The Life of Admiral Viscount Exmouth

by Edward Osler

The number of points which required to be constantly watched (for more than two thousand miles of coast, from the Ionian Islands to Gibraltar, was in the hands of the enemy), made a considerable force necessary; and the Mediterranean fleet was at this time one of the largest ever entrusted to an Admiral. The commander-in-chief, with a principal part of the line-of-battle ships, blockaded the French fleet in Toulon, cruising off that port from the beginning of March to the end of November, and sheltering in Mahon through the three winter months. A Rear-Admiral was kept at Malta, with a sufficient force under his direction to guard the different points of the station at the upper part of the Mediterranean. Another Rear-Admiral was stationed on the south coast of Spain, to watch the movements of the enemy, and to assist the Spaniards whenever they could assemble in numbers to make a stand. A third remained at Gibraltar; and a Commodore, with a ship of the line, and frigates, watched the Gulf of Genoa, and the western coast of Italy. Frigates and small vessels were detached wherever their services became necessary.

Knowing from his own experience what could be done by the flag-officers and captains of his fleet, he was enabled to assign to all of them their respective duties in the full confidence that they would not disappoint him. He associated much with them, and was in the habit of freely communicating his ideas, as well on general subjects connected with the movements of the fleet, as on their own personal charge. By his prompt measures, and personal attention to the repairs, victualling, and storing of the fleet, and his care to obtain ample supplies of stores and provisions from England in such good time as never to be deficient in any necessary article, he kept all the ships in a high state of equipment, and afforded at the same time an example of activity and forethought which was not lost upon his officers. He was attentive to everything which affected the discipline of the crews, and was particularly strict in enforcing regulations for constant exercise at the great guns and small arms.

How perfect was the discipline of the fleet may be inferred from the fact, that with so many ships, and on a station where the enemy had the chief part of his naval force, he lost, in three years that he held the command, not a single vessel by capture: and only one, a small gun-brig, by shipwreck. It may be added, that through almost twenty years of command in war, as Commodore and Admiral, no vessel under his orders was ever taken. Something of this may be ascribed to fortune; but more must be referred to the excellence of the officers and crews; which, when the results are so uniform, is in fact also the praise of the commander. Indeed, the superiority of the Mediterranean fleet under his command was well known, and James, in his Naval History, complaining of the dearth of good seamen on other stations, laments that "so many thousands of the very best of seamen, who, under the wise regulations of Sir Edward Pellew, were daily improving themselves in the neglected art of gunnery, should be denied the power of showing their proficiency where it was the most wanted."

He was particularly anxious to keep down the expense of the fleet, and indefatigable in his exertions to economize stores of every description, which at this time were procured from home with much difficulty. When it was found that fresh water could be obtained at the mouths of the Rhone, the fleet went there, and usually completed in forty-eight hours. He was thus enabled to discharge several transports. From the size and force of that river, the fresh water floats for a considerable distance over the sea; and at first, some of the cruisers completed their water by dipping it carefully from the surface. But on the fleet anchoring in the bay, the launches, with the armed boats to protect them, were sent up the river, where the water was not at all brackish. An arrangement was eventually made with the French General, who agreed not to molest the boats, the Admiral on his part promising that none of his people should be suffered to land on the marshes, or in any way to disturb the cattle grazing there, of which there were many thousands. In the strong north-west gales, so common in the Gulf of Lyons, the ships were in the practice of furling sails every night, and driving off from Toulon, standing in-shore again under easy sail when the gale moderated. During the winter months, when he sheltered in Mahon harbour, the ships had their repairs made good, and their stores and provisions completed; the Admiral being as active in the dockyard, where he would often be found at the earliest dawn of the morning, as he showed himself when afloat. Care was taken that while the fleet thus lay in harbour, it should always be ready for an immediate start if the enemy should put to sea; and two frigates, occasionally with a line-of-battle ship, were kept off Toulon to make a daily observation of the state and movements of their force. On two occasions, the in-shore frigates particularly distinguished themselves. On the 22nd of September, 1811, the Volontaire and Perlen retreated from a division of three line-of-battle ships, and two frigates, with which they were repeatedly engaged during six hours; and saved themselves through their admirable seamanship without loss: and in the following May, the Menelaus alone, when close in-shore, was chased by several line-of-battle ships; and though her fore-topmast was nearly cut in two by a shot from the batteries, she secured it, and escaped.

Competent masters were provided for the young gentlemen of the Caledonia, who were assembled every day in the Admiral's fore-cabin, and kept closely at their studies; the Admiral himself often visiting them, and interesting himself in their progress. The French and Spanish interpreters instructed them in these languages: the flag-lieutenant superintended their navigation, and that they might perfect themselves in seamanship, a frigate-built yacht of eight or ten tons was provided, upon which they were exercised in sailing, rigging and unrigging, and every part of a practical seaman's duty. All the arrangements of the ship, with regard both to officers and men, displayed consideration for their comfort and advantage. When the Admiral thoroughly knew his officers, he confided in them in their respective situations, never teasing them with interference, or disturbing himself by unnecessary watching or anxiety, after his orders had been given. The influence which he exerted on their behalf, and his great success in obtaining promotion for them, gave every one the strongest inducement to excel. He had known the anxieties of a young man forcing his way through the service without friends; and his own recollections taught him how best to assist and encourage others.

