Over and above all this the army was encumbered by a disproportionate throng of non-combatants. Besides the ordinary camp-followers, male and female, it has already been observed that there were with the army a number of persons—partly women—who should not have been permitted to accompany it. There were sick and wounded to the number of at least several thousands at the outset. The French colony at Moscow mostly fled with the army. Also a number of Russian prostitutes, and even a good many women and girls of better stamp—including some of the upper classes—accompanied men who had formed connections with them.
The precise state of feeling in the army cannot be ascertained. There is no doubt that the struggle at Borodino had badly affected its morale, and the French troops at least with their quick intelligence must have looked forward to the future with dread. On the other hand, their natural light-heartedness and their belief in Napoleon probably sustained their spirits. The foreign element was, doubtless, even less hopeful. That the more reflective among the officers were filled with misgiving is indubitable; and there was much discouragement among the generals, many of whom, besides, were war-weary and yearned for rest.
Thus, disorganised, with discipline shattered, ill clothed, ill supplied, deficient in transport but laden with useless plunder, encumbered with sick, wounded, and helpless non-combatants, and with demoralisation latent everywhere, the Grande Armée set out from Napoleon’s Farthest to fight its way home. It is perhaps difficult to see things in their true light, every effort at so doing being naturally affected by knowledge of succeeding events. But the conclusion can hardly be avoided that the fate of the Grande Armée was already sealed, and that the shadow of impending disaster lay darkly upon its disorderly columns.
The numbers of the Napoleonic host on leaving Moscow can only be approximately computed. The dates of the muster-rolls collected by De Chambray vary so much that they can only be taken as a general guide. There are also errors in the published tables, the 8th Corps having 4916 infantry and artillery instead of 1916. De Chambray also, with all his merits, has the failing, natural enough indeed, and entirely excusable, of rather under-rating French numbers. An example of this may be seen in his estimate of Napoleon’s strength at Borodino.
On the whole, working upon the muster-rolls collected by De Chambray, the marching-out strength of Napoleon’s army from Moscow would appear to have been approximately as follows:—
| Corps. | Infantry, Artillery, Dismounted Cavalry. | Mounted Cavalry. | Total. | Guns. |
| Grand Quarter-General | 3,000 | 1,000 | 4,000 | ? |
| Imperial Guard | 19,000 | 4,000 | 23,000 | |
| 1st Army Corps | 30,000 | 1,000 | 31,000 | |
| 3rd ” ” | 10,500 | 1,000 | 11,500 | |
| 4th ” ” | 26,000 | 1,500 | 27,500 | |
| 5th ” ” | 5,000 | 1,000 | 6,000 | |
| 8th ” ” | 5,000 | 750 | 5,750 | |
| Cavalry Reserve | 1,000 | 5,000 | 6,000 | |
| Brigade of Dismounted Horsemen | 4,000 | 4,000 | ||
| Artillery Parks, Engineers, } Pontonniers, Gendarmerie, etc.} | 5,000 | 500 | 5,500 | |
| 108,500 | 15,750 | 124,250 | 600 |
The precise number of guns is not very certain, and to compute it is a somewhat unnecessary task. But, including the spare pieces in the reserve parks, and allowing for losses and reinforcements, the total must have been in the neighbourhood of 600. There were over 2000 artillery vehicles, for the most part heavily laden and very inadequately horsed.
The trains, already enormous, were now still further augmented by quantities of carts and carriages of every kind taken in Moscow, and requisitioned to transport food, wounded, refugees, and plunder. The bulk of the troops had made additions to their worn uniforms in the shape of garments of all kinds, often female ones, ransacked from the shops and warehouses. The effect must at the time have appeared fantastic and comical; but the humour of the sight was soon to be quenched in horror.
It has been seen that on the 14th orders had been issued which foreshadowed the evacuation of Moscow; and on the 16th Napoleon wrote to Maret at Vilna, setting forth his intentions. He would march against and defeat Kutuzov, take Kaluga, and then act according to circumstances. He would probably eventually go into winter quarters between Minsk and Smolensk, as Moscow did not afford a satisfactory military position. The Emperor made a final attempt to induce Kutuzov to open negotiations, but, of course, without result. He was in one of his worst moods, raging at his want of success, and the savage side of his nature displayed itself in all its nakedness in the disgraceful orders to blow up the Kremlin and its sacred and historic buildings.
From Moscow two roads led to Kaluga. The western one went by the towns of Fominskoië, Borovsk and Maloyaroslavetz, that to the east by Voronovo and Tarutino. The eastern road is the more direct of the two, and is roughly the chord of the shallow arc of a circle described by the other. From Borovsk a cross-road leads by Vereia to Gzhatsk. From Maloyaroslavetz a fairly good highway goes eastward and south-eastward by Medyn to Yukhnov, and thence by Ielnia to Smolensk. The two Moscow-Kaluga roads are farthest apart between Tarutino and Borovsk, the latter place being some 20 miles distant from the former and slightly to the north-east of it. Maloyaroslavetz is about 11 miles south of Borovsk, and some 22 by road from Tarutino. It is thus evident that it was a point of great strategic importance.