, and Siegenthal sent forward part of his division. By these combined efforts the advance of the Russians was brought to a stand and finally converted into a retreat. The brigades of Lilienberg and Sahr moved forward together, Hesse-Homburg joining in on the left, Lecoq’s Saxon division prolonging the line to the right, while Zechmeister, reinforced by Froelich’s Austrian and Gablenz’s Saxon cavalry, renewed his attacks on Lambert. The latter had hitherto held his own with considerable success, but was now driven back and forced to seek shelter behind Markov’s line. Night ended the conflict, and under cover of darkness Tormazov rallied his detachments and retreated on Kobrin, covered by a rear-guard, under Lambert. At Teveli, 7 miles from the battle-field, Chaplitz rejoined and took over rear-guard duty from Lambert.
BATTLE OF GORODECZNA
Fought between Napoleon’s detached right wing (Austrians and Saxons) under Prince Schwarzenberg against the Russian Army of Volhynia