Barclay strongly supported Kutuzov, and he was followed by Raievski, Konovnitzin, and Ostermann-Tolstoï. Barclay appears otherwise to have had no great confidence in the ability of the Russian troops, diluted with militia, to manœuvre. When fighting generals such as Raievski and Konovnitzin ranged themselves with him the question was practically decided. According to Bennigsen he was supported by Dokhturov and Platov; but his claim to have had the votes of Konovnitzin and Yermólov is elsewhere contradicted. To his suggestion that battle should be delivered Ostermann-Tolstoï replied with a blunt question as to whether he was ready to answer for victory. Bennigsen evaded this embarrassing query; but Kutuzov, who had perhaps already made up his mind, ended the discussion by deciding upon retreat. As to its direction Barclay appears to have considered that it should be to the eastward on Vladimir and Nizhnii Novgorod; but Toll, thinking more of the question of supplies, suggested a retirement towards Kaluga. A direct retreat on the latter place would have exposed the army to one of Napoleon’s dreaded flanking attacks. Strategically Barclay’s suggestion was sound enough, if perhaps over-cautious. Clausewitz points out that Napoleon’s offensive power was exhausted, and that he could scarcely have pursued.
Kutuzov decided that the line of the retreat should be by Kolomna on Riazan, thus intermediate between that suggested by Barclay and that proposed by Toll. By taking it no opening was afforded for a flank attack; and it would be easy to manœuvre on either wing should occasion arise. The commissariat of the army would be assured since it would have at its back the fertile “Black Soil” provinces; and it would furthermore be in easy communication with the manufactories of arms at Tula and elsewhere. Orders were therefore issued for the retreat of the army by the Kolomna road. Bennigsen was extremely discontented, and showed his displeasure by leaving the council. He attributed it to Barclay, and their relations, already strained, became more hostile than ever.
There can be no doubt that Kutuzov and Barclay were correct in their resolution to retreat, but it was no light thing to make it. Kutuzov was greatly agitated; he passed a sleepless night, and more than once tears were seen to roll down his cheeks. No Englishman can perhaps fully understand what it meant to a Russian to leave “White-Walled Moscow,” the mother of the Russian land, to the mercy of an enemy.
Barclay, though now in bad health, took executive command of the evacuation. At 2 a.m. on the 14th the army began its passage through the city. The troops, in the deepest dejection, tramped through the streets with furled standards and silent bands, many of them, officers and men, sobbing with rage and despair. The foreign commandant of the Kremlin garrison regiment began the evacuation with band playing, according to the usages of war, and there was a violent outcry among the retreating soldiery. They indignantly shouted that he was rejoicing, and the music had to cease.
NAPOLEON’S FIRST VIEW OF MOSCOW
The Emperor is standing on the Sparrow Hills, from which an imposing view of the old Russian capital is obtained.
From the painting by Verestchagin.
Barclay stationed his staff-officers along the line of retreat to enforce order. Knowing the especial weakness of the Russian soldiers, he issued strict orders that anyone found in a beer-shop or intoxicated was to be summarily punished. He worked himself to death in directing the march, and was on horseback for eighteen hours. He complained bitterly of the inefficiency of the staff, which, as usual, did little or nothing to facilitate the march. There was frequently disorder among the retiring columns. None the less it must be said that the operation was remarkably successful. By 9 o’clock in the evening, after eighteen hours of incessant toil, 90,000 fighting men, more than 600 guns and thousands of vehicles, had been passed through the great city and were on the Kolomna road. Kutuzov himself traversed Moscow in the morning. An eyewitness states that he saw him near the Kolomna gate sitting in his carriage quite alone, resting his head on his hands, silent and sad, while before him troops, guns, and waggons poured in an endless stream. The head of the army halted for the night at Panki, a village about ten miles from the city, where Kutuzov established his head-quarters.
Meanwhile, early on the 13th, Napoleon halted his army, fearing that Kutuzov was manœuvring to attack his right flank. That he could conceive such an eventuality shows how completely, and not for the first time in the campaign, his cavalry had failed to keep touch with the enemy. At 10 a.m., however, he became convinced that the Russian army was still in his front, and resumed his march. At 1 p.m. on the 14th Murat’s vanguard crowned the Sparrow Hills, about a mile and a half west of Moscow, and saw before them in the plain the Russian rear-guard, and beyond it the widespreading city—the goal which they had toiled so strenuously to attain.
The Russian army was still pouring through the streets, and Miloradovich sent an officer to Murat to propose a short armistice, adding that if it were not granted he should defend the city step by step, and fire it as he fell back. After a while a sort of informal suspension of arms until 7 p.m. was made between Miloradovich and Sebastiani, now commanding the 2nd Cavalry Corps. The Russians evacuated the Dorogomilov suburb at 3 p.m., and Murat quietly followed. At about the same time Napoleon reached the Sparrow Hills. He is said to have gazed long and eagerly upon the goal of his wishes, now spread out before his greedy eyes; but he may well have muttered the words attributed to him: “It is full time!”