The following description of the condition of things on the decks of Admiral Ting’s flag-ship Chen-Yuen, after her fight with the two Japanese cruisers Naniwa and Yoshino, was sent to an English paper by an officer of the British squadron at Chefoo: “The slaughter has been awful, blood and human remains being scattered over the decks and guns. Three of the five men working the four-ton gun in the after-turret were blown to pieces by a six-inch shell from one of the Naniwa’s quick-firing guns, and a fourth was shot down while attempting to leave the turret. The remaining gunner stuck to his post and managed to load and fire three rounds at the Naniwa, and, one shell entering her engine room and another blowing her forebridge away, she hauled off. The Chinese Admiral awarded the plucky gunner 1000 taels. One shell struck the Chen-Yuen’s steel deck and, glancing off, passed up through the conning-tower and exploded, blowing the gunnery lieutenant to pieces and leaving his head hanging on one of the voice-pipes. Huge fragments of armor and backing had been torn from their fastenings and carried inboard, crushing a number of poor wretches into shapeless masses, even the upper part of the funnels being splashed with blood. An engineer officer (European) was sent for to repair the steam-pipe of the steering-engine, and tried to grope his way through the smoke of bursting shells and heaps of killed and wounded lying on the deck, when a shot struck his assistant and disembowelled him, covering the engineer with blood. He nevertheless managed to reach the steering-engine and repaired the pipe, for which he received a rather handsome reward from the Admiral. This engagement lasted about one and a quarter hours, when the Japanese hauled off and the Chen-Yuen made the best of her way to Wei-hai-wei, their naval station, where she arrived the next day in just the same condition as she had left the scene of action, no attempt having been made to wash away the blood or remove the dead bodies.”
A French writer, in speaking of the battle, says: “As was to be expected, recriminations were rife among the officers of the defeated fleet. Each one tried to throw the responsibility upon his neighbor, while the captains were the objects of all sorts of reproaches, some of them being charged with downright cowardice. But, if his subaltern officers failed in their duty, Admiral Ting cannot avoid the greater part of the responsibility for the defeat. During the years that he has commanded the fleet in the Gulf of Pe-chi-li he has not known how to make it a naval force worthy of the name. The fire of his ships was more than mediocre, and the Japanese, in that respect, had a vast advantage over the Chinese gunners. On the other hand, this general officer has proved himself absolutely ignorant of the general principles of naval tactics. He hastily got under way and took a formation in the shape of a closed crescent, something like a V, which no sailor before him ever dreamed of doing; his ships mutually paralyzed each other, and at a glance Admiral Ito took in the situation and overwhelmed the branches of the V, one after the other.
“Admiral Ting would only have been excusable if he had not had time to form line of battle; but in this case he must be reproached for not having lookout vessels far enough away, as he must have known that the conditions were favorable for Japanese vessels to make raids in the Gulf of Pe-chi-li and the Bay of Korea. He appears to have known nothing of the movements of his enemy, and if he took any interest in them it was purely a speculative one. Personally, Admiral Ting conducted himself with bravery; but personal courage is not the only requisite in those on whom is conferred the fearful responsibility of chief command.”
To sum up the result, the battle of the Yalu was won by guns, on fast ships-by guns alone, just as in former naval engagements; for neither torpedoes nor rams played any part. If the Japanese torpedo-boats had been present, it is quite likely that the destruction would have been greater. The Japanese guns were a little more modern than those of the Chinese.
The Japanese had among their artillery some large Canet guns and Armstrong rapid-fire guns of moderate calibre. The Chinese had Krupp and Armstrong guns of more ancient model, and it would appear that the only rapid-fire guns they possessed were of very small calibre—such as are intended for defence against torpedo-boats, of which the Japanese had none in the battle.
The Chinese fleet showed great want of concerted movement, and as a consequence a defective formation—a lack in the commanding officers of ability in manœuvring—and the crews were insufficiently drilled. When the Matsushima received such injuries that Admiral Ito was obliged to shift his flag to the Hashidate, there must have been a period of hesitation and delay among the Japanese ships, but Admiral Ting does not appear to have taken advantage of it. He either did not see it or he did not know how to profit by it.
The Japanese, on the other hand, showed admirable decision, and took the offensive with a precise and definite knowledge of what they wished to accomplish, while their Admiral, by a manœuvre worthy of all praise, concentrated the whole of his force upon each wing of his enemy’s fleet in succession. Their crews were well drilled and instructed and full of patriotic ardor, all having the same end in view—to win the battle at all costs. This is always the case when battles are won, either at sea or on land. Victory is the reward of worthy effort and methodical preparation. The Japanese have appreciated and adopted European methods, have assimilated Western ideas, and put them in practice with an ability which is the more astonishing when we consider that thirty years ago they were armed with the weapons of feudal days.
It was reserved for the last comer into the family of nations—the last to assume fellowship—to give lessons to the rest in the art of naval warfare.
No doubt, if two first-class European or American fleets had cannonaded each other for five long hours, as the Japanese and Chinese did at the Yalu, there would have been even more terrible destruction; but the deduction is nevertheless to be made, from the late battle, that the victory was won by the side which knew best how to prepare for it. The lesson it teaches to all nations is the necessity of careful preparation and sedulous training. Modern men-of-war take a long time to build and modern arms a long time to construct, while the training of an efficient ship’s company takes almost equally long, even when good and conscientious officers devote to it their best abilities.
After the date of the battle of the Yalu, events of great import and influence upon the course of the war followed each other with great rapidity, and the telegraph conveyed to the Western world reports of marches, battles and sieges, in which, however, the Japanese navy bore only a secondary but still very important part.