The rising prestige of Germany in the Near East and the rapid expansion of German economic interests in Turkey, however, did not, during these crucial years of 1898–1900, arouse the fear or the cupidity of other European powers. Russia, it is true, objected for strategic reasons to the construction of the proposed Bagdad Railway via the so-called “northern” or trans-Armenian route from Angora. But when the Tsar was assured by the Black Sea Basin Agreement that a southern route from Konia would be substituted, M. Zinoviev, the Russian minister at Constantinople, withdrew his formal diplomatic protest.[18] The French Government adopted a policy of benevolent neutrality toward the claims of the Deutsche Bank for the concession, on the ground that the Imperial Ottoman Bank, representing powerful financial interests in Paris, was to be given a substantial participation in the proposed Bagdad Railway Company. The pact of May 6, 1899, between the German and French promoters satisfied even M. Delcassé![19]
In Great Britain, likewise, there was the friendliest feeling toward the German proposals. When the Kaiser made his second visit to the Near East in 1898 the London Times said: “In this country we can have nothing but good wishes for the success of the Emperor’s journey and for any plans of German commercial expansion which may be connected with it. Some of us may perhaps be tempted to regret lost opportunities for our own influence and our own trade in the Ottoman dominions. But we can honestly say that if we were not to have these good things for ourselves, there are no hands we would rather see them in than in German hands.”[20] The Morning Post of August 24, 1899, expressed the hope that no rivalry over the Bagdad Railway would prejudice the good relations between Great Britain and Germany. “So long as there is an efficient railway from Haidar Pasha to Bagdad, and so long as the door there is open, it should not really matter who makes the tunnels or pays the porters. If it should be necessary to insist on an open door, the Foreign Office will probably see to it; while if it should happen to be, as usual, asleep, there are always means of poking it up. As a matter of general politics it may not be at all a bad thing to give Germany a strong reason for defending the integrity of Turkey and for resisting aggression on Asia Minor from the North.”
Sympathetic consideration of German expansion in the Near East was not confined to the press. Cecil Rhodes, great apostle of British imperialism, visited Germany in the spring of 1899 and came away from Berlin favorably disposed toward the Bagdad Railway and none the less pleased with the Kaiser’s apparent enthusiasm for the Cape-to-Cairo plan. In November of the same year William II paid a royal visit to England. It was then that Joseph Chamberlain, Secretary for the Colonies, learned the details of German plans in the Ottoman Empire, but, so far from being alarmed, he publicly announced his belief in the desirability of an Anglo-German entente. The almost simultaneous announcement of the award of the preliminary Bagdad Railway concession met with a favorable reception from the British press.[21]
At the same time, however, less cordial sentiments were expressed toward Russia and France. There was general agreement among the London newspapers regarding at least one desirable feature of the Bagdad Railway enterprise: the discomfiture it would be certain to cause the Tsar in his imperial ambitions in the Near East. The Globe characterized as “impudence” the desire of Russia to regard Asiatic Turkey as “a second Manchuria.”[22] No love was being lost, either, on France. The Daily Mail of November 9, 1899, said: “The French have succeeded in wholly convincing John Bull that they are his inveterate enemies. England has long hesitated between France and Germany. But she has always respected German character, while she has gradually come to feel scorn for France. Nothing in the nature of an entente cordiale can exist between England and her nearest neighbor. France has neither courage nor political sense.”
The Bagdad Railway Concession Is Granted
It was almost three years after the Sultan’s preliminary announcement of the Bagdad concession that the imperial decree was issued. During the interval the German technical commission was completing its survey of the line; details of the concession were being arranged between Zihni Pasha, Minister of Public Works, and Dr. Kurt Zander, General Manager of the Anatolian Railway Company; Dr. von Siemens was working out plans for the financing of the enterprise. Finally, on March 18, 1902, an imperial iradé of Abdul Hamid II definitely awarded the Bagdad Railway concession to the Anatolian Railway Company.[23]
The Constantinople despatches announcing the Sultan’s award met with a varied reception. In Germany, of course, there was general satisfaction and, in some quarters, jubilation. The Kaiser telegraphed his personal thanks to the Sultan. In Vienna, the semi-official Fremdenblatt expressed the opinion that “the construction of the railway would be an event of the greatest economic and political importance and would materially strengthen Turkey’s power of resistance.”[24] M. Delcassé, French Minister of Foreign Affairs, interpolated in the Chamber, informed the Deputies that, whether one liked it or not, the convention was a fait accompli which France must accept, particularly because French capitalists were associated with the German concessionaires in the enterprise.[25] The Russian Government was silent at the time, although two months before M. Witte had informed the press that he saw no reason for granting financial assistance or diplomatic acquiescence to a possible competitor of Russian trans-Asiatic railways.[26]
In England there was very little opposition, but much friendly comment, on the German plans. Earl Percy expressed the hope that Great Britain would do nothing to interfere with the construction of the Bagdad Railway. “Germany,” he told the House of Commons, “is doing for Turkey what we have been doing for Persia, for the social improvement and material welfare of native races; and in the struggle between the Slavonic policy of compelling stagnation and the Teutonic policy of spreading the blessings and enlightenment of civilization, the victory will lie with those nations which are striving, selfishly or unselfishly, consciously or unconsciously, to fulfil the high aims which Providence has entrusted to the imperial races of Christendom.” Lord Cranborne, Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, announced that, although the Government had every intention of maintaining the status quo in the Persian Gulf, it would not otherwise interfere in the project for a German-owned trans-Mesopotamian railway. Lord Lansdowne, Secretary for Foreign Affairs, informed the French and German ambassadors at London that His Britannic Majesty’s Government would not oppose the Bagdad enterprise, particularly if British capital were invited to participate in its consummation.[27] This was taken as a definite promise, for English financiers already had been asked to take a share in the Bagdad Railway Company by purchase, pro rata, of portions of the holdings of the German and French interests.[28]
Although there was a noticeable lack of unanimity in European diplomatic circles, little or no reason existed in 1902 to believe that any determined resistance would be made to the consummation of the plans for the construction of the Bagdad Railway. The chief difficulties of the concessionaires seemed to be not political, but financial and administrative. The year 1902 was one of economic depression; in Germany, in particular, industrial and financial conditions were distinctly unfavorable for the flotation of a large bond issue such as would be required to raise funds for the construction of the Bagdad Railway. Certain of the minor provisions of the convention of 1902, furthermore, were unsatisfactory to the financiers of the project. The concession for the lines beyond Konia had been granted to the Anatolian Railway Company without privilege of assignment to any other corporation. This meant that any participation of outside capital in the new Bagdad Railway would, of necessity, involve participation in the profits of the Anatolian lines already in operation—a prospect by no means pleasing to the original promoters. Furthermore, there was some question as to the advisability of placing under a single administrative head all of the line and branches from Constantinople to the Gulf.[29]