[32] Cf. supra, pp. 324–325.
[33] The Chester concessions will be treated more fully in the succeeding pages.
[34] Supra, pp. 245–249, 325–326. It was the Turkish contention that the Black Sea concessions were invalid for the following reasons: they were negotiated by a government for the acts of which the National Assembly assumed no responsibility; they never had been ratified by the Turkish Parliament; the French bankers had not fulfilled all the conditions upon which the concessions were predicated.
[35] The New York Times, April 12, 1923.
[36] Regarding the Bank für orientalischen Eisenbahnen, cf. supra, p. 32. Accounts of the purchase by British interests are to be found in The New York Times, April 28, May 15 and 16, 1923, and The Times (London), May 18, 1923.
[37] The Chester concessions conflict, to a degree, with the rights of the British-owned Turkish Petroleum Company (cf. supra, Chapter X) in the vilayet of Mosul. The area in conflict is so small, compared to the total of the two concessions, however, that it is extremely doubtful if there will be any serious difficulty in reaching a satisfactory adjustment.
[38] “Report of the King-Crane Mission to the Near East,” published as a supplement to the Editor and Publisher, Volume 55 (New York, 1922), pp. I-XXVIII. Cf., also, “Report of the American Military Mission to Armenia,” Senate Document No. 266, Sixty-sixth Congress, First Session (Washington, 1920).
[39] E. J. Bing, “Chester and Turkey, Inc.,” in The New Republic, Volume XXXIV (New York, 1923), pp. 290–292.
[40] Cf. E. M. Earle, “The Outlook for American Imperialism,” in the Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Volume CVIII (Philadelphia, 1923).
[41] For the text of this correspondence, cf. Parliamentary Papers, No. Cmd. 675 (1921).