THE FRENCH RETREAT. MALOYAROSLAVETZ TO ORSHA
On October 26th the French retreat by the Moscow-Smolensk road definitely commenced. Napoleon with the Guard and 4th Corps moved back to Borovsk. Ney was directed by Vereia on Mozhaïsk, while Davout with the 1st Corps and the relics of the 1st and 3rd Cavalry Corps remained near Maloyaroslavetz until the evening. And, while Napoleon was retracing his steps, Kutuzov, also, was retreating upon Kaluga. He apparently feared that the French, having the road open, would move westward to Medyn and thence south-eastward upon Kaluga. This hypothesis is a direct reflection upon his action in abandoning his position outside Maloyaroslavetz. As matters stood, Kutuzov’s inference was not unreasonable; Poniatowski’s corps was actually on the march from Vereia to Medyn, and appeared to be the advance-guard of a turning movement. Miloradovich remained in observation on the original Russian position, and Platov continued to hover about Davout’s corps. The Corps de Bataille retrograded to Gonsherevo, about 12 miles from Kaluga. Paskievich’s division was sent to bar the Medyn-Kaluga road at Adamovskoë, some miles to the westward. There he was joined by Ilovaïski IX and his Cossack detachment. Miloradovich was about to fall back on the Russian main body when it was discovered that Maloyaroslavetz was evacuated. Kutuzov was informed, and the advance-guard reoccupied the line of the Luzha.
Kutuzov appeared to have inferred that Napoleon’s intention was to retreat upon Smolensk—as, in fact, it was. He accordingly directed his main body upon Adamovskoë, evidently with the purpose of following on the flank of the French retreat, while Miloradovich was ordered to Medyn. The latter, however, disquieted by reports that the French army was moving from Borovsk by cross-roads upon Medyn, hesitated, delayed, and finally also moved to Adamovskoë. Kutuzov remained at the latter place during the 29th, endeavouring to envisage the situation, and finally appears to have decided that the Grande Armée was retreating on Vitebsk. The conclusion was reasonable enough. The march of the French along the Borovsk-Mozhaïsk road might certainly indicate an intention to cross the Smolensk road at Mozhaïsk and take a route to the northward for Vitebsk—as Jomini considers that they should have done. Consequently upon the 30th Kutuzov marched northwards upon Mozhaïsk. Platov with his Cossacks and Paskievich’s division was to follow the French rear-guard. The advance-guard would move parallel with the French left flank, while the Corps de Bataille kept to the left of the advance-guard, generally at about a day’s march distance. On the 30th the main army had reached Kremenskoë, but by that day the French rear-guard had arrived at Mozhaïsk and all the corps were moving along the highway to Smolensk. Kutuzov and Miloradovich therefore turned to the westward, while Platov and Paskievich harassed Davout.
The result, therefore, was that the French army had at the outset gained a start upon their pursuers. Bennigsen says that he advised that the march should be directed from Adamovskoë on Yukhnov, thence by a broad road to Slavkovo. It seems clear that this direction would have been an excellent one. But Kutuzov knew that Napoleon was free to use the Medyn road, and indeed expected him to do so. He had, however, fallen back by Vereia, a direction which rather indicated an intention of retreating upon Vitebsk. If he had hoped by taking this route to deceive the Russians as to his line of march he had certainly succeeded.
From Mozhaïsk to Viasma the Moscow-Smolensk road proceeds generally in a shallow arc of a circle, often describing a very sinuous course. Miloradovich marched steadily to the south of it, gradually closing in, and moving much faster than the already dwindling and straggling French army with its immense trains. Still farther to the south and far to the rear the Russian Corps de Bataille had turned in the right direction and was also marching for Viasma. The roads by which it was forced to proceed were wretched, but none the less the troops marched at a very creditable pace, covering some 74 miles in 4 days.
Meanwhile the Napoleonic host was making its way into and along the Moscow-Smolensk high-road. Junot’s corps being actually on it when the retreat from Maloyaroslavetz began of course led the way; behind it came in succession the Guard, the 2nd and 4th Cavalry Corps, and the 3rd, 4th, and 1st Corps d’Armée, while Poniatowski covered the left flank. At Vereia, on the 27th, Mortier rejoined, bringing with him his prisoner, Winzingerode. Napoleon treated the general with gross insolence and brutality, overwhelming him with abuse, and actually condemned him to death as a traitor because he was a German and therefore a subject of one of his vassals! It is difficult to say whether he was or was not in earnest. When he was enraged his manners were brutal beyond words; and at this time he had every cause for being exasperated. In any case, he gave way to the remonstrances of Berthier and Murat. His conduct was otherwise inexcusable. Winzingerode had entered the service of Russia previous to the formation of the Rhine Confederacy. After being kept in suspense for some days Winzingerode was sent in custody to France; but he was rescued in Lithuania by Cossacks, as we shall have occasion to mention.
On the 28th Napoleon, at Mozhaïsk, received a report from Davout that he had as yet seen no enemies but Cossacks. He thereupon inferred that the main Russian army was marching to cut his line of retreat. Its natural objective would in that case be Viasma, and the Emperor decided to push for that place with all speed with the Guard.
