As a means of promoting closer relationships with Turkey numerous societies were established in Germany for the purpose of disseminating information on the Near East and its importance in the war. For example, Dr. Hugo Grothe conducted at Leipzig the work of the Deutsches Vorderasienkomitee—Vereinigung zur Förderung deutscher Kulturarbeit im islamischen Orient. This organization published and distributed hundreds of thousands of books, pamphlets, and maps regarding Asiatic Turkey; conducted a Near East Institute, at which lectures and courses of instruction were given; maintained an information bureau for business men interested in commercial and industrial opportunities in the Ottoman Empire; and established German libraries in Constantinople, Aleppo, Bagdad, Konia, and elsewhere along the line of the Bagdad Railway. A similar organization, the Deutsch-türkische Vereinigung, was maintained at Berlin under the honorary presidency of Dr. von Gwinner of the Deutsche Bank and the active supervision of Dr. Ernest Jäckh. The two societies numbered among their members and patrons Herr Ballin, of the Hamburg-American Line, General von der Goltz, Baron von Wangenheim, and the Ottoman ambassador at Berlin.[8]
The watchdogs of British imperial welfare, however, were not asleep. Lord Crewe, the Secretary of State for India, was busily engaged in plans for safeguarding British economic and strategic interests in Mesopotamia. Early in September, 1914, General Sir Edmund Barrow, Military Secretary of the India Office, prepared a memorandum, “The Rôle of India in a Turkish War,” which proposed the immediate occupation of Basra on the grounds that it was “the psychological moment to take action” and that “so unexpected a stroke at this moment would have a startling effect” in checkmating Turkish intrigues, encouraging the Arabs to revolt and thus forestalling an Ottoman attack on the Suez, and in protecting the oil installations at the head of the Persian Gulf.[9] Supporters of a pro-Balkan policy, in the meantime, were urging an attack on Turkey from the Mediterranean. Winston Churchill, Chief Lord of the Admiralty, for example, in a memorandum of August 19, 1914, to Sir Edward Grey, advocated an alliance with Greece against Turkey; by September 4 he had completed plans for a military and naval attack on the Dardanelles; on September 21 he telegraphed Admiral Carden, at Malta, to “sink the Goeben and Breslau, no matter what flag they fly, if they come out of the Straits.” Mr. Churchill, with whose name will ever be associated the disastrous expedition to the Dardanelles, believed that, whatever the outcome of the war on the Western Front, the success or failure of Germany would be measured in terms of her power in the Near East after the termination of hostilities. To destroy German economic and political domination of Turkey it was necessary to have an expedition at the head of the Persian Gulf and, possibly, another in Syria, but the commanding strategic position was the Straits. The capture of Constantinople would win the war.[10]
There were others who considered that a purely defensive policy should be followed in the Near East. Lord Kitchener, for example, believed in concentrating the maximum possible man power in France and advocated restricting Eastern operations to the protection of the Suez Canal and other essential communications. Influential military critics, like Colonel Repington, were firmly opposed to “side shows” in Mesopotamia, at the Dardanelles, or elsewhere, which would divert men, matériel, and popular attention from the Western Front. Sir Edward Grey appeared to be more interested in Continental than in colonial questions. Lord Curzon was swayed between fear of a Moslem uprising in India and the hope that British prestige in the East might be materially enhanced by outstanding military successes at the expense of the Turks.[11]
The Near Eastern imperialists, however, had their way. During September, 1914, the Government of India was ordered to prepare an expeditionary force for service in the region of the Persian Gulf. Early in October, almost four weeks before Turkey entered the war, Indian Expeditionary Force “D,” under General Delamain, sailed from Bombay under sealed orders. It next appeared on October 23, at Bahrein Island, in the Persian Gulf, where General Delamain learned the purposes of the expedition which he commanded. His army was to occupy Adaban Island, at the mouth of the Shatt-el-Arab, “with the object of protecting the oil refineries, tanks and pipe lines [of the Anglo-Persian Company], covering the landing of reënforcements should these be required, and assuring the local Arabs of support against Turkey.” For the last-named purpose Sir Percy Cox, subsequently British High Commissioner in Irak, was attached to the army as “political officer.” In addition, General Delamain was to “take such military and political action as he should consider feasible to strengthen his position and, if necessary, occupy Basra.” Nevertheless, he was warned that the rôle of his force was “that of demonstrating at the head of the Persian Gulf” and that on no account was he “to take any hostile action against the Turks without orders from the Government of India, except in the case of absolute military necessity”![12]
Meanwhile, Sir Arthur Henry McMahon, subsequently first High Commissioner in Egypt under the Protectorate, entered into an agreement, dated October 23, 1914, with the Sherif of Mecca, assuring the latter that Great Britain was prepared “to recognize and support the independence of the Arabs within territories in which Great Britain is free to act without detriment to the interests of her ally, France,” it being understood that “the districts of Mersina and Alexandretta and portions of Syria lying to the west of the districts of Damascus, Homs, Hama and Aleppo cannot be said to be purely Arab.” In other words, an independent Arab state was considered to be feasible insofar as it did not conflict with the sphere of interest in Syria developed by French railway-builders and recognized by the Franco-German agreement of February 15, 1914.[13]
Even before Turkey formally entered the war, therefore, a British army was “demonstrating” in the Shatt-el-Arab; Sir Percy Cox was coöperating with the Sheik of Koweit for the purpose of precipitating a rebellion among the Arabs of Mesopotamia, and a British representative had sown the seeds of a separatist movement in the Hedjaz. It was a short step from this, after the declaration of hostilities, to the occupation of Basra, on November 22, and of Kurna, on December 9. The close of the year 1914 saw Turkey in the unenviable position of having to choose between increasing German economic and political domination, on the one hand, and dismemberment by the Entente Allies, on the other.
