“The cover of the brochure gave the name of the Marquis de Gricourt as the author; but I know for certain that the Emperor was the author of it, for he wrote it during his captivity at Wilhelmshöhe, and gave me a copy of it.”
This highly-interesting document is so little known—I will venture to say it is unknown—that I will quote some of its principal paragraphs in full, fortified by the conviction that I shall be thereby clearing the Emperor’s memory (as I have already cleared that of the Empress) from many reproaches and sneers which have been accepted as gospel by all who have not waded through M. Ollivier’s fifteen volumes, which are not likely to be translated into English, although possibly they may be issued in German; but even that is doubtful, for the author of “L’Empire Libéral” is a very outspoken historian.
The Emperor wisely says: “We must not judge of things as they are, but as they might have been. Certainly, since Königsgrätz the power of Prussia has increased amazingly; hence her crushing France with considerable forces, outnumbering her own by hundreds of thousands.... Before 1866 there was no possibility of forming an alliance in the centre of Europe. Austria was irrevocably joined to Germany, and Italy did not then exist as a Power. But might it not likewise be argued that in 1870, also, France remained alone? Central Europe then permitted her to form alliances. The Austro-Hungarian Empire might have been won over, and Italy, reconstituted, led to join in the war. Had these events taken place, the policy of the Second Empire doubtless would have triumphed; for facts could have proved that, in spite of the augmentation of Prussia, there existed in Europe a serious counterpoise to her gigantic power.... From January 2, 1870, France[123] became entire mistress of her own destinies. And what use did she then make of the liberties so largely accorded to her? The country desired peace; the Chambers and Government desired peace; and yet the climax to the situation was War.”
With these preliminary words Napoleon III. proceeds:
When M. Émile Ollivier accepted the task of forming a Ministry, his programme—as submitted to the Emperor—frankly acknowledged the principle of nationalities,[124] recognizing the right of Germany to reconstitute herself in a manner thought best suitable to her. He likewise expressed the most pacific intentions.[125] Soon after the installation of the Ministers on January 2, 1870, Comte Daru, Minister for Foreign Affairs, proposed to Prussia, through the intervention of England, a general disarmament. To support this demand, it was suggested, in the Chambers, to reduce the annual contingent by 10,000 men. This last measure was adopted; but as to the proposition of Comte Daru only a formal and evasive answer was returned. Nevertheless, it may be said that the year 1870 began under favourable auspices. Nothing seemed to threaten the repose then enjoyed by Europe. The only thought in France was to develop, under a Liberal Government, the moral and material resources of the country.[126]
But it has often been said, “He who sows the whirlwind shall reap the tempest.” For four years the Opposition—including all sections—had caused the Tribune and the Press to resound with most bitter lamentations on the increase of Prussian power.... These constant assertions, these perpetual attacks, had penetrated to the remotest parts of the country. The army, even, had not remained insensible to the reproaches of weakness hurled at the Government; it felt humbled by the successes of Prussia, as if those very successes had been obtained against itself.
Again, when the news reached France of the likelihood of a Prussian Prince becoming King of Spain, it had the effect of a spark falling on inflammable matter; all hatred, jealousies, and envyings were at once aroused. This incident, which at another time would only have provoked an exchange of diplomatic Notes, now fired the whole nation.
The Ministry, it must be owned, committed the serious fault of carrying to the tribune a sort of challenge, which rendered any diplomatic arrangement difficult. Nevertheless, on the Prince of Hohenzollern withdrawing his son’s name as candidate for the Spanish throne, it was hoped that peace might still have been maintained; but public opinion had been too violently agitated: it spurned all conciliatory measures. The journals of nearly every shade of opinion cried out for war. The provinces partook of the exultations of the capital. Whatever may be said of the confidential messages sent by the Préfets, and of which only garbled accounts had been given, the majority of these high functionaries announced, in the aggregate, that in the Departments the public mind was animated beyond precedent; conditions of peace, however honourable, would in no way satisfy them. Of this we need no further proof than the following despatches, found by the Prussians in the Palace of St. Cloud, and published in the “North German Gazette”:[127]
“Perpignan, July 15, 1870.—The Préfet to the Minister of the Interior, Paris. In consequence of the last news we have had great excitement here. The idea of war with Prussia is warmly received by the bulk of the population. Even the Radicals say that in a week’s time hostilities will commence, and that by August 15 our soldiers will celebrate the Emperor’s fête at Berlin. No one, for one moment, doubts the results of the war. Everywhere, in town and village, there is the same confidence shown.”
“Marseilles, July 16, 1870.—The Préfet to the Minister of the Interior, Paris. There has just been a great manifestation here, a torchlight procession parading the streets of our town, followed by 10,000 to 15,000 people, singing ‘La Reine Hortense’ and the ‘Marseillaise.’ The cries of ‘Vive l’Empereur!’ ‘A bas la Prusse!’ ‘À Berlin!” resounding on all sides. The crowd is full of enthusiasm, and no disorder.”