[4] The text of the Russo-Turkish Treaty of March 16, 1921, is given as an appendix to an article by A. Nazaroff, “Russia’s Treaty with Turkey,” in Current History, Volume XVII (1922), pp. 276–279.
[5] Bowman, op. cit., p. 398.
[6] Cf. supra, pp. 202–203. Professor Toynbee now speaks of this feature of the Entente in terms of contempt: “Its direct motive was covetousness, and it rested locally on nothing more substantial than the precarious honor among thieves who find their business threatened by a vigorous and talented competitor. Some of the thieves, at any rate, never got out of the habit of picking their temporary partners’ pockets.“ Op. cit., p. 46.
[7] Ibid., pp. 45–46.
[8] It seems to be established that Mr. Lloyd George compelled a readjustment of the terms of the Sykes-Picot Treaty by threatening M. Clémenceau with a complete exposure and repudiation of all of the secret treaties. Cf. Baker, op. cit., Volume I, pp. 70–72.
[9] See Minutes of the Council of Four, March 20, 1919, reported in full by Baker, op. cit., Volume III, Document No. 1.
[10] Regarding the claims of the Turkish Petroleum Company, cf. supra, p. 261.
[11] Parliamentary Papers, No. Cmd. 675 (1920). Cf., also, the “Franco-British Convention of December 23, 1920, on Certain Points Connected with the Mandates for Syria, the Lebanon, Palestine, and Mesopotamia,” Parliamentary Papers, No. Cmd. 1195 (1921). For a general discussion of the oil situation, see: H. Bérenger, La politique du pétrole (Paris, 1920); F. Delaisi, Le pétrole—La politique de la production (Paris, 1921); A. Apostol and A. Michelson, La lutte pour le pétrole (Paris, 1922).
[12] Cf. supra, Chapter X, Note 18.