During the evening the French troops took up position. Oudinot’s plan of action is difficult to understand. He left nearly the whole of Verdier’s and Merle’s divisions and the bulk of his cavalry on the left bank of the Düna. On the right bank, along the Polota, stood St. Cyr’s weak corps, with its right at the village of Spas, about a mile from Polotsk. Wrede’s division was in front line and Deroy in reserve. To the left of the Bavarians were Legrand’s division, 1 regiment of Verdier’s, and Corbineau’s cavalry brigade. Oudinot’s whole force was over 35,000 strong, with about 130 guns.
The Russian 1st Corps and the reserve troops attached to it—the latter now combined into regiments—totalled about 23,000 or 24,000 men and 99 guns. It was distributed in three mixed divisions, under Major-Generals Berg, Sazonov and Kakhovski, and two mixed brigades commanded respectively by Major-General Helfreich and Colonel Vlastov.[4]
Wittgenstein and his staff considered that Oudinot’s position about Polotsk was too strong, defended as it was by superior forces, to be attacked, and decided to confine themselves to a vigorous demonstration upon Spas to cover the bridging of the Düna and a raid on Oudinot’s communications. Early on the 17th, covered by Helfreich and Vlastov, the Russian main body debouched from the woods and deployed. The divisions as usual were broken up in the line of battle. In general, however, it may be said that Vlastov’s detachment formed the extreme left opposite Spas, and thence Berg’s division and Helfreich’s vanguard continued the line towards the Düna. Sazonov and Kakhovski were in reserve.
Vlastov, and part of Berg’s division, under the general direction of Prince Iachvil, attacked Spas, which was gallantly defended by the Bavarians. To sustain the attack Wittgenstein was obliged to direct to the left the rest of Berg’s division, replacing it by only two battalions of his second line. Oudinot thereupon ordered Legrand to attack the weakened Russian centre, but after some sharp fighting this was repelled by the advance of fresh battalions from Sazonov’s division. Legrand renewed his attacks, but was again forced to retire, but to repulse him nearly the whole of Sazonov’s division had to be employed. Around Spas a furious conflict raged all day, the Russian attacks being repelled time after time by a much smaller force of Bavarians. The outlook for Oudinot was entirely promising; by night almost all Wittgenstein’s army had been engaged and had been held at bay by the division of Legrand, about half of Wrede’s and one regiment of Verdier’s. All this time two strong divisions were inactive south of the Düna. It was probably fortunate that in the evening Oudinot was severely wounded and forced to transfer the command to the stronger hands of St. Cyr.
The latter general made up his mind that the badly shaken morale of his army, no less than the Emperor’s interests, imperatively demanded a victory, and determined to give battle. But he was too wary to deprive himself of the advantage of allowing the Russians to waste their strength against his defensive position before himself taking the offensive. He therefore waited during the morning of the 18th for Wittgenstein to come on. The latter, on his side, having driven Oudinot again into Polotsk, decided to withdraw, his mission being to defend the St. Petersburg road, and greatly overestimating the strength of the force opposed to him. His troops were to commence their march at 9 p.m.
St. Cyr during the morning made a parade of retiring his trains and reserve parks through the town towards Vitebsk, while Merle and Verdier were brought nearer to it as though to cover an evacuation. Some of the cavalry also defiled along the southern bank of the Düna with their horses laden with forage. These devices do not appear to have tricked the Russian staff into the belief that Polotsk was about to be abandoned; but they did give it the impression that there was no fear of an attack. The Russian army lay bivouacked in the order in which it had fought on the 17th, and head-quarters were at the hamlet of Prizmenitza, only half a mile from Spas.
St. Cyr, finding that Wittgenstein did not show any sign of attacking, and doubtless marking the obvious unpreparedness of the Russians, decided to take the offensive. About 2 p.m. Verdier’s division began to cross the Düna, screened from the sight of the Russians by the houses of Polotsk and the high banks of the Polota. Merle, Doumerc, and Castex’s light cavalry followed. Meanwhile at Spas Deroy’s division relieved Wrede’s, and a battery of 31 guns was massed at the village.
St. Cyr’s plan, as he defines it, was to smash Wittgenstein’s line by a heavy and concentrated attack of four infantry divisions advancing at the double, Wrede’s Bavarians leading on the right, Deroy to their left rear, Legrand and Verdier in echelon on the left of Deroy, while the cavalry followed in support, and Merle’s division stood in reserve at Polotsk. St. Cyr in his report to Berthier says that he had intended to commence the attack at 4 p.m., but the bringing up of the troops from the left bank of the Düna proved a tedious operation; and it was not until nearly 5 that St. Cyr was able to give the signal to commence the battle.
The French and Bavarian artillery opened a tremendous cannonade against the unsuspecting Russians, with great effect, especially among two batteries in advance of Prizmenitza, which lost nearly all their horses, and had a number of guns and waggons disabled or blown up against the Bavarian artillery. Diebich skilfully placed some guns in a battery on the extreme Russian left, which, being masked, caused considerable loss, but could not silence the far stronger array of pieces ranged before Spas.
