Both sides now settled down into cantonments. Both had suffered very severely and neither was in a state to resume hostilities. Wittgenstein entrenched his position at Sivokhino, and his cavalry were able to circumscribe the French foraging operations on the right bank of the Düna. Wittgenstein also fortified his advanced base of Sebezh. Meanwhile, St. Cyr threw up entrenchments round Polotsk. The troops were distributed around the town, and, being largely in quarters or in barracks and tolerably well supplied, were soon in good condition. The effectives were increased by drafts and convalescents, but it is doubtful whether there was any great rise in the numbers owing to the diminution occasioned by constant petty skirmishing. The Bavarians were apparently unable to recover from the blighting effects of the sickness planted in their midst by their terrible hardships in July, and, though they were at rest and better supplied than they had hitherto been, their numbers continued to diminish. Maret and Hogendorp did their best to forward supplies from Vilna, but bread was often scarce and already, on October 7th, St. Cyr was writing to express his anxiety at the difficulty of procuring forage. The numerical strength of St. Cyr’s force by the middle of October appears to have been about 30,000 men—2nd Corps 21,000; Doumerc about 2200; 6th Corps perhaps 7000 or 8000.
Meanwhile, Marshal Victor, having crossed the Niemen on September 4th, reached Smolensk on the 27th. On October 6th Napoleon gave him his instructions. Besides his corps and the Saxon and Westphalian brigades of Löw and Coutard he was given control of Dombrowski’s division. He was informed that he was to act as the general reserve of the Grande Armée, and would move to support either Schwarzenberg, St. Cyr, or Napoleon, according to circumstances. Napoleon greatly underestimated the pressure on his flanks. He says in the despatch that Chichagov is only 20,000 strong, that his junction with Tormazov will only raise his force to 40,000, and that Schwarzenberg can easily deal with him. As a fact, both Schwarzenberg and St. Cyr were opposed by greatly superior numbers. Even when the former had been joined by his reinforcements he was still outnumbered by Chichagov, who might be further strengthened by Ertel from Mozyr. On the north Wittgenstein and Steingell had 50,000 men against St. Cyr’s 30,000. To afford adequate support to the wings Victor would have needed 80,000 men.
A few words must here be said upon the diplomatic situation. Prussia, trodden into the dust by Napoleon’s iron heel, was in the last stages of destitution, while Austria, though sorely humiliated, was still independent, far less wasted, and, in addition, was more or less afraid of a revival of Prussia. These circumstances are reflected in the despatches of the Prime Ministers, the Prussian, Hardenberg, being eager to take vigorous steps and inclined to believe in the rumours of French defeats; while Metternich is pessimistic and obviously playing for his own—or Austria’s—hand. He seems after the fall of Moscow to have considered that Napoleon might win, and accordingly a reinforcement of about 5000 men was despatched to Schwarzenberg. Otherwise there were signs that Napoleon’s vassals were beginning to falter at the never-ending drain of human life. Bavaria and Württemberg sent drafts to refill the wasted ranks of their contingents; but the King of Württemberg spoke of his uneasiness at receiving no news. The Grand Duke of Baden professed himself unable to add to his treaty contingent. In his growing anxiety Napoleon actually went to the length of politely asking the King of Prussia to replace two weakened cavalry regiments. He also directed that every reinforcement despatched was to be stated in all newspapers at double its strength, so as to impose upon the Russians should the tidings reach them!
After the failure of the sortie from Riga Count Steingell made up his mind to waste no more time in attempting to execute the official plan of operations, but to join Wittgenstein without delay. On October 5th he left Riga, and proceeded by forced marches up the right bank of the Düna. On the 15th he reached Druia, having marched over 180 miles in ten days.
On October 10th Wittgenstein’s first column of reinforcement, over 5000 strong, arrived at Sivokhino. On the same day the 9000 men of the second column reached Nevel, and on the 14th its junction with the main force was practically complete. Wittgenstein had now under his hand about 40,000 men, including 5000 cavalry and Cossacks, with 154 guns.
Wittgenstein distributed the militia battalions among the infantry, one to each regiment, and his staff issued special orders as to how these enthusiastic but raw troops were to act in battle. The effect was excellent; and though the men were imperfectly clothed and equipped, and almost untrained, they rapidly gained efficiency and cohesion.
The unfortunate effect of the elaborate and too minute Imperial plan of operations now became evident. Steingell had acted upon his own judgment in marching to reinforce Wittgenstein; but he felt himself obliged to act upon his master’s orders as far as possible, and so crossed the Düna at Druia to operate on the left bank. He was thus completely separated from Wittgenstein, and the latter could only endeavour to remedy the strategic defect by bridging the river nearer Polotsk. As he had no pontoons the operation was likely to prove a lengthy one. He ordered his chief of engineers, Colonel Count Sievers, to construct a bridge at Desna, detailing as his escort 4 battalions of infantry and a regiment of cavalry—2500 men and 4 guns.
So far as there was any concerted plan of operations on the part of the Russian commanders, it appears to have been that Wittgenstein was to attack Polotsk and Steingell to cut off St. Cyr’s retreat. It was clear that the French general might choose to hold Polotsk merely by a rear-guard, and destroy Steingell’s small force by concentrating upon him the bulk of his own army. To obviate this, Wittgenstein must attack Polotsk speedily and vigorously. Even so the outlook was not altogether promising. Polotsk was fortified; and St. Cyr was quite strong enough to hold it against the 37,000 men of whom Wittgenstein disposed after deducting Sievers’ detachment.
Wittgenstein distributed his numerically strong but rather incoherent force into three large divisions of all arms, commanded respectively by Lieutenant-Generals Prince Iachvil and Berg and Major-General Beguichev, besides a flank detachment under Major-General Alexiev. On the 16th he began his march upon Polotsk, while Steingell was moving from Druia.