[XX.—BATTLE OF MARSTON MOOR.]
A.D. 1644.
King Charles was fully conscious of the perilous position in which he would be placed if York fell, and Yorkshire passed into the hands of the enemy; he therefore instructed Prince Rupert to march to the relief of York, using the following impressive language:—“I command and conjure you, by the duty and affection which I know you bear me, that, all new enterprise laid aside, you immediately march, according to your first intention, with all your force to the relief of York; but if that be either lost, or have freed themselves from the besiegers, or that, for want of powder, you cannot undertake that work, that you immediately march with your whole strength to Worcester, to assist me and my army, without which, or your having relieved York by beating the Scots, all the successes you may afterwards have, most infallibly will be useless unto me.”
Gathering up forces as he advanced, Rupert marched to the succour of the city, and occupied Knaresborough and Boroughbridge on the evening of the 30th of June. On the following morning the Parliamentarians drew up on Hessay Moor, to arrest Rupert’s advance. Outgeneraling his adversaries, the Prince marched to Poppleton Ferry, halted his army, and entered York with 200 Cavaliers. That night a council of war was held, and Rupert resolved to give battle to the enemy. The Marquis of Newcastle endeavoured to dissuade the Prince from this step, and begged him to await the arrival of a reinforcement of 5,000 men, expected in the course of a few days. Rupert is accused of behaving with discourtesy towards Newcastle, and for this there can be no defence. There was, however, good reason for fighting, and at once. Certainly the Prince could not be expected to put a great value on Newcastle’s advice. Rupert had achieved many successes, and had relieved York by a masterly movement; on the other hand, Newcastle had not achieved any remarkable success, and had allowed himself to be besieged in York without fighting a battle. If he could hold Leslie in check, surely he might have attempted to raise the blockade of York before Manchester arrived with reinforcements. Had Rupert waited for reinforcements, would the Parliamentarians have accepted battle, or retired to some stronger position? Rupert was in a favourable position, with a tried army, almost as strong as that of the enemy, and if he did not at once give battle as favourable an opportunity might not again occur. Having relieved York, was he to retire and leave the enemy in Yorkshire to again besiege the city, or capture the various royal strongholds? Two nearly equal armies were opposed on Yorkshire soil, would one army leave the other in possession? would the Parliamentarians compel the Cavaliers to fight? or would the two armies move away in different directions, seeking other fields and other foes? Rupert and the Parliamentarian leaders knew that they were there to fight. The King’s affairs absolutely demanded a victory, and the blame that attaches to Rupert is that he forgot the general in acting the part of a captain of horse, and so lost a battle that it was within his capabilities to have won, as the conduct of his army abundantly proved.
The morning of the 2nd of July beheld Rupert’s army in motion; but the enemy were marching upon Tadcaster, not expecting an engagement. A threatening movement of Rupert’s cavalry was promptly checked, and both armies began to form for battle under the Earls of Leven and Manchester and Lord Fairfax on the one hand; and Rupert, Goring, Lucas, and Sir John Urrie on the other. Some time elapsed before the various divisions reached the field, and stood opposed in order of battle.
The Parliamentarians occupied a gentle eminence covered by a crop of rye, beaten down by horse and foot. The regiments of Scotch and English were intermixed, that the grace or blame of victory or defeat might be equally shared. The centre consisted of serried masses of pikemen and musketeers, commanded by Leven and the elder Fairfax; Sir Thomas Fairfax led the right wing, consisting of his Yorkshire cavalry, supported by three regiments of Scottish horse, and outflanked by the village of Marston. The left wing, extending to Tockwith village, was commanded by Manchester and Cromwell. Their field word was “God with us!” Before them was the open moor, held by the King’s men, but the furze and broken ground was calculated to retard their charges. Between the two armies extended a ditch and hedge, soon to be immortalised as the scene of some heavy fighting and dreadful slaughter.
Some uncertainty exists as to the disposition of the Royalists, the various accounts of the battle being very contradictory, but it may be assumed that the centre was commanded by Goring, Sir Charles Lucas, and General Porter; Newcastle heading his own regiment of white-coated pikemen. Rupert carried his huge red-cross banner, emblazoned with the arms of the Palatinate, on the left wing; and Sir John Urrie commanded the right. Grant seems disposed to support the statement of Rushworth, that Rupert led the right wing, and Sir Charles Lucas the left.