The Mutazilites took up the opposite side of this great question and said:—
(i). If man has no power to will or to do, then what is the difference between praising God and sinning against Him; between faith and infidelity; good and evil; what is the use of commands and prohibitions; rewards and punishments; promises and threats; what is the use of prophets, books, &c.
(ii). Some acts of men are bad, such as tyranny and polytheism. If these are created by God, it follows that to tyrannise and to ascribe plurality to the Deity is to render obedience. To this the Ash'aríans reply that orders are of two kinds, immediate and mediate. The former which they call "Amr-i-takwíti," is the order, "Be and it was." This comprehends all existences, and according to it whatever is ordered must come to pass. The latter they call "Amr-i-tashri'í," an order given in the Law. This comes to men through prophets and thus is to be obeyed. True obedience is to act according to that which is revealed, not according to the secret intentions of God, for that we know not.
(iii). If God decrees the acts of men, He should bear the name of that which he decrees. Thus the causer of infidelity is an infidel; of tyranny a tyrant, and so on; but to speak thus of God is blasphemy.
(iv). If infidelity is decreed by God He must wish it; but a prophet desires faith and obedience and so is opposed to God. To this the orthodox reply, that God knows by His eternal knowledge that such a man will die an infidel.
If a prophet intends by bringing the message of salvation to such an one to make God's knowledge become ignorance, he would be doing wrong; but as he does not know the secret decrees of God, his duty is to deliver his message according to the Hadís: "A prophet has only to deliver the clear message."
(v). The Mutazilites claimed as on their side all verses of the Qurán, in which the words to do, to construct, to renew, to create, &c., are applied to men. Such are the verses: "Whatever is in the heavens and in the earth is God's that He may reward those who do evil according to their deeds: and those who do good will He reward with good things." (Súra liii. 32). "Whoso shall have wrought evil shall not be recompensed but with its like: but whoso shall have done the things that are right, whether male or female and is a believer, these shall enter Paradise." (Súra xl. 43). Say: "the truth is from the Lord; let him then who will believe; and let him who will, be an infidel." (Súra xviii. 28).[[170]] "Those who add Gods to God will say: 'If God had pleased neither we nor our fathers had given Him companions.' Say: 'Verily ye follow only a conceit, ye utter lies.'" (Súra vi. 149). The Hadís is also very plain. "All good is in Thy hands and evil is not to Thee." (Al-khair kuluhu fí yadaika wash-sharru laisa 'alaika.)
The Ash'aríans have one famous text which they bring to bear against all this reasoning and evidence. It is: "This truly is a warning; and whoso willeth, taketh the way of his Lord; but will it ye shall not, unless God will it, for God is knowing, wise." (Súra lxxvi. 29, 30). To the Hadís they reply (1) that there is a difference between acquiescence in evil and decreeing it. Thus the expression "God willeth not tyranny for His servants," does not mean
that God hath not decreed it, but that tyranny is not one of His attributes: so "evil is not to Thee" means it is not an attribute of God; and (2) the Hadís must be explained in accordance with the teaching of the Qurán.
The Muslim philosophers tried to find a way out of the difficulty. Averhoes says: "We are free to act in this way or that, but our will is always determined by some exterior cause. For example, we see something which pleases us, we are drawn to it in spite of ourselves. Our will is thus bound by exterior causes. These causes exist according to a certain order of things which is founded on the general laws of nature. God alone knows before hand the necessary connection which to us is a mystery. The connection of our will with exterior causes is determined by the laws of nature. It is this which in theology we call, 'decrees and predestination.'"[[171]]