Fallout in the vicinity of the test sites did cause damage. In the past this damage was not great although in one Pacific test it was serious. Precautions have been increased and we may hope that future accidents will be avoided altogether. The safety record of the Atomic Energy Commission compares favorably with other enterprises of similar scale.
It seems probable that the root of the opposition to further tests is not connected with fallout. The root is deeper. The real reason against further tests is connected with our desire for disarmament and for peace.
There can be no doubt that the desire for peace is most deep, and this desire is felt by all thinking and honest people on our earth. All of us certainly hope that the catastrophe of war can be avoided. This great and universal wish for peace is the driving force behind the desire for disarmament. In the minds of most people it would be an important step toward disarmament if the testing of nuclear weapons were stopped by all nations. This belief is widely held, but it is not necessarily well-founded. In fact, there are arguments on the other side which should be considered carefully.
It is generally believed that the First World War was caused by an arms race. For some strange reason most people forget that the Second World War was brought about by a situation which could be called a race in disarmament. The peace-loving and powerful nations divested themselves of their military power. When the Nazi regime in Germany adopted a program of rapid preparation for war, the rest of the world was caught unawares. At first they did not want to accept the fact of this menace. When the danger was unmistakable, it was too late to avert a most cruel war, and almost too late to stop Hitler short of world conquest. Unfortunately, disarmament is safe only when no one wants to impose his will by force of arms upon his neighbors.
In the uneasy world in which we live today no reasonable person will advocate unilateral disarmament. What people hope is that all sides will agree to reduce their military power and thereby contribute to a more peaceful atmosphere. The elimination of tests has appeared possible and proper for two reasons. One is that tests are conspicuous, and therefore it is believed that we can check whether or not testing has actually been stopped by everyone. The second reason is that nuclear explosives already represent such terrifying power that further tests appear useless and irrational. These arguments are simple and almost universally accepted. They are based on misconceptions.
A nuclear explosion is a violent event, but in the great expanses of our globe such tests can be effectively hidden if appropriate care is taken to hide them. There can be no doubt that this is possible. The question is only how much it costs to hide a test and how big is the explosion that can be carried out in secret for a certain amount of expenditure.
If an agreement were made to discontinue the tests, the United States would surely keep such an agreement. The very social and political structure of our country excludes the possibility that many people would collaborate in breaking an international undertaking. Whether Russia would or would not keep such an agreement would depend on the ingenuity of the Russians, on their willingness to make economic sacrifices, and on their honesty. Of these three factors we can have a firm opinion about the first. The Russians are certainly ingenious enough to devise secret methods of testing. As to the other questions, whether the Russians will want to invest the effort and whether they will be bound by their word, we feel that each man is entitled to his own opinion. According to past experience, an agreement to stop tests may well be followed by secret and successful tests behind the iron curtain.
In a more general way we may ask the question: Is it wise to make agreements which honesty will respect, but dishonesty can circumvent? Shall we put a free, democratic government at a disadvantage compared to the absolute power of a dictatorship? Shall we introduce prohibition in a new form, just to give rise to bootlegging on a much greater scale? It is almost certain that in the competition between prohibition and bootlegging, the bootlegger will win.
All of these arguments, however, would become irrelevant if it were true that further testing would not accomplish any further desirable result. It has been said and often repeated that we now possess adequate nuclear explosives to wipe out the cities of any enemy. What more do we need?
Our main purpose in further experimentation with nuclear bombs is not, of course, to make city-busters more horrible. We would prefer not to have to use our nuclear weapons at all. We keep them as a counterthreat against the danger that we ourselves should be subjected to a devastating attack. To understand what we are actually trying to do in the tests, we have to take a closer look at some military problems.