The Borodino position has often been spoken of as an admirable one for defence. Clausewitz, who knew it, is of a very different opinion; and in all probability it was selected simply because there was no likelihood that anything better would present itself in the endless plain-lands. It had one grave strategic defect. Some way to the west the great road forks, the branches uniting again at Mozhaïsk, about 6 miles east of Borodino. It was therefore necessary to hold two roads instead of one, and to be strong on both. At Borodino they are 2½ miles apart, the new road, on which Borodino stands, lying to the north.
The Kolotza rivulet makes a very acute angle with the new road, running for a considerable distance nearly parallel with it, always in a gully with steep banks. After passing Borodino, which lies on its left bank, it flows north-eastward with a very sinuous course to join the Moskva, about 2¾ miles farther on. The Moskva itself flows south-eastward to the high-road at the village of Uspenskoïe, three miles from Borodino, where it turns eastward towards Mozhaïsk.
In the angle formed by the two streams lies a low partly wooded plateau, its base formed by a rivulet which joins the Kolotza at Borodino. At its south-western angle stood the hamlet of Gorki, about a mile from Borodino. A few hundred yards higher up another streamlet joined the Kolotza from the south-east. This streamlet, called after the hamlet of Semenovskoï, about a mile and a quarter south of Borodino, flows in a little ravine, and the ground between it and the Gorki rivulet forms another low plateau, not more than 30 feet high, but with a fairly steep western drop. It descends very slightly towards the east for about a mile, until it is crossed by another brook flowing in a gully. The eastern bank of this gully is the higher, and the ground extends eastward in another low plateau on which lies the village of Tzarévo, a mile and a half east of Semenovskoï. Just west of Gorki there is a low knoll, and another a mile due south-east of Gorki, and about 1100 yards north of Semenovskoï. From Semenovskoï to the old road at the village of Utitza is about a mile and a quarter, and from the latter village extended northward for about 1000 yards a thick wood. Three-quarters of a mile east of Utitza is a knoll, and a little eastward again another low plateau. South of the old road extended marshy woods, though a little south of Utitza there was a clearing round the hamlet of Michino. Patches of wood were scattered over the whole position. The villages were all log-built and useless for defence. From Utitza by Borodino to the junction of the Kolotza with the Moskva is a distance of almost 5 miles.
To the west of the Borodino-Utitza line the country is of the same character, only slightly lower. At the village of Shevardino, a mile westward from Semenovskoï, is a low knoll. The villages were of so little consequence that it is superfluous to name them.
It will probably be gathered from this description that the general position afforded no great advantages to the weaker side. Clausewitz, indeed, says that in places it was difficult to tell which had the advantage of the ground. The northern plateau was fairly advantageous for defence, but the Kolotza ravine in its front prevented the troops posted on it from making counter-attacks. The old road afforded opportunities to an enterprising foe of a turning movement. It was therefore necessary to hold it strongly, but the wood south of Semenovskoï almost cut the troops about Utitza from the main line farther north. Bennigsen criticises the whole position most bitterly, as far too extended, but represents it as being 2 miles longer than it really was. He was himself an advocate of very narrow positions, and French critics declared that his line at Eylau was far too close and heavy. He says in his memoirs that he perfectly understood that Napoleon’s concentrated attacks could only be repulsed by a concentration of defence. In principle he was no doubt right, but the defensive concentration, as Wellington had been teaching an unappreciative Europe for years, should have been one of effective muskets, not of crowded columns. Bennigsen was too self-satisfied to see this; but it is perhaps fair to add that probably the British army was the only one in Europe sufficiently highly trained to execute linear tactics. The Russian soldiers were extremely steady and accurate in manœuvre, but not rapid, and scarcely highly trained; French observers criticise their clumsiness. Clausewitz thinks that the reserves were too near the front. The bulk of the army was massed on a front of four miles; both flanks were covered by Cossacks.
The Kolotza entered the Moskva amid marshy ground; the right was accordingly supported on a wood a mile and a half further south. In front of this and on its left towards Gorki were various field works. In front of Gorki was a parapet with redans, and on the knoll south of Borodino a large earthwork, called by the French the “Great Redoubt.” Semenovskoï had been destroyed, the houses being mere shell traps. At its western end a parapet had been marked out, and to the south three flèches or redans. The Gorki work, the Great Redoubt and the Semenovskoï redans were the only entrenchments at all complete, and they were very hastily finished and of poor profile. Engineers and sappers were few in the Russian army, and tools seem to have been lacking.
The strength of the army gathered to defend this very mediocre position cannot be exactly estimated. Russian figures vary, and none seem to be accurate in details. Bogdanovich, for example, reckons 14,500 artillery and sappers present, which, allowing for 1000 of the latter, gives an average of 250 per battery—more than in June!
The only very certain fact about the Russian strength is that when the army reached Gzhatsk it cannot have contained much over 100,000 men, of whom 3000 were militia and 7000 Cossacks. Miloradovich’s 15,500 men were drafted into the regiments, presumably with a view to bringing them up as far as possible to equal strength. On the 4th the army was joined by 7000 militia from Moscow under Count Markov, the vanguard of the great national levy. The total may be fairly estimated at nearly 125,000 men. The militia were absolutely raw troops; some of them were merely employed on police and fatigue duties. There were over 17,000 excellent regular cavalry, 7000 Cossacks, and 640 guns and howitzers, admirably appointed and horsed.
Napoleon had left perhaps 700 men in Gzhatsk, and allowing 1000 men for casualties at Gridnevo and Kolotskoï, and 2000 for stragglers or men who failed to rejoin, he had still over 131,000 men on the 5th of September, exclusive of the head-quarters guard, at least 3000 men, who must be counted as present no less than the Russian militia. Between the 5th and 7th the army was reinforced by 4000 cavalry, giving a total of 138,000 men available. There were about 32,000 cavalry, but their superiority in numbers hardly compensated for the inferior condition of the horses. The weight of metal thrown by the 584 guns was slightly superior to that projected by the 640 opposing pieces; and the former—with the exception of the regimental artillery—were undoubtedly more efficiently served, but here also the horses were in poor condition.
After the fight at Kolotskoï the French moved forward,—the main column by the new road, Eugène to the left rear, Poniatowski by the old road on the right—Konovnitzin and his troops retiring steadily before them. The Russian army was not yet definitely ranged for battle, the direction of Napoleon’s attack being still uncertain. Barclay, with the 2nd, 4th and 6th Corps, was behind Borodino, Bagration about Semenovskoï with an advanced guard, under his second in command Prince Gorchakov, at Shevardino, where a redoubt had been thrown up and armed with 12 heavy guns. Gorchakov’s force comprised the 27th Division, Sievers’ cavalry corps, the 2nd Cuirassier Division, and a light infantry regiment from the 2nd Corps. The 3rd and 5th Corps, with the militia, were for the present held in reserve.