But M. Ollivier has more to say on this point:
The Empress and the Duc de Gramont were convinced that, the war over, it would have been easy for us [the Ollivier Cabinet] to have established the Papal Sovereignty had it been overthrown by revolutionaries. The Emperor and the Duc did not realize the situation in which we should then have found ourselves.... The withdrawal of our troops, in the circumstances in which it took place, was equivalent to the abandonment of what remained of the Temporal Power.
Even had Victor Emmanuel sent troops to our aid, he could not have done so before the first week in September; consequently, such help from Italy would not have saved us from Spicheren, Wörth, and Sedan.
The real motive of the abstention of Italy was not the refusal to give up Rome. The Italian Ministers from the first subordinated the question of participation in the war to the initiative which Austria might have taken. Italy could do nothing without Austria.
The causes which led Austria to refuse to come to our aid and to bring Italy with her are infinite. But the one cause which dominated all others was the known intention of Russia[137] to put her army at the service of Prussia if Austria sent her troops to the assistance of France.
This is confirmed by King William, who, on the morrow of his victory, wrote to the Emperor Alexander II.: “Never will Prussia forget that she owes it to you that the war did not take extreme proportions. God bless you! Your grateful friend for life, WILLIAM.”
To this outburst of gratitude the Tsar replied: “I am happy to have been able to show you by the evidence of my sympathies that I am a devoted friend. May the friendship which unites us assure the happiness and the glory of the two countries!—Alexander.”
We may not question the sincerity of M. Ollivier’s avowal, extorted from him by bitter memories of, as Napoleon III. says, “what might have been”: “La Russie a beaucoup à réparer à notre égard.”
At this point it is germane to the diplomatic question—which, as we have seen, was at the root of everything—to recall the doubtless forgotten fact that on July 24, 1870—five days after France had declared war—a Conference took place in Paris on the vital question of the proposed alliance of France, Austria, and Italy. Prince Napoleon and the Duc de Gramont represented France, Prince de Metternich (husband of the celebrated Princess Pauline) and Count Vitzthum represented Austria, and Count Nigra (a great admirer of the Empress) and Count Vimercati Italy.
The Duc de Gramont produced the draft of a proposed Treaty, which was agreed to. The Conference was about to break up when Prince de Metternich and Count Nigra simultaneously introduced a condition making it a sine quâ non that France should give up Rome to Italy. Prince Napoleon refused to accept the condition, and the Duc de Gramont announced that the Conference was at an end. Napoleon III. at once informed Prince de Metternich and Count Nigra that only in the last extremity would he agree to a diplomatic conference on the question of abandoning Rome to the Italian Government.