[32] Riesser, op. cit., pp. 110, 121.
[33] It should be remarked here that the author is not unaware of the fallacy of speaking of “German trade” and “German industry.” He is cognizant of the fact that trade takes place not between countries, but between individuals. If he anthropomorphizes the German Empire for the purposes of this description, it is not because of either ignorance or malice, but for convenience.
[34] For further consideration of German economic progress during the late nineteenth century see: Dawson, op. cit., Chapters III, IV, XII, XVI; E. D. Howard, The Cause and Extent of the Recent Industrial Progress of Germany (New York, 1907); T. B. Veblen, Imperial Germany and the Industrial Revolution (New York, 1915); W. H. Dawson, Industrial Germany (London, 1913); Karl Helfferich, Germany’s Economic Progress and National Wealth (New York, 1913); G. Blondel, L’Essor industriel et commercial du peuple allemand (Paris, 1900).
[35] Paul Dehn, Weltwirtschaftliche Neubildungen (Berlin, 1904), passim.
[36] Bernhard von Bülow, Imperial Germany (English translation, New York, 1914), pp. 17, 18–20.
[37] The extent of German economic control of central and eastern Europe before the War is indicated by Mr. J. M. Keynes, in his book The Economic Consequences of the Peace (New York, 1920), pp. 17–18: “Germany not only furnished these countries with trade, but in the case of some of them supplied a great part of the capital needed for their own development. Of Germany’s pre-war foreign investments, amounting in all to about six and a half billion dollars, not far short of two and a half billions was invested in Russia, Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, Rumania, and Turkey. And by the system of ‘peaceful penetration’ she gave these countries not only capital, but what they needed hardly less, organization. The whole of Europe east of the Rhine thus fell into the German industrial orbit, and its economic life was adjusted accordingly.” A frank German admission of a policy of a self-sufficient Central Europe is the work of Friedrich Naumann, Mittel-Europa, translated into English by C. M. Meredith and published under the title Central Europe (New York, 1917). See, especially, Chapters IV-VII. Cf., also, Ernst zu Reventlow, Deutschlands auswärtige Politik (3rd revised edition, Berlin, 1916), pp. 336 et seq.; K. H. Müller, Die Bedeutung der Bagdadbahn (Hamburg, 1916), p. 29.
[38] Paul Rohrbach, Die Bagdadbahn (Berlin, 1903), p. 16.
[39] H. A. Gibbons, The Reconstruction of Poland and the Near East (New York, 1917), pp. 57–58. The author is not in agreement with either Dr. Rohrbach or Dr. Gibbons. He certainly would hesitate to call any imperialist policy “inevitable.”
[40] Die deutsche Türkenpolitik, p. 8.