The political and military situation of Turkey did not improve during the year 1915. By mid-January, the rigors of a Caucasian winter and the absence of adequate means of communication and supply brought to a standstill Enver Pasha’s drive against the Russians. Early in February, Djemal Pasha’s army, which had crossed the Sinai Peninsula in the face of seemingly insuperable obstacles, attacked the Suez Canal only to be decisively defeated by its British and French defenders. During March a secret agreement was reached between Great Britain, France, and Russia for the partition of the Ottoman Empire, including the assignment of Constantinople to the Tsar. On April 26, by the Treaty of London which brought Italy into the war, the Entente Powers bound themselves to “preserve the political balance in the Mediterranean” by recognizing the right of Italy “to receive on the division of Turkey an equal share with Great Britain, France and Russia in the basin of the Mediterranean, and more specifically in that part of it contiguous to the province of Adalia, where Italy already had obtained special rights and developed certain interests”; likewise the Allies agreed to protect the interests of Italy “in the event that the territorial inviolability of Asiatic Turkey should be sustained by the Powers” or that “only a redistribution of spheres of interest should take place.”[14] To give greater effect to these secret imperialistic agreements British troops were landed at the Dardanelles on April 28. The bargains were sealed with the blood of those heroic Britons and immortal Anzacs who went through the tortures of hell—and worse—at Gallipoli![15]
In the meantime, British activities were resumed in Mesopotamia. In March, 1915, General J. E. Nixon was ordered to Basra with renewed instructions “to secure the safety of the oilfields, pipe line and refineries of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company,” as well as with orders to consolidate his position for the purpose of “retaining complete control of lower Mesopotamia” and of making possible a subsequent advance on Bagdad. On May 29, in accordance with these instructions, the Sixth Division, under General Sir Charles Townshend, occupied Amara, a town of 12,000 lying about fifty miles north of Basra on the Tigris, seat of the Turkish provincial administration and one of the principal entrepôts of Mesopotamian trade. Beyond this point General Nixon refused to extend his operations unless assured adequate reënforcements, which were not forthcoming. Nevertheless, because of the insistence of Sir Percy Cox that some outstanding success was necessary to retain support of the Arabs, another advance was ordered in the early autumn. On September 29, General Townshend occupied Kut-el-Amara, 180 miles north of his former position.
Then followed the decision to advance on Bagdad—a move which will go down in history as one of the chief blunders of the war, as well as a conspicuous instance of the manner in which political desiderata were allowed to outweigh military considerations. The soldiers on the ground were opposed to the move. General Nixon believed it would be disastrous to advance farther than Kut without substantial reënforcements. General Townshend was convinced that “Mesopotamia was a secondary theatre of war, and on principle should be held on the defensive with a minimum force,” and he warned his superiors that his troops “were tired, and their tails were not up, but slightly down,” that they were fearful of the distance from the sea and “were going down, in consequence, with every imaginable disease.” But the statesmen at London were thinking not only of winning the war but of eliminating Germany from all future political and economic competition in the backward areas of the world. “Because of the great political and military advantages to be derived from the capture of Bagdad,” and because the “uncertainty” of the situation at the Dardanelles made apparent “the great need of a striking success in the East,” Austen Chamberlain, Secretary of State for India, telegraphed the Viceroy on October 23, 1915, that an immediate advance should be begun. Fearful of the consequences, but faithful to his trust, General Townshend began the hundred-mile march to Bagdad. Worn out, but heroic beyond words, his troops drove the Turkish forces back and, on November 22, occupied Ctesiphon, only eighteen miles from their goal. This, however, marked the high tide of Allied success in the Near East during 1915, for General Townshend was destined to reach Bagdad only as a prisoner of war.[16]