No man could be more careful of the reputation and feelings of his officers, or more ready to suggest a plea in excuse for their errors. He had an extreme dislike to bring any of them to a court-martial, and would never resort to this painful extremity where it could with any propriety be avoided. Very few cases occurred under his command; so few, indeed, that it has even been asserted that not one took place. This it would be too much to affirm. It may be quite true that he was in no case the accuser: it certainly was his practice to prevent extreme measures wherever he could support the authority of the superior without subjecting the accused to the consequences of a public trial; and the recommendation of the commander-in chief would generally be conclusive. Still, a serious case would sometimes occur, in which it was impossible to prevent the law from taking its course. At a particular period of his command, and on a very important and critical occasion, one of his captains placed him in a position of much embarrassment, by entering without authority into a treaty with the Queen and Court of Murat. The commander-in-chief arrived very soon after, and annulled the treaty; but he spared the officer the pain of his position by charging him with the most prominent and honourable service connected with his own arrangements. In his despatches to the Admiralty on the occasion, he touches very lightly on the error, but enforces every exculpatory plea. Of the unauthorized arrangement with the enemy, he merely writes, "which I should have been glad he had never entered upon;" yet he adds, "from my conviction that he had been actuated by the purest motives, and placed in a peculiar situation. I thought it right, in acknowledging his letter, to express my approbation of his general proceedings; and in consideration of all the circumstances connected with his engagements. I gave him my sanction to," &c. He then proceeds to describe the flattering trust he had committed to this officer.

But kind as he was, he endured no relaxation of discipline, and never forgot what was due to his rank and station. His manners were formed by his character; and whenever an individual with commanding talents directs them to worthy objects, combining a proper sense of what he owes to himself with a just consideration for others, he will always, and without an effort, appear dignified and amiable: far more so in his unaffected simplicity, than the man who only assumes the character of the chief and patron, because his position requires it.

His temper was warm, the common failing of quick and active minds. No one was more conscious of it than himself; and where he feared it had given pain, he would labour to remove the impression by marked and continued attentions. In the multiplicity of cares and duties which surround a commander-in-chief, there are so many sources of irritation and disappointment, that it is no wonder the mind should sometimes be brought to that extreme point of endurance, when a small additional annoyance destroys its equanimity.

The service in the Mediterranean was one of multiplied details, individually too unimportant for history, yet calculated to influence materially the progress and result of the war. Along the eastern coast of Spain, the support and co-operation of the ships afforded that encouragement to the inhabitants which in the western provinces they derived from the presence of the British army. Even when the fortresses had fallen, and Spain had no longer a force for a rallying point in that part of the country, the guerillas, acting in concert with the fleet, were enabled to perform exploits which alarmed and distressed the invader, and kept alive the spirit of hope and resolution. Along the shores of Italy and France, the most daring and brilliant enterprises were continually achieved. Batteries and forts were stormed in open day, and prizes, sometimes in whole convoys, carried off from anchorages where they seemed to be unassailable. Looking at the evident danger of such attempts, one is astonished at the constant success which attended them, and at the generally inconsiderable loss sustained. It would be unjust to the courage of the enemy, and still more to that of the gallant officers and men who performed such services, not to state the cause of this impunity and success. It was not that the defences on shore were feebly maintained, or that their defenders were surprised and overpowered by the reckless desperation of the assailants; but that the different boat attacks were planned with a judgment, and supported by a force, which prevented effectual resistance. Officers such as Hoste, Gordon, Rowley, Maxwell, Duncan, Ussher, and indeed all, for no commander ever placed more general and deserved confidence in his officers than Sir Edward Pellew, were not men to send away their people on doubtful and desperate services. The Admiral himself, much as he admired enterprise, strongly discouraged all acts of useless daring. He was always most unwilling to risk men's lives in boat attacks, when they could not be supported by the fire from the ships; and when his own boats were necessarily detached on service, his anxiety for their safety was very great. But the men, who saw in these successes only the daring courage which obtained, but not the considerate judgment which planned them, learned to fancy themselves invincible, and would go to what might appear a death service, as if it were an excursion of pleasure. The crew of the Imperieuse, who had often distinguished themselves in these attacks, petitioned their captain to remain with them, when he had been appointed to a finer ship, and offered to prove their attachment to him by taking any two French frigates they could meet. It is right to add, that their captain, a son of the great and good Lord Duncan, submitted their petition to Sir Edward Pellew, who continued him with his faithful followers. "You are a brave nation," said Napoleon at Elba to an English captain, one of Sir Edward's officers, "so are the French; but the English are individually brave." Services like these create the individual bravery which Napoleon admired.

Still more important was the moral influence which these attacks impressed on the enemy. When the inhabitants along the southern coasts of Europe could scarcely look upon the waters without seeing an English cruiser; when they saw the apparent ease with which their strongest defences were carried; when they felt themselves at the mercy of the assailants, yet always experienced their forbearance and protection; the respect felt for an enemy so powerful and generous, taught them to desire the more earnestly their own day of deliverance from the common tyrant. And when the tremendous judgment which visited him in the Russian campaign offered the prospect of his speedy and final overthrow, every facility existed for acquainting them with the full extent of his reverses, and preparing them to avail themselves of the earliest opportunity to assert their freedom. "Affairs in these countries," says Sir Edward, in one of his letters, "look well, and promise much next summer, all over the East. Detestation, amounting to horror, is the general expression against this tyrant of the earth."