From the Turkish point of view, the Chester concessions may be justified on the grounds that the new railways will bring political stability to Anatolia[46] and will initiate an era of unprecedented economic progress. From the point of view of those American interests which believe in the stimulation of foreign trade, likewise, the Chester project has much to commend it. Exploitation of the oilfields of the vilayets of Erzerum, Bitlis, Van, and Mosul, and the development of the mineral resources of Armenia—including the valuable Arghana copper mines—will provide rich sources of supply of raw materials. In the construction of railways, ports, and pipe lines there will be a considerable demand for American steel products. Economic development of the vast region through which the new railways will pass promises to furnish a market for American products, such as agricultural machinery, and to offer ample opportunity for the profitable investment of American capital. The Chester project may well become an imperial enterprise of the first rank.
With the exception of the temporary advantage which they hoped to gain at the second Lausanne Conference, the Turkish Government wished no political importance to be attached to the Chester concessions. As Abdul Hamid had awarded the Anatolian and Bagdad Railway concessions to a German company because he believed Germans would be less likely to associate political aims with their economic privileges, so the Government of the National Assembly has awarded the Chester concessions to an American syndicate because Turkish Nationalists are convinced that Americans have no political interests in Turkey. This was made clear by Dr. I. Fouad Bey, a member of the National Assembly, in a semi-official visit to the United States during April, 1923. “We Turks wish to develop our country,” he said. “We need foreign coöperation to develop it. We cannot do without this coöperation. Now, there are two kinds of foreign coöperation. There is the foreign coöperation that is coupled with foreign political domination—coöperation that brings profit only to the foreign investor. We have had enough of that kind. There is another kind of coöperation—the kind we conceive the Chester project and other American enterprises to be. This kind of coöperation is a business enterprise and has no imperialistic aim. It is a form of coöperation designed to profit both America and Turkey, and not to invade Turkish sovereignty and Turkish political interests in any way. That is why we prefer American coöperation. That is why the Grand National Assembly at Angora is prepared to welcome American capital with open arms and secure it in all its rights.”[47]
These sentiments found a ready echo among American merchants. At a dinner given in honor of Dr. Fouad Bey by the American Federated Chambers of Commerce for the Near East, one of the speakers said: “Turkey, in our opinion, is destined to have a magnificent future. It is on the threshold of a new and great era. Its extraordinary resources, amazingly rich, are practically untouched. Although in remote ages of antiquity these vast regions played a great rôle in history, they have for many centuries lain practically fallow. The tools, appliances, machinery and methods which have been so highly perfected in the United States are appropriate to and will be needed for the development of this marvelous latent wealth. Our capital likewise can be very helpful. The members of our Chamber of Commerce have a keen interest in the furtherance of trade relations between Turkey and the United States. We want both to increase the imports of its raw materials into our country and to stimulate the export of our manufactured articles to Turkey. We are inspired by no political aims. We seek no annexation of territory. We desire no exclusive privileges. Our motto, if we had one, would be ‘A fair field and no favors.’ In the development of commercial relations with Turkey, in seeking the investment of our capital there, we ask for nothing more than an open door.”[48]
The American press, likewise, is in accord with a policy of governmental non-intervention in the ramifications of the Chester project. The following editorial from the new York World of April 23, 1923, is perhaps representative:
“There is no reason why the State Department should make itself the attorney for or the promoter of the Chester business enterprises. If the Angora Government has granted privileges to the Admiral’s company, then the Admiral’s business is with Angora and not with Washington.
“Certainly the American people have no more interest in taking up the Chester concessions diplomatically than they would have if the Admiral were proposing to open a candy store in Piccadilly, a dressmaking establishment in the Rue de la Paix, or a beauty parlor on the Riviera. If the Admiral and his friends wish to invest money in Turkey, they no doubt know what they are doing. They will expect profits commensurate with the risks, and they should not expect the United States Government, which will enjoy none of the profits, to insure them against the risks.”
It is difficult, nevertheless, to see how the Chester concessions, and their affiliated enterprises can be kept scrupulously free from political complications. The French Government, in defence of the interests of its nationals, has announced semi-officially that American support of the concessions might lead to “a diplomatic incident of the first importance.”[49] Furthermore, the United States Navy is said to be vitally interested in the Chester project. The oilfields to which Admiral Chester’s Ottoman-American Development Company obtain rights of exploitation may prove to be important sources of fuel supply to American destroyers operating in the Mediterranean—Mr. Denby, Secretary of the Navy, said apropos of the concessions that the Navy “is always concerned with the possibility of oil supplies.”[50] Furthermore, an American-built port at Youmourtalik, on the Gulf of Alexandretta, might conceivably be utilized as an American naval base. Such a station, less than 150 miles from Cyprus and less than 400 miles from the Suez Canal, could hardly be expected to increase the British sense of security in the Eastern Mediterranean.
The American Navy has already been very active in the Near East. “Soon after the armistice, Rear Admiral Bristol was sent to Constantinople to command the small American naval forces there. A large part of his efforts was immediately devoted to the promotion of American business in that unsettled region, including the countries bordering on the Black Sea. He soon established for himself such an influential position by sheer force of character and by his intelligent grasp of both the political and economic situations that he was appointed high commissioner by the State Department.
“Early in 1919 several American destroyers were ordered to Constantinople for duty in the Near East. Although these destroyers are good fighting ships, it costs some $4,000,000 a year to maintain them on this particular duty, which does not train the crews for use in battle.... The possible development of the economic resources of this part of the world was carefully investigated by representatives of American commercial interests. These representatives were given every assistance by the Navy, transportation furnished them to various places, and all information of commercial activities obtained by naval officers in their frequent trips around the Black Sea given them. The competition for trade in this part of the world is very keen, the various European countries using every means at their disposal to obtain preferential rates. The Navy not only assists our commercial firms to obtain business, but when business opportunities present themselves, American firms are notified and given full information on the subject. One destroyer is kept continuously at Samsun, Turkey, to look after the American tobacco interests at that port. ... The present opportunities for development of American commerce in the Near East are very great, and its permanent success will depend largely upon the continued influence of the Navy in that region.”[51] This is the situation as diagnosed by the Navy Department itself.